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because a state

held that 65 pounds of marijuana taken from resp's luggage after
an airport stop based on a "drug courier profile" were
inadmissible.
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Two Dade County narcotics officers
stopped resp after he left an airJ.ine ticket counter in the Miami
International Airport.

Their stop was based on a

"~ruq

courier

profile" which Dade County officers adapted from the DEA profile
used in United States v. Mendenhall, 446
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this case four of resp's characteristics matched the profiJ.e:
He had two heavy American
standard

brand)~

cash~

luggage bags (the smuggJer's

(2) He appeared nervous and as if he might be

looking for police
York with

~ourister

(1)

officers~

(3) He

pai~

for his ticket to New

(4) He wrote only the name "Holt" on the baggage

rather than adding his address.

~he

officers

i~entified

themselves and asked resp if he had a moment to talk and he said
yes.

~hey

asked to see his plane ticket and some other

identification and he complied.

The ticket was also in the name

"Holt" whiJ.e his driver's license identjfied him as "Mark Rover."
Asked about the discrepancv, resp said that he
the reservation for him.

ha~

He was apparentJy not

a friend make

ask~~

why he ?Ut

"Holt" on his bags.
The officers told resp that they suspected he was
transportino narcotics.

Without returning his Plane ticket, they

asked him to accompanv them to a nearby room.
them.

One of the officers, without asking,

He accompanied

retrieve~

resp's bags

and brought them to the room, whi.ch was a large closet with a
small desk and two cha5rs.

It was about fnrtv feet from the spot

where the officers ap?roached resp.
In the room the officers asked whether he would open his
suitcases.

An officer testified that resp then took a kev and

opened one of the suitcases.

(Resp

testifie~

that he had

~mptied

~---------------------his
pockets at the officers' request and that they opened the

suitcase.)

The other suitcase had a combination lock.

Resp said

he did not know the combination, but agreed to let the officers
open it.

One of them opened it with the aid of a screwdriver.

Marijuana was found in both bags.

-

·~

.
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Resp lost a motion to suppress the marijuana.

J

The court

found that resp had consenten to the searches . . As a sepatate
ground, it concluded that there was no time to obtain a search
warrant before resp's plane left.

A panel of the Florida Court

of Appeals for the Third District affirmed that decision.

The

panel consisted of two senior iunges and a dissenting active
judge.

The Florina Court of Appeals for the

~hird

met en bane and unanimously reversed the panel.
389 So.2d 1007

District then

Royer v. State,

(1980).

The en bane court rejected the trial court's conclusion that
resp had voluntarilv consented to the search.

The court first

found that resp was involuntarilv confined at the time the
suitcases were openec since he had been told he was suspected of
transporting narcotics, taken to a small room, and the police had
~he

both his ticket and luggage.

no probable cause for the arrest.

court then found that there was
It stated that "a mere

similar{ty with the contents of a drug courier profile is
insufficient even to constitute the articulable suspicion
required for a Terry stop.

E.g., Reid v. Georgia ... ;contra

United States v. Mendenhall, supra (opinion of Powell, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the iudgment) ."
1019.

~he

389 So.2d at

court went on to say that even were the rule

otherwise, no probable cause existed in this case despite the
discrepancy between the name on resp's bag and ticket and the
name on his driver's license.

Therefore the court concluded that

the resp's consent was tainted and invalid.

~he

court summarily

rejected the trial court's other ground--that exigent
circumstances justified the search--since exigent circumstances
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,

justify a failure to obtain a warrant but do not take the pJace
of probable cause.
~he

Florida Supreme r.ourt declined to review the en

bane decision.
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this case is governed by
Mendenhall.

Noting the "contra" signal preceding the appellate

court's citation of Mendenhall quoted above, petr argues that
stops based on similarity to a "drug courier profile" are
permissible.

As in Mendenhall the resp was found upon

questioning to be travelling under a different name and
accompanjed the officers to a room for further questjoning
without protest.

~

t~id v. Georgia,
confusio~ is~conciliable.

Petr contends
created

448 U.S. 438 (1980),
In Reid the Court held

that a Georgia court erred in concluding that a seizure based on
a drug courier profile was lawful.

On remand from Reid, petr

notes that the Georgia court found the seized drugs admissible
because the defendants in that case had voluntarily consented to
a search.

Resp consented in this case as weJ.l, petr argues, and

therefore the marijuana should have been found admissible.
Moreover, petr argues, the Third District of the Florida
Court of Appeals has repeatedly reversed trial court admissions
of drugs seized in the Miami International Airport.

Since Miami

is a major narcotics terminal, efforts to slow the flow of drugs
have been seriously disrupted.

Because Mendenhall and Reid have

not fully resolved matters, petr contends that the Court should
hear this case and make clear that stops based on similarity to a
"drug courier profile" are permissible.

-

. ,., .
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Resp argues that the opinion below is consistent with
Mendenhall.

The "contra" citation was mere dicta because the

court below did not base its decision on the unlawfulness of the
stop.

Instead the opinion rests on the conclusion that resp had

been ariested without probable cause at the time he consented to
the search.

Resp notes that the officer stated at the

suppression hearing that he did not have probable cause to arrest
resp until he opened the suitcases.

Mendenhall

is

distinguishable because resp was told he was suspected of
carrying drugs and the officers had his plane ticket and his
luggage.

Furthermore, in Mendenhall the defendant was

affirmatively told that she could withhold her consent to be
searched.

Resp could not have reasonably thought he was free to

leave.
DISCUSSION: The

Court has repeatedly declined to review

opinions of the Third District of the Florida Court of Appeals
suppressing the fruits of airport searches, most recentlv in
Florida v. Harrison, No. 80-1449, cert. denied 5/4/81 (CJ and HAB
would grant; WHR voted off the record to grant).

Unlike

Harrison, the opinion
below was cJ.early based on federal law and
..____ _ _ _ _ _ _.--.::::::> <!!> "" <:::>~

:or=>

t

is not a candidate for remand under California v. Krivda, 409

u.s.

33

(1972).

Interpretation of of Mendenhall is difficult, in part
because only Justice Rehnquist joined the part of Justice
Stewart's opinion concerning whether the defendant

---

was ~~~

----------------------

by the officers who stopped her in the airport terminal based on
a drug courier profile.

Justice Powell, joined by the Chief

Justice and Justice Blackmun, decided that the issue should not
be reached because the courts below had not reached it.

446

u.s.

-

at 443.
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They again neclined to reach the issue in Reid.

448

U.S. at 443.
This case does not squarely present the issue of whether the
airport stop based on the "drug~---------------courier profile" was a seizure.

---.

As resp argues, the holding below was based on the conclusion
that resp han been

a; re-..s ;_~

consented to the search.

wi tho~~ause at the ti_me he

Mendenhall is reasonably distinguished

because the police had resp's plane ticket and luggage and did
not tell him he could withhold his consent.

The "contra" signal

and the lower court's statement that mere similarity to a nruq
courier profile does not justify a stop amount to either an
alternative holding or mere dicta.

Therefore, although this case

is worthy of discussion, it may not be an appropriate case for
resolving the unsettled questions from Mendenhall and Reid.

There is a response.

7/27/81

Wright

Op at 389 So.2d 1007
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Reciroulated: ____________

Justice Rehnquist, dissenting

I find it all but inexplicable that four Members of the
Court are unwilling to grant certiorari to review a judgment of
the Florida District Court of Appeal which, in my opinion, is
virtually indistinguishable from our recent decision in United
States v. Mendenhall, 446

u.s.

544 (1980), in which a majority of

this Court held that there was probable cause to arrest a
defendant in an airport search case.

Since there is no question

that the Florida District Court of Appeal based its decision to
suppress the 65 pounds of marijuana in respondent's suitcases
searched at the airport upon federal constitutional grounds, and
since the state of Florida is the petitioner in this case, the
....

decision of the District Court of Appeal brings into prospect a
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new facet of the "Balkanization" of a nation which the founders
set out to prevent in the commercial sense when they adopted the
United States Constitution.

Because of federal constitutional

principles enunciated by the Florida District Court of Appeal,
the State of Florida is prohibited from using 65 pounds of
marijuana found in respondent's suitcase at his trial for
smuggling drugs.

It has done this virtually in the teeth of our

recent decision in United States v. Mendenhall, supra, and not
with any desire to be more solicitous of drug smugglers who are
apprehended in Florida under the Florida constitution than drug
smugglers apprehended elsewhere in the United States.

It is

doubtless true that this Court cannot review every case which a
majority may believe to be wrongly decided by a state court or a
lower federal court, but given the dimensions of the drug problem
in this country and the well known fact that the Miami area is a
principle point of entry for illicit drugs smuggled from South
America, I do not see by what rational calculus it can fail to
grant certiorari in this case.

- 3 -

The drug-courier profile search is not unfamiliar to this
Court.

See United States v. Mendenhall, supra, Reid v. Georgia,

448 u.s. 438 {1980).

Because the Fourth Amendment analysis

undertaken by the Florida District court of Appeal in this case
departs from the principles adopted by a majority of this Court
in Mendenhall, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.
The facts in this case bear a strong resemblance to those we
examined in Mendenhall.

Officers Johnson and Magdelena of the

Narcotics Investigation Section of the Dade County Public Safety
Department were on duty at Miami International Airport, which is
known as a point from which imported illicit drugs are
transported by couriers on commercial airlines to other cities. 1
As was the case in Mendenhall, 446 u.s., at 547 & n. 1, Johnson
and Magdelena were trained in the use of the drug-courier
profile, an abstract of characteristics found in practice to be
typical of persons carrying illicit drugs.

The officers observed

1 see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 u.s. 544, 562

{1980) {POWELL, J.).
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respondent as he was walking across the concourse of the airport
toward a ticket counter, carrying two heavily-laden suitcases.
Nervous in appearance, respondent was looking around at other
persons as if he were looking for police officers.

Respondent

paid for his ticket to New York, a "target" city, in cash, as is
characteristic of the smuggler.

Rather than filling out his full

name, address, and phone number on the baggage tags furnished by
the airline as passengers are typically instructed to do,
respondent merely wrote the words "H6lt" and "LaGuardia" on each
tag.
The officers approached respondent as he left the ticket
counter, identified themselves as police officers, and asked
respondent if he had a moment to talk.

After he answered in the

affirmative, the officers asked respondent to show them his
airline ticket and some identification.

Although his ticket bore

the name "Holt," respondent's driver's license was in the name of
"Mark Royer."

When asked to explain this discrepancy, respondent

stated that a friend had made the reservation in the name of

- 5 -

"Holt."

When respondent became more nervous, the officers

explained that they were narcotics investigators and had reason
to suspect that he was transporting illicit drugs.

The officers

then asked respondent to accompany them to a small room that was
adjacent to the concourse so as to be away from the "general
population of the Airport."
feet away.

This room was no .more than forty

The officers retrieved the suitcases respondent had

checked with the airline and brought them to the small room.
Once inside the room, respondent was asked whether he would
consent to a search of his suitcases.

Respondent produced a key

out of his pocket and opened one of the suitcases, but explained
that he did not know the combination to the other one.

Officer

Johnson then asked respondent if he had any objection to the
officers opening the second suitcase.
go ahead."

Respondent answered, "No,

Together, the suitcases contained 65 lbs. of

marijuana.
The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the
seizure of the marijuana, expressly finding that respondent had

- 6 -

consented to the search of his suitcases.
District Court of Appeal affirmed.
reversed.

A panel of the

That court en bane, however,

The en bane court held that respondent was "arrested"

when he was escorted to the small room.

Despite the fact that

respondent had apparently agreed to accompany the officers to the
small room, the court explained that the officers had taken
respondent's plane ticket and luggage, and that the officers had
previously informed him that they had reason to suspect that he
was transporting narcotics.

Until the suitcases were opened, the

court reasoned, the officers did not have probable cause to
arrest respondent since similarity with the drug-courier profile
is insufficient to establish probable cause.

The consent was

thus "tainted" by an illegal arrest, and since petitioner was
unable to establish proof of "any break in the chain of
illegality, [respondent's] consent must be deemed involuntary and
thus invalid as a matter of law."
The en bane court distinguished our decision in Mendenhall
on the ground that the respondent here was not informed that he

- 7 could refuse to consent to the search.

The en bane court also

concluded that conformity with the drug-courier profile, "without
more," is insufficient in any case to establish reasonable
suspicion justifying a limited seizure or "stop" under Terry v.
Ohio, 392

u.s.

1 (1968).

According to the en bane court, the

implication of suspicion based upon the profile's characteristics
is an example of "the fallacy of the undistributed middle," 2
because the profile's characteristics are at least as consistent
with innocence as they are with narcotics smuggling.
The en bane court's analysis3 is inconsistent with a

2The "fallacy of the undistributed middle" is a term used
in formal logic to explain the invalidity of a syllogism where
the middle term, the one which shows the relationship between the
premises and the conclusion, does not refer to all members of the
class. See L.S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic 88
(1948)~ N. Simco & G. James, Elementary Logic 155-156, 160-161
(1954). Applied to the facts of this case, we have the following
invalid sylogism:
All drug couriers exhibit some of the profile's
characteristics~

Mark Royer exhibits some of the characteristics~
Therefore, Mark Royer is a drug courier.
The middle term, exhibition of the profile's
characteristics, is undistributed because not all persons who
exhibit the characteristics are drug couriers.
3The District Court of Appeal's decision was clearly based
on federal constitutional grounds. Florida courts treat search
and seizure issues identically under the state and federal
constitutions. Hetland v. State, 366 So.2d 831, 836
Footnote continued on next page.
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majority of this Court's Members who joined either the opinion of
JUSTICE STEWART or the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL in Mendenhall.
Under JUSTICE STEWART's analysis in Mendenhall, the officers
in this case did not seize 4 respondent when they approached him
in an open airport concourse, identified themselves as police
officers, and asked respondent if he had a moment to talk.

The

officers requested, but did not demand to see respondent's ticket
and identification.

Since "nothing in the record suggests that

the respondent had any objective reason to believe that [he] was
not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on
[his] way," id., at 555, the officers' initial approach did not
constitute a seizure.

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979}, aff'd, 387 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1980}.
4 "[A] person has been 'seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that
might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt
to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of
the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled." 446 u.s., at 554.
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In Mendenhall, JUSTICE POWELL assumed that the agents had
seized the respondent when they approached her, but concluded
that since the agents had reasonable suspicion that the
respondent was engaging in criminal activity, the agents did not
violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping her for routine
questioning.

Id., at 560.

In determining the reasonableness of

a stop, a court must consider "(i) the public interest served by
the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and
(iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer
relied in light of his knowledge and experience."

Id., at 561.

As in Mendenhall, "the public has a compelling interest in
detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal
profit."

Ibid.

Second, as in Mendenhall, the intrusion in the

instant case was "quite modest."

The respondent was not

physically restrained, the agents did not display weapons, and
the questioning was brief.

Finally, since law enforcement

officers are "able to perceive and articulate meaning in given
conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained

-

observer,"

Brown v. Texas, 443

~u

-

u.s.

47, 52 n.2 (1979}, the

officers had reasonable suspicion, based upon their observation
of objective factors, to believe that respondent was trafficking
in illicit drugs.

In the instant case, respondent exhibited the

behavior of a suspect who appeared to be evading police contact 5 ,
he purchased a ticket with cash to a target city, he carried
heavily-laden suitcases, and failed to fill out his full name and
address on his baggage tags as airlines customarily instruct
their passengers to do.

This is sufficient to conclude that the

officers had reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaging in
criminal activity. 6

5 In this regard, the District Court of Appeal concluded
that since police officers are not psychiatrists, they are unable
to distinguish between persons who are attempting to evade police
contact and those who are simply nervous. This Court, however,
has repeatedly emphasized that a trained police officer may draw
inferences and make deductions that may elude any untrained
person observing the same conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Cortez, 449 u.s. 411, 418 (1981}. We have noted as an example
the behavior of a suspect who appears to the officer to be
evading police contact. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall,
supra, at 564; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 u.s. 884-85
(1975}. The Florida court's criticism of what obviously was good
police work is entirely unjustified under our decisions.
6The Florida court's conclusion that an approach based
solely on the suspect's conformance with the drug-courier profile
Footnote continued on next page.

-
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Under either approach, the next step in the analysis is to
determine whether respondent's consent to accompany the officers
to the small room was in fact voluntary or was the product of
coercion, and thus tantamount to a "seizure" or an "arrest."

As

in Mendenhall, respondent was not told that he had to go to the
office, but was simply asked, after a brief period of
questioning, if he would accompany the officers to the room.
There were neither threats nor any show of force.

Respondent was

informed as to why the officers wished to question him briefly.
Although the officers here did not return respondent's ticket
prior to their request, I do not see how this alone can render
the consent ineffective under the circumstances, given the
absence of any objective indicia of coercion.

It means that

respondent would have to request that the officers return his

is inherently unreasonable is thus contrary to the views of five
Members of this Court. Reid v. Georgia, 448 u.s. 438 (1980), is
not to the contrary. Reid holds only that under the
circumstances in that case, the approaching officers did not have
reasonable suspicion in order to effect a lawful seizure. Reid
left open the question as to whether a seizure in fact had taken
place. Id., at 443 (POWELL, J., concurring).

-

~~

-

ticket before he could enplane for New York: it says absolutely
nothing as to whether respondent would have been forcibly
restrained had he refused to accompany the officers.

Mere

nonreturn of the tickets does not transform an apparent consent
into an arrest.
This phase of police-citizen encounter in this case
constrasts sharply with the circumstances we examined in Dunaway
v. New York, 440

u.s.

200 (1979).

In that case, police officers

deliberately sought out the suspect at a neighbor's

~ouse

and,

with a show of force, brought the suspect to police headquarters
in a police car, placed him in an interrogation room, and
questioned him extensively after giving him a Miranda warning.
Unlike Dunaway, respondent in the instant case was, after brief
questioning, asked to cooperate by accompanying the officers to a
room, no more than forty feet away, so that the questioning could
proceed out of the view of the general public.

Continuing the

questioning on the spot under these circumstances may well be

-

.l..l

-

more coercive and intrusive than asking respondent to move to a
private room.
The next stage of the Mendenhall analysis is to determine
whether, once inside the small room, respondent consented to the
search.

In this regard, respondent was most cooperative and did

not offer even a hint of resistance.
suitcase and opened it himself.

He produced the key to one

After he explained that he did

not know the combination to the other suitcase, respondent stated
that he had no objection to the officers opening it themselves.
Although respondent was not informed that he had a right to
refuse to consent to the search, we have held that "proof of
knowledge of a right to refuse [is not] the sine qua non of an
effective consent to a search."

u.s.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412

218, 234 (1973).
Other than the fact that the room was small, the District

Court of Appeal pointed to nothing in the record that would
indicate that respondent's consent to the search was involuntary.
In this regard, the en bane court relied on the size of the room

-

L4

-

to conclude that the consent was the product of an illegal
arrest.

If respondent consented to accompany the officers to the

small room, as he did, it does not follow that he was "arrested"
upon entering the room merely because the room itself was small.
Logical analysis would focus on whether the size of the room
would render the subsequent consent to the search of the luggage
involuntary.

There is nothing to indicate that respondent's

resistance to was overborne by the size of the room.

Respondent

simply continued to cooperate with the officers as he had from
the beginning of the encounter.
During the entire encounter, respondent cooperated with each
and every request the officers made.

The Florida District Court

of Appeal apparently would have it as a rule of law that a drugcourier profile suspect can guarantee suppression of any
contraband found on his person or in his luggage simply by
cooperating at every step with the investigating officers.
Although this rule would be easily applied, it cannot substitute

-

L~

-

for the analysis of each step of the encounter undertaken by this
Court in Mendenhall.
In a similar fashion, the Florida court fashioned a "brightline" rule with regard to the profile itself, when it concluded
that conformity with the profile, "without more," is insufficient
to establish reasonable suspicion that would justify the limited
Terry-stop.

This Court has never held that or anything like it,

and the five members of the Court who voted for the result in
Mendenhall, all but explicitly rejected such a rule.

Although

conformity with certain aspects of the profile does not
automatically create "particularized suspicion" to justify an
investigatory stop, see Reid v. Georgia, supra, our decision in
Mendenhall, made it clear that the officer is entitled to assess
the totality of the circumstances in the light of his experience.
In order to justify an investigatory stop, the officer need only
demonstrate a particularized suspicion that the individual is
engaged in wrongdoing, based upon the officer's objective
observations and his "consideration of the modes or patterns of
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operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers."

United States v.

Cortez, 449 u.s. at 418.
This process is amenable neither to bright-line rules nor to
the Florida court's invocation of the "fallacy of the
undistributed middle."

If this rule of formal logic were applied

to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally, the State would have
to show that all persons who exhibit the suspicious
characteristics are criminals, before any police-citizen
encounter could be justified. 7

But we have held in Cortez that

the process of ascertaining particularized suspicion "does not
deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.

Long before

the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical
people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human
behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same--and

7see ante, at ---n.2. Not only would the concepts of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause be invalidated by the
"fallacy of the undistributed middle" were that rule of formal
logic incorporated as a constitutional principle, but proof of
factual guilt in most cases would be rendered impossible.
'

- 17 so are law enforcement officers.

Finally, the evidence thus

collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement."

Id., at 418.

If respondent were now in some other nation, and the State
of Florida or the United States were obligated to extradite him
in order to bring him back to the United States for trial on the
offense with which he is charged in this case, we would have a
different case.

That foreign nation might well refuse to

extradite him because of its feeling that producing marijuana,
hashish, or cocaine for example was a vital ingredient of its
economy, and it was perfectly willing to allow the drug raised
and used locally and smuggled into the United States.

But here

Florida itself seeks to prosecute, and when its courts so clearly
misapply the Constitution of the United States which binds all
fifty states into one union, I think its decision suppressing the
evidence obtained in this case calls for plenary review by this
Court under any reasonable standard which we choose to use in the
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administration of our discretionary jurisdiction.
dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case.

I therefore
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 12, 1981

No. 80-2146

Florida v. Royer

Dear Bill,
Based on your dissent from denial of certiorari in
the referenced case, I am now persuaded to vote to grant
cert.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

November 12, 1981

Re: No. 80-2146 - Florida v. Royer
Dear Bill:
I voted to grant ·certiorari in this case before, and I
adhere to that vote.
I have felt that the Florida District
Court of Appeal has been flouting this Court's decisions and
creating a real problem in drug enforcement in the Miami area.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

tlovember 12, 1981

80-2146 Florida v. Royer

near Bill:
seizure,
grant.

I

As this case involve~ an "arrest" rather than a
have been hesitant to join you in voting to

Your opinion persuades me, however, that the
practical effect wi.ll be the same: the police may not rely
upon the "drug profile" to stop drug couriers even when
reasonable suspicion justifies it.
Accordingly, I join your dissent, and also will
vote to grant.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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Memorandum for the File
Subject:

80-2416, Florida v. Royer

This is the Florida "airport search case" that we were
uncertain about taking, and after reading the briefs I rather
think it may have been a mistake to grant it.
In brief summary, the facts (as stated in the en bane
opinion of the Florida Court of Appeals) were as follows:
Two State Narcotics Officers (Johnson and one other) spotted
respondent in the Miami airport, and made the following
observations:
Johnson said that these were the facts

that

(a) the defendant was carrying American Tourister
baggage of a type which "seemed to be standard brand
for marijuana smuggling;"

(b) he was "nervous in

appearance, looking around at other persons as though
he might be looking for possible police officers;"
(c) he paid for the ticket to New York in cash (and
therefore without the necessity of showing identification from a roll of small-denomination bills; and
(d) rather than filling out a full name, address, and
phone number on the baggage tags furnished by National,
he wrote only the words "Holt" and LaGuardia" on each
of them.

Florida v. Royer
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As the State prevailed in the trial court, the Court of
Appeals accepted Johnson's view of the facts.

The agents

believed that respondent's conduct was consistent with the
"drug courier profile", developed by Federal officers and
generally relied upon.
Accordingly the agents thought there was "reasonable
suspicion", they stopped respondent as he left the ticket
counter, identified themselves, and asked if respondent had
a moment to talk.

Respondent replied affirmatively, and also

agreed to show his airline ticket.

The ticket bore the name

"Holt", but when he also consented to show his driver's license,
the name thereon was "Mark Royer".

Respondent explained the

discrepancy by saying that a friend had made the reservation in
the name of "Holt".
The officers then told respondent that they were Narcotics
Investigators, and that they suspected respondent was transporting
narcotics.

Respondent agreed to accompany the officers some 40

feet to a room in the Concourse used as the stewardesses lounge.
The officers also used a ''large storage closet"
several chairs) to which they took suspects.

(with a table and

Without any prior

consent, the officers retrieved the suitcases, and with respondent's
consent opened one of them with a key provided.

The second one haa

Florida v. Royer
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a combination, respondent denied that he knew the combination,
but agreed to its being forced open.
of marijuana.

It contained 60 pounds

Respondent thereupon was arrested.

At the suppression hearing, Johnst on testified as above
stated.

Respondent claimed that he had agreed to talk, to show

his ticket and driver's license, and had accompanied the
officers to the office only because he felt he had no choice.
They were "police officers", and "I felt that's what I had to do".

Trial Court
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, stating:
"[T]he Court believes that the consent was freely
and voluntarily given. By the same token, I think
under circumstances such as this where the police
officers are in the airport and are surveilling, as
testified to by the officer, with a specific profile
that they are following, that the officer doesn't
have the time to run out and get a search warrant
because the plane is going to take off.
If there
is going to be anything occurring it's going to
occur long before they can take any type of action.
So it's a denial on dual grounds. Might as well
get it tested whether it's reasonable or unreasonable
because, I assume you are taking an appeal."

4.

Florida v. Royer

Florida Court of Appeals ~~
A panel, one dissent, of the Florida District Court of
Appeals affirmed.

But on rehearing en bane, the panel decision

was reversed, and the charges against respondent were ordered
dismissed.
The Court held (i) that respondent had been unlawfully
restrained (seized) within the interrogation room, and that his
"silent consent" to the search of his suitcase was involuntary;

(ii)

that there was no probable cause, and "and for all practical
purposes, respondent had been placed under arrest when the
alleged consent was given";

(iii) the consent was "tainted and

invalid"; and (iv) the claim of exigent circumstances was
irrelevant because this doctrine applies only to excuse the

--------

absence of a warrant, and does not justify arrest without

)

probable cause.

r-----

It is particularly relevant to note the following statement

by the Court of Appeals:
"Since we hold that probable cause was required in
this case and did not exist, we need not decide
whether on this ground there was founded suspicion
to justify stopping respondent"
p. 43).

(Supplemental Appendix,

5.

Florida v. Royer

State's

A~ument

The State's principal argument is that

~

~e

police act

in "good faith'' - as seems to be conceded in this case - the
exclusionary rule is not applicable.
Byron's view that

a 1~ood

faith

It relies heavily on

exceptio~~ should

be adopted,

a view Byron expressed at some length in his separate opinion
in Stone v. Powell.

In this case, Johns . on testified that the

real deterrent against misconduct (unlawful arrest) by police
officers is the ever present threat of a civil suit for damages,
not the exclusionary rule.
The State also relies on Justice Stewart's view in Mendenhall
that a "stop" is valid when objectively, a reasonable person could
conclude that he was free to walk away."

Finally, the State

argues that respondent freely consented to the search.
I note here that respondent, in his brief, dismisses the
"good faith'' issue as not having been presented below.

The State

has not yet filed a reply brief, but the opinion below did not
address this issue.

Florida v. Royer
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SG' s Arguments

In an amicus brief, the SG emphasizes the importance of
the case and advances alternative arguments.

On the basis of

a preliminary reading, it i~?~ntirely clear to me which is the
SG's principal argument.
His basic argument appears to be that the Florida court
~

failed to distinguish seizures that subject to the Fourth

"'

Amendment from "consensual police - citizen contacts that do
not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all".

Putting it

differently, "an arrest requiring probable cause is to be
distinguished from an investigative detention by reference to
the purpose and duration of the detention, as well as the
procedures which accompany it."

(p. 11)

Thus, as I understand it, the SG is agreeing with my
analysis in Mendenhall where I concluded that there was a
"seizure"

(as there was no probable cause) but that for pur-

poses of investigation there may be a brief seizure on the
basis of reasonable suspicion.

Florida v. Royer
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The SG made an alternative argument that there was no
unlawful seizure at all, relying on Justice Stewart's opinion
in Mendenhall to the effect that even without reasonable
suspicion, police may stop a person for a brief interrogation,
and that following such interrogation - in this case - there was
consent to go to the private room, and consent thereafter to
open the suitcase (as in

M~ndenhall).

See SG's brief p. 18 et seq./

particularly p. 21, quoting Justice Stewart.

* * *
Although I am not at rest in this case, I am inclined to
think - as I did in Mendenhall - that there was a seizure but
that there was reasonable suspicion justifying it; and thereafter,
there was consent : r See my opinion in Mendenhall (446
et seq.).

u.s.

at 560

~
)

I relied on Terry v. Ohio, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,

1\

arguing that "a reasonable investigative stop does not offend the
Fourth Amendment", and that reasonableness turns on the facts of
each case.

Our cases - as I mentioned - emphasize

the public

Florida v. Royer
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interest served by the seizure, the nature and scope of the
intrusion, and the objective facts upon which the law
enforcement officers relied in light of their knowledge and
expertise.
I must agree that the court's per curiam in Reid v. Georgia
(decided subsequently to tp Mendenhall, and in which I dissented)
lends support to respondent's position.

On the other hand, a

great deal of language in Justige Stevens' more re ~t ~

~
/

-

Michigan v. Summers, decided June 22, 1981 (101

s.Ct. 2567).

"'

In that case, the Court held that where there was a warrant to

the front

had searched

·II

'•

In the

course of his opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized at length - citing
Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, that "some seizures are
significantly less intrusive than an arrest", that "special
enforcement problems" such as in Brignoni-Ponce" may justify the
brief stopping of vehicles near the border.
said:

Justice Stevens then

9.

Florida v. Royer
"These cases recognize that some seizures admittedly

covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited
intrusions on the personal security of those detained
and are justified by such substantial law enforcement
interests that they may be made on less than probable
cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for
suspecting criminal activity.

In these cases, as in

Dunaway, the Court was applying the ultimate standard of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment.

+hey

are consistent with the general rule that every arrest,
and every seizure having the essential attributes of a
formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported
by probable cause.

But they demonstrate that the

exception for limited intrusions that may be justified
by special law enforcement interests is not confined to
the monentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a
frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams.

Therefore,

in order to decide whether this case is controlled by the
general rule, it is necessary to examine both the character
of the official intrusion and its justification."

------~~ --------

3,~

IZ.Je__
Questions

~~w.~.

Presented ~ !;J;-~:Ir-zl.-t..... ~

~~l.tt.e-f ~.L'Aqr/p2.2.
(1) Was there an "arrest," or a "seizure" short of a ~ '
arrest, on the facts of the present case?
(2) Does behavior consistent with the "drug courier profile" constitute probable cause to justify an arrest, or articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a more limited seizure?

s~JJEA ?h~-)0/.$-
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I.
A.

Background

The Drug Courier Profile
During the early 1970s, when air piracy was a major

problem, the Federal Aviation Administration and the commercial
airlines developed a list of characteristics common to most skyjackers, and used this "profile" to identify potential skyjackers
before they boarded the plane. 1

In 1974, a Detroit DEA agent

developed a similar list of characteristics common to most drug
couriers arrested in the Detroit airport.

Versions of this "drug

courier profile" are now used in airports throughout the country
to help identify passengers who might be likely to be carrying
drugs.

Items on a list might include, for example, arrival or

departure from or to a narcotics "source" or "use" city,

~

unusual~

~ki

nervousness, carrying little or no baggage, purchasing airline

tickets with cash, and making a telephone call immediately after
deplaning.
When police discover a person fulfilling several of the
criteria on the list, they might decide to approach him/her and
ask to see his/her airline ticket and some other identification.
Their suspicions will be reinforced if the passenger is travelling under an alias, has an unusual itinerary (such as a one-way
ticket, or a rapid turnaround in a distant city), or has not
checked any baggage.

In such cases, the police might request

1 see, ~' United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 668-70 (CA2),
c~. ~ed, 409 u.s. 991 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F.
Su pp. 1 0 7 7 , 1 0 8 4 , 1 0 8 6 (E . D. N. Y. 19 71) .

'"'":1.1·

~
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permission to search the passenger.

In most cases, the passenger

consents to the search, and many searches reveal illegal drugs.

B.

~~-

~~~

~ ~ ~~jzM.i.d·

Facts
The TC

~ led

the present case.

to make any explicit factual findings in

Since the state prevailed at trial, the appel-

late judges relied on the state's evidence in the record for
their statements of the facts.
undisputed. 2

----

,..--

The

-

p~ y

J act§ are essentially

Secondary facts may become relevant, however, de-

pending on the Court's approach to the case, and the lack of factual findings may become troublesome.

What follows is a summary

71u..

of the undisputed facts.

~~

Two Dade County plainsclothes detectives, Officers John- ~f:>
son and Magdalena, were on duty at the Miami airport looking for
drug couriers.

They first observed resp as he crossed the con-

J

~

course toward the National Airlines ticket counter with two

~ he ~y laden suitcases manufactured by American Tourister.

He

wa~nervous in appearance, looking around at other persons as
though he might be looking for possibly police officers."
App, at 29A (quoted by CA en bane, 389 So.2d, at 1016).

Jt
Johnson

declared he could distinguish resp's behavior from the type of

2There were only two witnesses at the suppression hearing: the
defendant and one of the arresting officers. Their testimony
conflicts on only one, minor point. See 389 So.2d, at 1009 n.3
(CA panel majority).
(The opinions of the lowe r-cotrr t s - ar e reproduced in the petn app in typescript, but the typing is poor,
and the opinions are difficult to read. I have therefore followed the parties' practice and cited to the published version of tf
I attach a copy for your convenience.)
~
~

'

\':

...
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cV

nervousness shown by "white knuckle flyers."

Resp paid for his

ticket to New York 3 in cash from a roll of small denomination
bills.
@

On the adhesive baggage tags furnished by the airline, he

wrote only "Holt" and "LaGuardia" (his destination) rather than a
full name, address, and telephone number.

These actions were

consistent with the officers' drug courier profile.
The officers approached resp as he left the ticket
counter, identified themselves, and asked if he had a moment to
talk.

He replied affirmatively.

They asked to see his airline

The ~was

ticket, and he showed it to them.

·~·"

in the name

They asked for further identification, and he

d~n

the name "Mark Ro.xer."

~~

produce~

To explain the dis-

~

crepancy, he claimed that a friend had made the airline reservation.

The officers told him that they were narcotics investiga.

tors and that they suspected h 1m o

f

.

.~· ~~

carry1ng narcot1cs.

~~

At this point, the officers asked resp to accompany them ~
.... .....,_,~
~
~
to a small room about forty feet from where they had approached ~
him.

They did not inform him that he was free to leave, although

Johnson admitted that they then had no probable cause to justify
an arrest.

Resp nevertheless went with them.

Using the baggage

claim checks attached to the ticket, Johnson recovered resp's
baggage from the airline without his consent. 4

The officers

3The officers were particularly concerned with a National
flight to Los Angeles. It seems that an LA destination would
have fit the profile, but it is not clear if NY would, as well.
4The officers may have recovered the bags after resp consented
to the search, but this is unclear.

~

page 5.
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asked to search the bags, but did not specifically inform him
that he had the right to refuse their request.

He

~

consented ~

providing the key to one of the bags and allowing the other to be
forced open.

It

'-\

They discovered sixty-five pounds of marijuana in

----------

~-I

the two bags, and officially arrested him.

c.

Decisions Below
(1) The Trial Court.

The TC, ruling from the bench,

denied resp's motion to suppress the marijuana.s

It held that

resp's "consent was freely and voluntarily given," Jt App, at
115A, despite resp's testimony that he had consented to the various police requests because "[t]hey were police officers and I
thought I had to," e.g., Jt App, at 79A, BOA, 81A (quoted by CA
panel, 389 So.2d, at 1009).

Alternatively, the TC appeared to

rely on an exigent circumstances exception, declaring "that the
officer doesn't have the time to run out and get a search warrant
because the plane is going to take off."

Jt App, at llSA.

(2) The District Court of Appeal Panel.

A divided panel

of the CA affirmed, holding that resp's consent had been voluntary.

The majority concluded that resp had not been in custody,

and that the officers had not coerced him.

389 So.2d, at 1010.

The statement that they suspected him of carrying narcotics was
not a threat but an explanation.

Ibid.

In any event, the fact

that resp's behavior conformed to the profile gave the police

5 The TC's decision is reproduced in a footnote to the majority
opinion of the CA panel. 389 So.2d, at 1008 n.l.

summer bench memo: Florida v. Royer
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Id., at 1011-12.

The majority agreed with the TC's alternative rationale,
holding that a warrantless search of the luggage was justified
without resp's consent.

(?~

The profile evidence provided probable ~

~s~~

cause, and his impending departure provided exigent circumstances.

Id., at 1012.

United States v. Chadwick, 433

u.s.

AJ_A ~
~~

1

~
(1977), was distinguished on the grounds that here "the defen- ~.;
dant' s sui teases were immediately associated with him"
"he was in constructive possession thereof."

because ~

389 So.2d, at 1013. ~

Judge Schwartz dissented, arguing that (a) the

offic~

effectively took resp into custody, thus placing him under arrest
for purposes of constitutional analysis; (b) the arrest was illegal because the officers, as Johnson admitted, did not have probable cause justifying an arrest; 6 and (c) the consent was invalid
since it was given while resp was illegally under arrest.
at 1014-15.

Id.,

He concluded that exigent circumstances could justi-

fy the lack of a warrant, but could not take the place of probable cause.

Id., at 1015.

(3) The District Court of Appeal En Bane.

A unanimous 7~~

CA en bane reversed, holding that there had been an arrest
out probable cause, and this tainted resp's consent.

-

with- ~ .I

The CA

rea- ~

~~

6The dissent left open the possibility that the officers may ~~~
have been within their rights to "encounter" resp, or that they
may have had the "founded suspicion" to justify a Terry stop.
389 So.2d, at 1014.
7The panel majority had consisted of two senior judges who were
not entitled to sit on the en bane CA. 389 So.2d, at 1015 n.l.

''
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soned that there had been an arrest because resp "found himself
~

in a small enclosed area being confronted by two police
officers," he knew he was a suspect in a narcotics investigation,
and his plane ticket and luggage had been taken away from him.
Under such circumstances, the CA concluded it was reasonable for
resp to believe that he was not free to leave.

Id., at 1018.

The CA accepted Johnson's concession that the officers
not had probable cause to make an arrest.

The CA went beyond

this,
-..., however, sayirig that "mere similarity with the contents of
the drug courier profile is insufficient even to constitute the
articulable suspicion required to justify a Terry stop."
1019.

Id., at

Relying on state authority, the CA completed its analysis

with the conclusion that the illegal arrest necessarily tainted
resp's consent.

Id., at 1019-20.

The CA, following the panel dissent, dismissed the exigent circumstances argument.

It held that exigent circumstances

could justify the lack of a warrant, but could not take the place
of probable cause.

Id., at 1020.

Judge Hubbart concurred separately.

He agreed that pro

file evidence, without more, could not constitute probable cause
for an arrest.

1

He differed from the majority in arguing

--

that profile evidence could constitute grounds for an investiga...
-.
.~ t ~e st~ . v{iting your opinion in United States v. Mendenhall,

-

~
.,

Ibid.

~-

446

u.s.,

at 560-66, he contended that the proper analysis re-

quired a balancing of (i) the public interest served by the stop;
(ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion; and (iii) the objective facts upon which the officer relied.

Id., at 1021-22.

He

felt that the public interest was very high, id., at 1023-24, and
that the intrusion was generally very minor, id., at 1024.

Thus

each case would "turn on the nature of the profile behavior
and the court's perception of how objectively suspicious the behavior in question seems to be."

Id., at 1022.

Judge Barkdull also concurred separately.

He distin-

guished Mendenhall on the grounds that the officers did not return resp's plane ticket, and did not inform him that he could
decline to consent.

Id., at 1026.

II.
A.

Exigent Circumstances

For convenience,
native rationale for
state nor the amici

Discussion

~f

·

.

~~

l'~lfl~f~~e3~

admitt~h~ 1 ei jed

mlrijuana.

Neither the

stresses~e~t ~i !c~~r~,s

but the CA panel endorsed the TC's reasoning, so I will briefly
deal with it.

To focus on the exigent circumstances aspect of

the argument, I will assume for the moment that the officers had
probable cause to search the bags without resp's consent.

The

validity of this assumption will be discussed below in part II.C.
The governing principles were set out in Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442

u.s.

U.S. 1 (1977).

753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433

In both cases, the police had probable cause to

8 The state devotes a sentence (p. 46) to an exigent circumstances argument, citing two pre-Chadwick CA cases and two preChadwick law journal notes.

page 9.

summer bench memo: Florida v. Royer

believe that certain luggage contained marijuana, so they arrested the owners and seized the luggage.

It would have been possi-

ble to secure the luggage pending receipt of a search warrant.
Moreover, there was no reason to believe that the bags were dangerous, or that the evidence inside would lose its value if not
discovered immediately.

The police in each case nevertheless

searched the luggage without a warrant.

This Court held that

both searches violated the Fourth Amendment.
The present case is indistinguishable.

Although resp

would have departed with the luggage if it had not been seized,
.
~
M~~~-~
that exigency (if such it is 9 ) justifies at most a se ! zure. Once ~
1\.

~

Johnson seized resp's bags, they were securely within his control, and no further exigency justified an immediate search.

Ab-

sent resp's consent, the proper course would have been to wait
for a warrant.
The CA panel ignored Sanders, but attempted to distinguish Chadwick on the grounds that the bags were "immediately
associated with" resp.

I find this distinction unpersuasive.

During the relevant period, resp had no independent access to the
bags.

They were not even in his presence until Johnson brought

9The extent of the "exigency" is questionable. Unlike Sanders
and Chadwick, where the suspects were departing in automobiles,
resp here was about to take a three-hour flight on a scheduled
airline. The officers knew he would have no access to his luggage until he reached the baggage claim area at LaGuardia. The
airport smuggling details around the country are in regular contact with each other. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 577
F.2d 378, 379 (CA6 1978). A DEA agent could presumably have met
resp in New York with a search warrant.

t:
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The CA panel's suggestion that "he was in construe-

tive possession" of the bags (through the claim-checks) is also
meritless: Johnson had taken the ticket with the claim-checks
stapled to it, and had not returned it.

But even if resp had

retained the claim-checks, it would make little difference.

He

would still have had less access to his bags than did the resps
in Chadwick prior to their arrest.

B.

Arrest, Seizure, or Consensual Encounter
The first step in resp's anlaysis of the case requires a

characterization of the contact between resp and the police.

His

argument depends on a finding that the intrusion was greater than
could be justified by the officers' information at the time of
the contact.

In particular, he argues that the contact was an

"arrest" which was not supported by "probable cause."

He could

similarly argue that the contact was a "seizure" which was not
supported by "articulable suspicion."
(1) The Legal Categories.

The Court has clearly held

that a confinement short of a formal arrest may be "indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."
U.S. 200, 212 (1979).

~~

Dunaway ' v. New Yor f: 442

In Dunaway, for example, the police took a

suspect into custody, drove him to police headquarters, gave him

----------------,

~

the Miranda warnings, and questioned him for an hour.

Although

he was not formally arrested, the Court found the confinement to
be the functional equivalent of a formal arrest and held that it
must be supported by probable cause .

. •'
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The Court has also recognized that a person who has not
been "arrested," because the intrusion is much less severe than a
traditional arrest, may nevertheless be "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

"[W]henever a police officer ac-

costs an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has 'seized' that person."

Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 16 (1968).

Although a "seizure" does not require probable cause, it does
require "an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity."
To date, this exception to the traditional Fourth Amendment
"probable cause" requirement has been narrowly construed. 10
Finally, "not all personal intercourse between policemen
and citizens involves 'seizure' of persons."
u.s., at 19 n.l6.

Terry, supra, 392

Thus some contacts between police and citizens

do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

As JUSTICE WHITE comment-

ed in Terry, "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the
streets."

392 u.s., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring).

He went on

to explain, "[o]f course, the person stopped is not obliged to
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest .•.. "

Ibid.

The distinction be-

10 see {ichigan v. Summers, 452 u.s. 692 (1981) (detention of
home-owner while home searched pursuant to warrant); United
States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 411 (1981) (brief immigration check
near border); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (order
to leave car when car lawfully stopped, and weapons frisk on basis of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 u.s. 873 (1975) (investigative stop near border lasting less
than a minute for "a brief question or two"); Adams v. Williams,
407 u.s. 143 (1972) (weapons "frisk" on basis of reasonable suspicion); Terry, supra (same).
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tween a Fourth Amendment seizure and a consensual encounter rests
on whether, "'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.'"

Reid v. Georgia, 448

(opinion of POWELL, J., concurring)

u.s.

438, 442 (1980)

(quoting United States v.

u.s.,

at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.)).

(2) The Facts Here.

The initial contact between resp

Mendenhall, supra, 446

and the police occurred when Johnson asked him if he had a moment
to talk.

At that point, no "seizure" had taken place.

e~solution

of this case would be a finding that

else happened with resp's consent.

The easi-

everything~

That is not what the TC

found, however, and the evidence on the record does not

such a conclusion.

~

compel ~

If the case is remanded, of course, such

~,
uLL

tc

finding remains open to the TC.
Assuming that resp did not voluntarily consent to

~

followed, the next step is to determine whether a reasonable
son in resp's pos~ u~ h~ felt free to leave.
not.

~~

per ~~

I think~

Although you did not reach the seizure issue in Mendenhall,

ou did say that the question was "extremely close."

9 ~~t

a~

560 n.l (Opinion of POWELL, J., concurring).

of seizure are significantly stronger.

446

Here the

u.s.,

As in Mendenhall, resp

without verbal response, after he had been asked to show his
As in Mendenhall, the offi-

cers wore no uniforms, made no threats, and displayed no weapons.
And as in Mendenhall, resp was not informed that he was free to
refuse to cooperate •

i

.

• I(

~

indicia~

accompanied the officers when requested to do so, apparently

plane ticket and driver's license.

Ao·
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first significant difference is that Mendenhall's
ticket and license had been returned to her immediately, before

-----------------

she was asked to accompany the DEA agents.
ly relies on this fact, 446

u.s.,

-

The Court specifical-

at 558, and the dissent singles

out the fact that the agents took her ticket and license "for

ah

~

time" as "an objective factor [ J that would tend to support a
'seizure' finding,"ll id., at 570

&

n.3 (WHITE, J., dissenting). ~

~

Here it is clear that the ticket was not returned to resp, and
appears that the license was simply placed with resp's other
things after he empti~ his pockets. 12
~'1,

~ ~he

2.second significant difference is that resp's luggage

was in the officers' possession, while Mendenhall was apparently
travelling without luggage.

A reasonable person would doubt his

freedom to leave when the police are holding his bags.

~~~t

(,/

--

did consider himself free to request the return of his bags,
is unclear what he could have done with them.

~object

9~

Even if

Most airlines

when a passenger, having already checked two bags, at-

tempts to check two bags a second time.

-~ ~

In sum, I conclude that there was a "seizure," probably ~
when the officers, without returning resp's ticket and license, ~

J

11As JUSTICE WHITE noted, "[i]t is doubtful that any reasonable
person about to board a plane would feel free to leave when law tt~
enforcement officers have her plane ticket." 446 U.S., at 570 ~
~ (White, J., dissenting).
~he state suggests that resp was not required to empty his
pockets until after his formal arrest. If this is true, the license was apparently not returned in time to make any difference
on the seizure question. If resp had been required to empty his
pockets earlier, on the other hand, that would be another indication that he had been seized before the formal arrest.
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_.

,~ ~ n~.,.(...{

~

WI~ ''4.-1-~~~
or informing him of his right to refuse, asked resp
them to the office.

to~bc;~~~~~

Perhaps, though, the seizure occurred

they had obtained his luggage.

aft~

If you agree that there was a

seizure, however, it makes no difference which of these two
points is selected as the time at which it was accomplished. 13
I think the harder question is whether the seizure here
was an "arrest."
_

Prior to Michigan v. Summers, supra, I would

-~~ ave agreed with the CA without hesitation and concluded that

~ this

case did present an arrest.

~~~ ·~li~ited

investigative stops to intrusions taking less than

~~ ~ e.

~

In Summers, however, the Court upheld a much more

~d

a~
intr~

~

t'ention as a "seizure" short of an "arrest," primarily
because the

~

Before Summers, the Court

Dunaway.

~etention ~much

les :_ i ~ trusive

than the

~A......

seizure ~

Certainly on the spectrum from formal arrest to weapons

frisk, this case falls nearer the latter.

But as the Dunaway

Court stressed, the general principle is that a seizure requires
probable cause (i.e., is an arrest); the investigative stop based
on reasonable suspicion is the narrow exception.

If the excep-

tion becomes too broad, it will swallow the general principle.
This case is near the line, but I would still be inclined to put
it on the

"ar~

CJ.,;z.,

t1 ~?

,

~

In making this recommendation, I do not worry that it

13 Nothing of relevant legal significance took place in the interim. Resp did not give his consent to the search then, and the
officers learned nothing new that would help justify a seizure.
The move from concourse to office may be relevant, but only in
determining that a seizure took place.
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would hobble the legitimate investigative activities of airport
smuggling details that rely on the drug courier profile.
Manua1 14 instructs the police in block capitals, "ALWAYS ADVISE
THE SUSPECT THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO REFUSE TO CONSENT TO A
SEARCH." !d., at 61. It --------------~~----------------is only slightly less emphatic on

---

ets and identification: "Return ticket and/or ID immediately."
Id., at 129 (emphasis in original).

If the officers here had

followed these instructions by returning resp's ticket and license immediately, and if they had not recovered his luggage until he had given his permission, then this would be essentially
the same close case as Mendenhall.

And if they had also informed

him that they sought his voluntary cooperation, which he had the
right to refuse, it would not even be a close case.

The DEA, in

preparing the Manual, obviously finds these constraints reasonable.

I see no reason why the

~~t

J?li/1- ~~-

should not endorse them.

Ur f~

a suspect's holding his ticket and knowing his rights would be
enough to hobble the procedure, the procedure relies not on voluntary cooperation but on fear and ignorance.

C.

Probable Cause or Articulable Suspicion
(1) The Profile Per Se.

There has been considerable

controversy about the drug courier profile,
assumption that the profile is designed to objectively /predi~\
14 Legal Problems in Airport Interceptions of Domestic Drug Couriers (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
1980) [cited herein, and in SG's amicus brief, as "DEA Manual"].

~9-::A- ~~--~\~

~~, · ~

~~-

'•·

-*"

5
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who is likely to be a drug courier. 15

The assumption is invalid,

however, for the profile neither is nor is intended to be any~

thing more than an investigative tool.
As a practical matter, the drug courier profile is highly subjective.

One district judge described it as "chameleon-

like," observing that "it seems to change itself to fit the facts
of each case."

United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F.

Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).

In United States v. Chamblis,

425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977), a DEA agent "testified
that the profile in a particular case consists of anything that
arouses his suspicions."
A few comparisons illustrate these concerns.

In Menden-

hall, the first three factors on which the agents relied to determine that the suspect fit the profile were (1) her arrival
from Los Angeles, a "source" city: (2) the fact that she was the
last to leave the plane, and appeared very nervous: and (3) her
failure to have any baggage.

446 u.s., at 547 n.l.

On the first

factor, the court in United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 56667 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 878 (1979), commented, "our experience with DEA agent testimony ... makes us wonder whether
there exists any city in the country which a DEA agent will not
15 see, e.g., Goldstein & Hirschhorn, Drug Courier Profiles (A
MarlU)nnian Nightmare) (Nat'l Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Criminal Defense Seminar, 1981): Bodine, Selecting Drug
'Suspects': Use of Courier Profile At u.s. Airports Lands DEA in
Controversy, Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1981, at 1: Costantino, Drug
Courier Profiles and Airport Stops: Is the Sky the Limit?, 3
Western New England L. Rev. 175 (1980).

summer bench memo: Florida v. Royer

page 17.

characterize as either a major narcotics distribution center or a
city through which drug couriers pass on their way to a major
narcotics distribution center."l6
On the second factor, United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d
1161, 1164 {CAS), cert. denied, 102 s.ct. 292 {1981), is instructive.

There the agents relied on the fact that the suspect "was

one of the first passengers to deplane."

Even nervousness, which

is inherently subjective, is not part of every profile.

In Unit-

ed States v. Hirnrnelwright, SSl F.2d 991, 992 n.l {CAS), cert.
denied, 434 u.s. 902 {1977)

{border search), an agent's suspi-

cions were aroused because the suspect was "extremely calm."
And on the third factor, the present case is noteworthy.
Resp was an object of suspicion not because he had no baggage, or
.______/

b S' ~

very little baggage, but because he was "carrying two apparently
heavily-laden suitcases."

389 So.2d, at 1016.

This subjectivity should not be surprising, for the profile is not designed to be anything more than an investigative

-

tool.

The DEA analogizes agents identifying couriers with a pro-

file to other professionals making professional decisions with

the aid of "an informal mental checklist" of relevant factors:
[A doctor], for example, in making a diagnosis, must
compare the patient's symptoms to a mental checklist of
characteristics which he knows indicate certain diseases. He probably learned that checklist originally
in medical school and has modified it over the years
16 cf. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d llSl, llSS n.l {CAS
1980) {"A review of the cases in which this profile has been
used, as well as the direct testimony of [a DEA agent], convinces
us of the tragic fact that every major population center in this
country has become a horne for drug traffickers.").
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from his own experience and that of fellow doctors ••••
DEA Manual, at 149.

The analogy strikes me as relevant.

A doc-

tor cannot decide to operate solely on the basis of a few symptoms unless those symptoms are highly probative, but he can use a
list of symptoms as an aid to exercising his independent professional judgment.

The legitimacy of the decision depends not on

the existence of a few symptoms, but on the quality of the doctor's judgment in the overall circumstances.
for seizures based on "profile evidence."

The same is true

As the DEA reminds its

agents, "Reasonable Suspicion will be established by what is in
your head, not what may be written on paper somewhere."
152.

Id., at

There is nothing wrong with using a profile, but its limi-

tations must be recognized--both by the agents in the field and
by the courts.

Whether there was probable cause or articulable

suspicion should be determined using the traditional analysis,
regardless of what legitimate investigative tools the
used to develop their suspicions.
(2) The Facts Here.

At the time resp was seized, John-

son and Magdalena knew the following:

(1) Resp was nervous, ap-

parently seeking to avoid detection.

(2) Resp was travelling

from Miami to New York on a one-way ticket purchased with cash.
(3) Resp had two heavily laden American Tourister suitcases.

~~; r

CJ_.,

@

~r

in the name "Holt," but he had identified his luggage with the

~~ name

Resp was t : avelling

"Holt."

@

on ~age.
~

a@

Not only was his ticket

Resp did not put an address or telephone number

It would have been better, of course, if the TC

had found that these circumstances either did or did not consti-

~f..r,M, (4-)

j-&) ~

~~
·(~!-~)

f.;·,
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-

-

~

fLth~~

b~

.
tute art1cula
le susp1c1on or pro bb
a le cause.

On

theba~ ~J

the record, though, I feel that the officers did not have proba-

L-

ble cause (a fact that Johnson conceded, Jt app, at 57A), but

~

that they did have reasonable suspicion.
=-===--_....,.,

--==-

z<"P :

a:::r

ow~

Standing alone, none of the factors is overwhelming, but
most have some probabative value.

I think an experienced officer

can tell the difference between "white knuckle flyer" nervousness
and wrongdoer nervousness, but the courts should require him to
articulate his specific findings in each case.
have been done here. 17
portant.

That seems to

The second factor strikes me as less im-

It is not unusual for a student attending college in

New York to buy a one-way ticket to New York City near the end of
the Christmas ~ ion.

Paying with cash is not surprising.

/

Many college students do not have the credit rating to justify a
credit card.

Furthermore, the Miami-New York airfare was not

very high at the time.
me.

The third factor also fails to impress

(:,5"~

Whenever I went back to college .after a vacation, my bags

were packed to the limit, and I was not alone in this regard.

,. am also not unusual in my use of American Tourister luggage.

<

I
The

,1

~~

fourth fac tp r is the most persuasive for me.

,.....

~

It was clear that
~L

\\.

The fifth factor
also carries some weight.

While many people do not wish to dis-

play their address and telephone number, they at least have bag-

17 Johnson testified to his experience, and explained that resp
was nervously looking around the area as though trying to spot
policemen. "White knuckle flyers" generally fidget and talk to
one another uneasily. Jt app, at 30A-31A.
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gage tags that allow the information to be obtained if necessary.
Resp obviously did not want his ownership of the bags established

I

if they fell into official hands.
My biggest trouble with this evidence is its lack of
specificity.

Resp was doing something that he did not want to

publicize, but it is not clear that he was doing anything illegal, and even less clear that he was carrying narcotics.

In 1978

(the most recent year for which statistics are provided) , the
LaGuardia Airport Unit made 43 searches.

On 16 occasions the

unit seized drugs, but on 13 occasions they discovered illegal
aliens.

DEA Manual, at 2. 18

Drug-running is not the only activ-

ity that travelers wish to keep secret.

The stereotypical adul-

terer using a commercial airline to travel to a distant rendez-

?

vous would fit the drug courier profile perfectly.
The lack of specificity convinces me that Johnson was
correct to admit that he had no probable cause to arrest resp.
Articulable suspicion is a closer question.

In Mendenhall, you

analyzed the problem using a three-part test which examined
( i) the public interest served by the seizure, ( i i) the
nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and expertise.
446

u.s.,

at 561.

Here the first two factors are essentially the

same as in Mendenhall and Reid v. Georgia, supra, so in comparing

18 cf. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 534 n.lO (CA5 1980)
(2~of searches at Atlanta Airport during 7 months in 1977 produced evidence of criminal activity other than transporting narcotics) .

...

> •
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the cases the th' d factor is determinative.

The officers here

had less basis for suspicion than the agents in Mendenhall.

Resp

was no more nervous than Mendenhall, his itinerary was less suspicious, his heavy luggage was less suspicious than her lack of
luggage, and they both travelled under an alias.

On the other

hand, they probably had more basis for suspicion than the agents
in Reid.

There the suspects were apparently travelling under

their own names on tickets purchased with a credit card.

Their

itinerary and airport behavior, however, were more suspicious
than resp's.

In the end this is a judgment call.

I would say

that the officers here had reasonable suspicion.
~---~

D.

--.

The Exclusionary Rule
If there was an "arrest" without probable cause, or a

"seizure" without articulable suspicion, then it is necessary to
consider the exclusionary rule.

I am inclined to think that the

Constitution does not require exclusion of the marijuana simply
because resp's consent to search his bags was given while he was
in illegal custody.

Suppression may be required when the custody

does in fact influence the consent, but the court below applied
what amounts to a per se rule.

Although such a rule makes sense

when the illegal arrest is the justification for the search, that
is not the case here.

Even a valid arrest, standing alone, could

not have justified searching resp's locked suitcases.

Here the

CA did not give the state the opportunity to prove that the consent was voluntary in the totality of the circumstances despite
the illegality of the arrest.

I do not think that Brown v. Illi-

summer bench memo: Florida v. Royer

nois, 422

u.s.

page 22.

590 (1975), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471 (1963), or the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule, requires such a result.
This may, however, be strictly a state constitutional
issue.

equiva- ~ ·
constitution. ~ ·

Unlike the federal exclusionary rule, the Florida

lent is explicit in Article 1, §12 of the state

While the Florida courts accept the federal standards for determining whether a search, seizure, or arrest is reasonable, Florida v. Hetland, 366 So.2d 831 (Fla. App. 1979), aff'd per curiam,
387 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1980), their exclusionary rule appears to be
more limited.

In applying the exclusionary rule, the court below

relied directly on Florida cases, and the courts in those cases,
in turn, relied on earlier Florida cases.

Since this looks

~
lik ~

a strictly state question, I do not discuss the federal issue in
detail here.

If you would find it helpful, however, I will be

happy to do so.
The state argues extensively for a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.

Resp argues that this was not raised

below, so it may not be available here.

In any event, it seems

that the Florida constitution would not permit such a result,
even if this Court relaxed the federal rule.

~

Once again, I do

not discuss this issue in detail, but will be happy to do so if
you would find it helpful.l 9

19 In tying up loose ends, please note that I have also not dealt
with resp's mootness argument. It looks like a narrow issue, but
I would like to see the state's reply before discussing it.

~
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III.

Conclusion

r:t~

This is a complicated case, with many of the complications arising out of the TC's failure to make explicit findings
on issues that may prove relevant.

To resolve the case, it is

necessary to make two close judgment calls that may end up being
closely bound to these facts.

On the ~ , I conclude there was

at least a "seizure," and that seizure might be an "arrest."

On

the ~~ I conclude the officers did not have probable cause
to make an arrest, but they did have articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a limited seizure.

If the case is to have any

broad precedential value, it will probably be in its treatment of
the drug courier profile.

On that issue, I recommend that the

Court treat it as a legitimate investigative tool, but

evaluate ~

The ~
~
extreme approach of the en bane CA is inappropriate, and the op--the agents' independent judgments in the traditional way.

posite extreme of the CA panel is even worse.

In some case pro-

file evidence will be sufficient, and in others it will not.
Each case must be judged on its facts •

..

~

~

=
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are required in this case to determine whether the Court
of

Appeal

of

Florida,

Third

District,

properly

applied

the

precepts of the Fourth Amendment in holding that respondent Royer
was being illegally detained at the time of his purported consent
to search his luggage.
I

On January 3, 1978,

respondent Royer was observed at Miami

International Airport by two plain-clothes detectives of the Dade
County,

Florida,

Public

Crime

Bureau,

County's
Detectives

Johnson

appearance,

mannerisms,

"drug

courier

Safety

and

·8

assigned

Narcotics

Investigation

Magdalena

believed

luggage,

profile.

Department

and

Royer,

actions

Royer's

the so-called

unaware

apparently

the

Sect ion. 1

that

fit

to

the

of

attention he had attracted, purchased a ticket to New York City
and

checked

his

two

suitcases,

pJ.acing

on

each

suitcase

an

identification tag bearing the name "Holt" and the destination,
"LaGuardia".
the

airline

As Royer made his way to the concourse which led to
boarding

area,

the

two

detectives

approached

him,

-2-

identified themselves as policemen working out of the sheriff ' s
office

and

asked

if

Royer

had

a

"moment"

to

speak

with

them ;

Royer said "Yes".
Upon r e quest,

but without oral consent ,

Royer produced for

the detectives his airline ticket and his driver's license.
airline
name

ticket,

"Holt,"

correct

1 ike

the baggage id en t if ic at ion tags,

while

name,

the

When

"Royer."
Royer

discrepancy,

driver's

license

the

explained

detectives

that

reservation in the name of "Holt."
nervous

during

this

carried

a

bore the

respondent's

asked

friend

The

had

about

the

made

the

Royer became noticeably more

conversation,

whereupon

the

detectives

informed Royer that they were in fact narcotics investigators and
that the y had reason to suspect Royer of transporting narcotics.
~he

det e ctives

identification

but

did

not

askeo

return

Royer

to

his

airline

accompany

ticket

them

to

a

and
room,

~
approximately forty feet away) adjacent to the concourse.
said

nothing

been

asked

in

to

response

do.

The

but went with the officers as he had
room was

later

Johnson as a "large storage closet",
lounge

and

containing

Royer's

consent

or

baggage

checks

stubs,

a

Royer

small

agreement,

desk

described

46

the

e$

located SJif the
and

two

"Holt"

stewardess~

chairs.

Detective Johnson,

retrieved

by Detective

Without

using Royer's

luggage

from

the

-3-

1
I

I

airline and brought it to the room where respondent and Detective

I

l

Magdalena were waiting.

1

search

I

of

the

Royer was asked if he would consent to a

suitcases .

Without

orally

responding

to

this

request, Royer produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases,
which

the detective

from Royer.
Detective

then opened without seeking

Drugs

were

Johnson,

found

Royer

in

that

stated

that

further assent

sui tease.
he

According

did

combination to the lock on the second suitcase.

not

know

to
the

When asked if he

objected to the detective opening the second suitcase, Royer said
"no,

go ahead," and did not object when the detective explained

that the suitcase might have to be broken open.

The suitcase was

pried open by the officers and more marijuana was found.
was then

told that he was under arrest.

Royer

Approximately fifteen

minutes elapsed from the time the detectives intially approached
respondent until his arrest upon the discovery of the contraband.
Prior
Royer

made

a

of

the

search
consent
that,

to

to

his

trial

motion

the

to

for

suppress

sui teases.
search was

regardless

of

felony

the

The

possess ion

the

trial

evidence
court

of

rna r i ju ana, 3

obtained

found

in

that Royer's

"freely and voluntarily given,"
consent,

the

the

warrantless

search

and
was

reasonable because "the officer doesn't have the time to run out
and

get

a

search

warrant

because

the

plane

is

going

to

take

-4-

off." 4

Following

changed

his

specifically

the

plea

from

reserving

motion to suppress. 5
The
Royer's

District

of

"not

the

the motion
guilty"

right

to

to

appeal

to

suppress,

"nolo
the

Royer

contendere,"
denial

of

the

Royer was convicted.

Court

conviction. 6

involuntarily
cause;

denial

of
The

confined

Appeal,
court

within

the

sitting

bane,

held

that

Royer

small

room

without

that the involuntary restraint

restraint permitted by 'rerry v. Ohio,

time his consent to the search was

en

reversed
had

been

probable

had exceeded the limited
392

u.s.

obtai~d

1

(1968), at the

that the consent

to search was therefore invalid because tainted by the unlawful
confinement. 7
Several factors led the court to conclude that respondent's
confinement was tantamount to arrest.

Royer had "found himself

in a small enclosed area being confronted by two police officers-

-rha:r
-a

situation

r•Aiil

presents

an

almost

classic

definition

of

'181 j6.2J.' p.A 1016. r - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The detectives'

statement to Royer that he was suspected

of transporting narcotics also bolstered the finding that Royer
was

*

~

"in custody"
In addition,

at

the time

the consent to search was given.

the detectives'

possession of Royer's airline

ticket and their retrieval and possession of his luggage made it

I

II

-5-

clear, in the District Court of Appeals' view, that Royer was not
free to leave.
At the suppression hearing Royer had testified that he was
under the impression that he was not free to leave the officers'
presence.

The

Florida
much

Court
more

Appea~d

of

than

a

that

well-justified

this

apprehension

"was

subjective

belief," for

the State had conceded at oral argument before that

court that "the officers would not have permitted Royer to leave
the room even if

[Royer]

had erroneously thought he could."

~.
rct.

-,r-

The nomenclature used to describe Royer's confinement, the court
found,

was

unimportant because under Dunaway v.

u.s.

200

the

limited

(1979),

"[a]

restraint

constitutionally

~'----~H~~~Y~e$~9

New York,

442

police confinement which •.. goes beyond
of

a

justified

Terry

only

389 So.2d, at 1019.

by

investigatory
probable

stop

cause."

may

be

~

Detective Johnson, who conducted the

search, had specifically admitted at the suppression hearing that
he

did

not

have

probable

sui teases were opened and
absence of probable cause,

cause

to

arrest

Royer

their contents revealed.
the court concluded,

until

~

~

the

In the

Royer's consent

to search, given only after he had been unlawfully confined, was
ineffective
proof

at

to

all

justify
that

a

the search.
"break

in

the

Because there was no
chain

of

illegality"

had

-6-

occurred,

the court found that Royer's consent was invalid as a

matter of law.

~at

1020.

We granted the State's petition for

1
certiorari, 454 U.S. 1079 (1981), and now affirm.

Some

preliminary obs

in order.

First,

it is

()r

unquestioned that without a warrant to search Royer's

~l(f'"""~
1

q€
....

zen

luggage ~

exigent circumstances, the officers' privilege

to search the two suitcases depended on Royer's purported consent
to the search.

Neither is it disputed that where the validity of

a search rests on consent,

the state has the burden of proving

that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing
a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.
Bustamante,

412

U.S.

218,

22,

233-234

Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968);

u.s.

10

(1973):

Schneckloth v.

No~

Bumper v.
~""C

Johnson~ited States,--3-3-3-~
-------t..---

(1948); Amos ., v. United States, 255 U.S 333 (1921).

vV~--

Second,

law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth

Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in
another public place,
some questions,
willing

to

by

listen,

by asking him if he

putting questions
or

by

offering

in

to

is willing to answer
him

if

evidence

the person
in

prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.

a

is

criminal

See Dunaway

-7-

J '!,!¥41\.,. New
u.s.

York,

1, 31,

White,

442

200, 210 n.

(1979); Ter ~-~ Ohio,

12

32-33

(1966)

(opinion of Harlan, J.), 34

Nor

would

the

J. ) .

-::.-

u.s.

fact

that

the

392

(opinion of

officer

identifies

himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter
into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification.

u.s.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446

,.,

=r'

,.,~~Stewart,

~\~~~~
~

J.).

544, 555

however,

The person approached,

(opinion of

(1980)

need not answer

7

any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the

a(tJ

t,tJ."'

questions at all and may go on his way.
(opinion of Harlan, J.), 34

32-33

not,

doing

without

so; and his

more,

furnish

Mendenhall, supra at 556
no

detention,

no

~

(opinion of White, J.).

not be detained even momentarily
grounds for

He may

=

without

reasonable,

objective

1

refusal to listen or answer does

those

grounds.

within

the

States ~ v.;-

United

(opinion of Stewart, J.).

seizure

---

Terry v. Ohio, supra, at

meaning

I f there - : : \

of

the

Fourth

Amendment, however, no constitutional rights have been infringed.
Third,

it is also clear that not all seizures of the person

must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime.
~

a seizure
unless

u.s.

'

Ohio, supra, any restraint on the person amounting to

for

the purposes of

justified

200'

Prior

207-209

by

the Fourth Amendment was invalid

probable cause.

(1979).

I

I

Dunawa ~ ew

York,

442

-------~

Terry created a limited exception to

-8-

this general

rule:

certain seizures are

justifiable unoer

the

Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person
is about to commit a crime.

In that case, a stop and a frisk for
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
·~

weapons were found unexceptionable.
143

applied

(1972),

informant's

report

the
that

same
an

-----"--

approach

unnamed

in

')'

authorized

in Terry,

873, 881-882

United States

in

a

'7'==

in saying

suspicion of criminal activity warrants a

of

an

nearby

Although not expressly

\J s.- Brignoni-Ponce,

was unequivocal

(1975)'

con text

individual,

vehicleAwas carrying narcotics and a gun.
.

the

422

u.s.

that reasonable

temporary seizure for

the purpose of a questioning limited to the purpose of the stop.
In

Brignoni-Ponce,

suspicion

that

governmental

J..tP-\ll 4
'(k~~ 9"/detention
t\'-\(1, ~tr~

for

that

the

purpose

immigration

interest

that was

limited

was

to

laws

were

sufficient

questioning.

verify

The

or

being

dispel
violated,

the
a

to warrant

t e mporary

petitioner

does

not

~1( ~

suggest,

t,~'J'"
~
0~ ' wl

temporary detention for questioning on less than probable cause

co.~,t~

-'(

~·
(D1'

tt"~ (,

~~f(

nor do we,

that

a similar rationale would not warrant

where the public interest involved is the suppression of illegal
transactions in drugs or of any other serious

crime ~

Fourth, Terry and its progeny, nevertheless, created only a
limited exception to the general rule that seizures of the person
probable

require

I

I

cause

to

arrest.

Detentions

may

be

-9-

investigative

yet

probable cause.
subject

was

violative

of

Dunaway~w

taken

to

the

incriminating

reasonable
custodial

suspicion

police

of

crime

-~

Fifth,

even

~
u.s. 721

Dunaway

and

Amendment

from

were

is

home

and,

an hour.

The

held

inadmissible:

insufficient

though

the

u.s.

absent

There, the

his

interrogated for

Brown v. Illinois, 422

v. Mississippi, 354
~

station

statements

interrogation

investigative.

Fourth

York made this clear.

without being formally arrested,
resulting

the

to

justify

interrogation

590

is

(1975), and Davis

(1965), are to the same effect.

Brown

also

hold

that

statements given

during a period of illegal detention are inadmissable even though
voluntarily given provided they are the product of

~

the illegal

r ci+!
(J)

detention and not the result of an independent act of free will i\

·tJI!':;own t,.VA. Illinois,

\~

crv~

cases

supra,

reiterated one of

at

598-599.

the principal

In

this

holdings

respect
of

those

...:..W;_:o_n~g.__;.:_S...:..u_;n-hv~

~"

United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Sixth, if the events in this case amounted to no more than a
permissible police encounter in a public place or a justifiable
Terry-type detention,
voluntary,
hi s

would have been effective

two s u i t cases .

424-425

Royer's consent to search his luggage,

(1976).

Cf.

United

The Court of

to

legalize

States ~ .

Watson,

~

Appea s

in

the

if

the search of
423

case

u.s.

411,

before

us,

-10-

however,

concluded not only that Royer had been seized

he

gave his consent to search his luggage but also that the bounds
of

an

investigative

stop had

been

exceeded.

In

its

view

the

"confinement" in this case went beyond the limited restraint of a
Terry investigative stop, and Royer's consent was thus tainted by
the

illegality,

a

conclusion

that

absence of probable cause to arrest.

required

reversal

in

the

The question before us is

whether the record warrants that conclusion.

We

think

that it

does.
III
The State contends that when Royer consented to the search
of

his

luggage,

he

was

not

being

illegally

detained,

first,

(!)

~ta-te·~ Fir-st ~"-ttttlli ~ toi\~A-t
because the entire encounter was consensual and hence he had not

been seized or detained at all;

@

s'hNff'~

officers

and,

alternatively, because the

sectJI\.4. aty{,(WAf : tA&Itl ~'1 f.fDp
reasonably

suspected

Royer

of

carrying

drugs,

any

seizure or detention to which he was subjected did not exceed the
bounds of

the kind of investigative confinement contemplated by

fJeel ~t I'P1JM'$S g)
Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce.

We need not address the claim

that the officers reasonably suspected Royer,
eM F(Q.

cr.

fl'ty

for we decline to

overturn the Florida court's conclusion that when Royer gave his
consent to search his luggage, he had been seized and subjected
to

detention

or

restraint

beyond

that

permissible

on

mere

-11-

suspicion and in the absence of probable cause.

1

By

the

time

Royer

was

informed

that

the

officers

wished

to

examine his luggage, he had identified himself when approached by
the officers and had attempted to explain the discrepancy between
the name shown on his identification and the name under which he
had purchased his ticket and identified his luggage.

Obviously,

the officers were not satisfied, for they informed him they were
narcotics agents and had reason to believe that he was carrying
illegal

drugs.

police room.
room -- a
He was

They

requested

him

Royer went with them.

to

accompany

them

to

the

He found himself in a small

large closet -- equipped with a desk and two chairs.

alone with

two police officers who again

they thought he was carrying narcotics.

told him that

He also found that the

officers, without his consent, had retrieved his checked luggage
from

the

airlines.

Obviously,

what had

'
inquiry

in

a

public

place

had

begun as

transformed

-

a consensual

itself

into

an

investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the
police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm
their suspicions.
identification,

The officers had Royer's ticket, they had his

and they had seizea his luggage.

It was never

suggested to Royer that he was free to board his plane if he so
chose,

I

and

he reasonably believed

that he was

being detained.

-12-

At

least

as

of

that

moment,

encounter had evaporated ,
of

Appeals

following
then

in

it

not

subjected.

consensual

aspects

of

the

and we cannot fault the Florida Court

concluding

did

any

justify the

Consistent

and

Terry ~hio

t hat

restraint

with

this

the

cases

to which Royer

conclusion,

the

was

police

conceded in the state courts that Royer would not have been free
to

leave

the

Furthermore,
testimony

luggage,

the

of

indicating

interrogation
state's

the

that

room

brief

officers

had

Royer

at

do

not

determining

a

when

detention.
be

suggest

that

the

a

seizure

asked

Court

to

so . 9

interprets

suppression
to

do

consent

hearing

to

search

the
as
his

the luggage and sought a

Petitioner's Brief 6.

there

consensual

he

this

the officers would have held

distinguishing

will

in

refused

warrant to authorize the search.
We

had

is

encounter
exceeds

a

litmus-paper

from

a

seizure

the bounds of

test

for

or

for

a Terry-type

Even in the discrete category of airport stops, there
endless

surrounding

such

variation
encounters,

in

the

facts

and

circumstances

so much variation that the courts

have not managed to reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule
that

will

provide

unarguable

answers

to

the

question whether

there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.

I

We have

not

been

able,

for

example,

to

-13-

improve

upon

the

between

legal

and

probable

cause

illegal

deeply divided on whether

arrests;

standard
yet

for

the

distinguishing

Courts

are

often

the standard has been satisfied.

We

nevertheless must render judgment, and we think that the Florida
Court of

Appea~ctly

relied on the rational of

.

New York in overturning Royer's conviction.
There,

the putative defendant

"

Dunaway~ •

was taken from his home and

transported to the police station where he was interrogated for
an hour before making incriminating statements.

The Court held

that the investigative detention authorized by Terry, Adams and
Brignoni-Ponce did

not authorize custodial

interrogation in the

absence of probable cause, even though the interrogatee was not
arrested,

his

investigative.

answers
Here,

were

not coerced,

and

the detention was

Royer was moved only a short distance and

it was only a short time before the officers achieved their aim
and arrested him.
officers who had

But he was alone in the police room with two
seized

his

luggage and who

their suspicions that he was carrying drugs.

sought

to confirm

We doubt that the

result would have been different in Dunaway had the suspect had
been picked up on the street in front of the police station and
had incriminated himself within fifteen minutes after his arrival
at the station.

The result should be the same here.

I

-14-

IV
The officers

testified

at

the suppression hearing and

the

Florida Court of Appeals held that there was not probable cause
to arrest until Royer's bags were opened.

The state nevertheless

asserts in this Court that probable cause existed and that Royer
was thus

subject to arrest.

that the officers c1id
proceeded

on

a

foreclose

the

state

probable

cause

from
hence

Royer's consent to search.
67

(19 68).

is correct,

the fact

not believe there was probable cause and

consensual

and

If the state

or

Terry-stop

rationale

would

not

justifying Royer's custody by proving
removing

any

barrier

to

Peters v. New York, 392

~

We agree with the Florida Court of

relying

u.s.

on

40, 66-

Appea~ever,

that there was not probable cause to arrest Royer at the time he
purported

to give his consent to search his luggage.

are

a

that

nervous

young

man with

two American Tourister bags

--v

~ft ~ '('Jtetr

paid cash for an airline ticket to a "target city".
led to

inquiry, which

its position,
ticket

that

-p,e

These facts

in turn revealed that the ticket had been

bought under an assumed name.
satisfy the officers.

The facts

The proffered explanation did not

We cannot agree with the state, if this is
-:::E.
,.._..

every nervous young

man

paying

cash

for

a

to New York City under an assumed name and carrying two

heavy American Tourister bags may be arrested and held to answer

t

-15-

for a serious felony charge.

v
Because we affirm the Florida Court of
that

Royer

was

being

illegally

detained

Appea~ conclusion

when he

consented

to

search his luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by the
illegality

and

was

ineffective

to

justify

the

search.

The

judgment of the Florida Court of Appeals is accordingly
affirmed.

~?rr~ g t) -2!'1-(o
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and voluntarily" was sustained by the evidence and that the
Court of Appeals was, therefore, in error in setting it aside.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, 11-B, 11-C, and III of the Court's opinion.
Because neither of the courts below considered the question, I do not reach the Government's contention that the
agents did not "seize" the respondent within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. In my view, we may assume for
present purposes that the stop did constitute a seizure. 1 I
would hold-as did the District Court-that the federal agents
had reasonable suspicion that the respondent was engaging in
criminal activity, and, therefore, that they did not violate the
Fourth Amendment by stopping the respondent for routine
questioning.
I
The relevant facts may be stated briefly. The respondent
arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a flight from
Los Angeles. She was the last passenger to leave the aircraft.
1 MR. JusTICE STEWART concludes in Part II-A that there was no "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He reasons that such
a seizure occurs "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave." Ante, at 554. MR. JusTICE STEWART also notes that "'[t]here
is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets.' " Ante, at 5~, quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1, 3~ (1968) (WHITE, J., concurring) . I do not necessarily disagree with the views expressed in Part IT-A. For me, the question
whether the respondent in this case reasonably could have thought she
was free to "walk away" when asked by two Government agents for her
driver's license and ticket is extremely ~·
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Two agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration watched
the respondent enter the terminal, walk to the baggage area,
then change directions and proceed to an Eastern Airlines
ticket counter. After the respondent accepted a boarding
pass for a flight to Pittsburgh, the two agents approached her.
They identified themselves as federal officers, and requested
some identification. The respondent gave them he~r's
license and airline ticket. The agents asked the respondent
several brief questions. The ~espondent accompanied the
agents to an airport office where a body search conducted by a
female police officer revealed two plastic bags of heroin.

II
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), establishes that a reasonable investigative stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment.2 The reasonableness of a stop turns on the facts and
circumstances of each case. In particular, the Court has
emphasized (i) the public interest served by the seizure,
(ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light
of his knowledge and expertise. See Brown v. Texas, 443
U. S. 47, 50-51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648,
654-655 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S.
873, 879-883 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20-22.
A
The public has a compelling interest in detecting those who
would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit. Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our population,
particularly our young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances. Much of the drug traffic
The Terry Court held that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a "stop." This category of police conduct must
survive only the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 392 U. 8., at 20.
1

I

i'
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is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated criminal
syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs,
including heroin, may be easily concealed. As a result, the
obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may be unmatched
in any other area of law enforcement.
To meet this pressing concern, the Drug Enforcement
Administration since 1974 has assigned highly skilled agents
to the Detroit Airport as part of a nationwide program to
intercept drug couriers transporting narcotics between major
drug sources and distribution centers in the United States.
Federal agents have developed "drug courier profiles" that
describe the characteristics generally associated with narcotics
traffickers. For example, because the Drug Enforcement
Administration believes that most drugs enter Detroit from
one of four "source" cities (Los Angeles, San Diego, Miami,
or New York), agents pay particular attention to passengers
who arrive from those places. See United States v. Van Lewis,
409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (ED Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F. 2d 385
(CA6 1977). During the first 18 months of the program,
agents watching the Detroit Airport searched 141 persons in 96
encounters. They found controlled substances in 77 of the
encounters and arrested 122 persons. 409 F. Supp., at 539.
When two of these agents stopped the respondent in February 1976, they were carrying out a highly specialized law
enforcement operation designed to combat the serious societal
threat posed by narcotics distribution.
B
Our cases demonstrate that "the scope of [a] particular
intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, [is] a central element in the analysis of reasonableness." Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 18, n. 15.8 The intrusion in this case was quite
a For example, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (1979), we considered the justification necessary for a random stop of a moving vehicle.
Such stops, which may take place at night or on infrequently traveled

UNITED STATEE v. MENDENHALL
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modest. Two plainclothes agents approached the respondent
as she walked through a public area. The respondent was
near airline employees from whom she could have sought aid
had she been accosted by strangers. The agents identified
themselves and asked to see some identification. One officer
asked the respondent why her airline ticket and her driver's
license bore different names. The agent also inquired how
long the respondent had been in California. Unlike the petitioner in Terry, supra, at 7, the respondent was not physically
restrained. The agents did not display weapons. The questioning was brief. In these circumstances, the respondent
could not reasonably have felt frightened or isolated from
assistance.
~

c

In reviewing the factors that led the agents to stop and
question the respondent, it is important to recall that a
trained law enforcement agent may be "able to perceive and
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly
innocent to the untrained observer." Brown v. Texas, supra,
at 52, n. 2. Among the circumstances that can give rise
to reasonable suspicion are the agent's knowledge of the
methods used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices. Law
enforcement officers may rely on the "characteristics of the
roads, interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and may be
frightening. Id., at 657. Thus, we held that police may not stop a moving vehicle without articulable and reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. We explicitly distinguished our earlier decision in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), which did not require individualized
suspicion for the stop of a motor vehicle at a fixed checkpoint, because a
checkpoint stop constitutes a "lesser intrusion" than a random stop. 440
U. S., at 656. The motorist halted at a permanent checkpoint has less
reason for anxiety because he " 'can see that other vehicles are being stopped
[and] can see visible signs of the officers' authority . . . .'" United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 558, quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422
.u.s. 891, 895 (1975).
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area," and the behavior of a suspect who appears to be evading
police contact. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S.,
at 884-885. "In all situations the officer is entitled to assess
the facts in light of his experience." I d., at 885.
The two officers who stopped the respondent were federal
agents assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Agent Anderson, who initiated the stop and questioned the
respondent, had 10 years of experience and special training in
drug enforcement. He had been assigned to the Detroit Airport, known to be a crossroads for illicit narcotics traffic,4 for
over a year and he had been involved in approximately 100
drug-related arrests. App. 7-8.
The agents observed the respondent as she arrived in Detroit
from Los Angeles. The respondent, who appeared very
nervous, engaged in behavior that the agents believed was
designed to evade detection. She deplaned only after all
other passengers had left the aircraft. Agent Anderson testified that drug couriers often disembark last in order to have
a clear view of the terminal so that they more easily can
detect government agents. I d., at 9. Once inside the terminal
the respondent scanned the entire gate area and walked "very,
very slowly" toward the baggage area. ld., at 10 (testimony
of Agent Anderson). When she arrived there, she claimed
no baggage. Instead, she asked a skycap for directions to the
Eastern Airlines ticket counter located in a different terminal.
Agent Anderson stood in line immediately behind the respondent at the ticket counter. Although she carried an American
Airlines ticket for a flight from Detroit to Pittsburgh, she
asked for an Eastern Airlines ticket. An airline employee gave
her an Eastern Airlines boarding pass. Id., at 10-11. Agent
Anderson testified that drug couriers frequently travel with4

From 1975 through 1978, more than 135 pounds of heroin and 22
pounds of cocaine were seized at the Detroit Airport. In 1978, 1,536
dosage units of other dangerous drugs were discovered there. See 596 F .
2d 706, 708, n. 1 (CA6 1979) (Weick, J., dissenting).
f

I
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out baggage and change flights en route to avoid surveillance.
Ibid. On the basis of these observations, the agents stopped
and questioned the respondent.

III
The District Court, which had an opportunity to hear Agent
Anderson's testimony and judge his credibility, concluded that
the decision to stop the respondent was reasonable. 5 I agree.
The public interest in preventing drug traffic is great, and the
intrusion upon the respondent's privacy was minimal. The
specially trained agents acted pursuant to a. well-planned, and
effective, federal law enforcement program. They observed
respondent engaging in conduct that they reasonably associated
with criminal activity. Furthermore, the events occurred in an
airport known to be frequented by drug couriers.' In light of
all of the circumstances, I would hold that the agents possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity when they stopped the respondent in a public place and
asked her for identification.
The jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment demands
consideration of the public's interest in effective law enforcement as well as each person's constitutionally secured right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In applying
~

5 Although the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District
Court, it did not explicitly reject this conclusion of law. See id., at 707.
The dissenting judge noted that the Court of Appeals failed to take issue
with the District Court's conclusion that the agents had reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. /d ., at 709 (Weick, J.).
e The results of the Drug Enforcement Agency's efforts at the Detroit
Airport, see supra, at 562, support the conclusion that considerable drug
traffic flows through the Detroit Airport. Contrary to MR. JusTICE
WHITE's apparent impression, post, at 573-574, n. 11, I do not believe that
these statistics establish by themselves the reasonableness of this search.
Nor would reliance upon the "drug courier profile" necessarily demonstrate
reasonable suspicion. Each case raising a Fourth Amendment issue must
be judged on its own facts.

J
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a test of "reasonableness," courts need not ignore the considerable expertise that law enforcement officials have gained from
their special training and experience. The careful and commendable police work that led to the criminal conviction
at issue in this case satisfies the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN,
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JusTICE STEVENS join,
dissenting.
The Court today concludes that agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) acted lawfully in stopping
a traveler changing planes in an airport terminal and escorting her to a DEA office for a strip-search of her person. This
result is particularly curious because a majority of the
Members of the Court refuse to reject the conclusion that
Ms. Mendenhall was "seized," while a separate majority decline
to hold that there were reasonable grounds to justify a seizure.
MR. JusTICE STEWART concludes that the DEA agents acted
lawfully, regardless of whether there were any reasonable
grounds for suspecting Ms. Mendenhall of criminal activity,
because he finds that Ms. Mendenhall was not "seized" by the
DEA agents, even though throughout the proceedings below
the Government never questioned the fact that a seizure had
occurred necessitating a showing of antecedent reasonable
suspicion. MR. JusTICE PoWELL's opinion concludes that
even though Ms. Mendenhall may have been "seized," the
) seizure was lawful because her behavior while changing
planes in the airport provided reasonable suspicion that she
was engaging in criminal activity. The Court then concludes, based on the absence of evidence that Ms. Mendenhall resisted her detention, that she voluntarily consented to
being taken to the DEA office, even though she in fact had
no choice in the matter. This conclusion is inconsistent with
OUl' recognition that consent cannot be presumed from a
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Solicitor General McCree, Assi8tant Attorney General Heymann, and Deputy Solicitor General Frey.
Bruce 1. Ennis, Jr.', argued the 'cause for the American Civil
Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With
him on the brief.was Lawrence H erman.•
delivered the opinion of the Court.
As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant
. to search a house for narcotics, they encountered respondent
descending the front steps. They requested his assistance in
gaining entry and detained him while they searched the
{!!emi!fs. After finding narcotics in the basement and ascertaining that respondent owned the house, the police arrested
him, searched his person, and found in his coat pocket an
envelope containing 8..5 grams of heroin.1
JusTICE STEVENS

·. *David Crump and Michael C. . Kuhn filed a brief for John B.
Holmes, Jr., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. ·
1 The execution of the warrant is described in greater detail in Justice
Moody's opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court:
.
"Upon arriving at the named llddress, Officer Roger Lehman saw the
defendant go out the front door of the house and proceed · acr068 the
porch and down the steps. When defendant was asked to open the door
he replied that he could not because he left his keys inside, but he could
ring someone over the intercom. Dwight Calhoun· came to the door, but
did not ~dmit the police officers. ~ a result, the officers obtained entrance to the premises by forcing open the front door. Once admittance
had been gained Officer Lehman instructed Officer Conant, previously stationed along the side of the house, to bring the defendant, ·still on the
porch, into the house.
,
.
,.
"After the eight occupants of the house were detained, a search of the
premises revealed two plastic bags of suspected' narcotics under the bar in
the basement. After finding the suspected narcotics in the basement and
upon determining that the defendant was the o'wner of the house, Officer
Conant formally arrested the defendant for violation of the Controlled
Substances Act of 1971. MCL 335.341 (4)(a); MSA 18.1070 (41)(4)(a).
A custodial search conducted by Officer Conant revealed a plastic bag containing suspected heroin in the defendant's jacket · pocket. It is this
heroin, discovered on the person of the defendant, that forms the basis

I
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Respondent was charged with possession of the heroin
found on his person. He moved to suppress the heroin as
the product of an illegal search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, 2 and the trial judge granted the motion and
quashed the information. That order was affirmed by a
divided panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals, 68 Mich.
App. 571, 243 N. W. 2d 689, and by the Michigan Supreme
Court over the dissent of three of its justices. 407 Mich.
432, 286 N. W. 2d 226. We granted the State's petition for
certiorari, 449 U. S. 898, and now reverse.
I
The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial
detention of respondent violated his constitutional right to
be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person. The
State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's
person by arguing that the authority to search premises
granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to
search persons on those premises, just as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and containers
in which the particular things described might be concealed.
But as the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly noted, even
if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify the
. initial detention of respondent outside the premises described
in the warrant. See 68 Mich. App., at 578-580, 243 N. W.

I

of the instant possession charge." 407 Mich. 432, 441, 286 N. W. 2d 226,
22~227.
2

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The Fourteenth Amendment requires the several States to secure these
rights. See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 576; Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200, 207.
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2d, at 692-693. If that detention was permissible, there is
no need to reach the question whether a search warrant for
premises includes the ri~ht
to search persovs found there,
,
because when the police earched respondent, they had probable cause-to arre-;mm-arufnad donesoT Our appraiSal of
the validit~ searhli"oTrespoiident's person therefore 1/,vJ_
depends . upon _a determination whether the · officers had the
authority to require him to re-enter the house and to rem~ c:;?
there while they conducted their search.• . .
"
~

• Because there were sl.'veral other occupants of the house, under Michigan law the evidence that. narcotics had been found in the basement of
respondent's house would apparently be insufficient to support a conviction. See People v. Davenport, 39 Mich. App. 252, 197 N. W. 2d 521
(1972). The Michigan Court of Appeals relied on Davenport to conclude
that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest or search respondent
even though he was the owner of a house in which contraband was found.
68 Mich. App., at 580-582, 243 N. W. 2d, at 692-693. Judge Bashara,
dissenting in the Court of Appeals, id., at 585, ~43 N. W. 2d, at 695,
and the three dissenting justices of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4ffl
Mich:, at 450, 463-464, 286 N. W. 2d, at 231, 237, pointed out that
Davenport, which concerns the proof necessary to support a conviction,
is not dispositive of the question whether the police had probable cause to
arrest . . See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 174-176. Regardless of whether the police had probable cause to arrest respondent under
Michigan law, probable cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is not at issue here. Respondent does not challenge the conclusion
that the evidence found iD his home established probable cause to arrest
him. See Brief for Respondent 17. ·
... ~
4 The "seizure" issue in this case should not be confused with ~
''search" issue presented in Ybarra v. 'Jllinois, 444 U. S. 85. IDYbarra
tli'e police executing a search warrant for a public tavern detained and
searched all of the customers who happened to be present. No question
concerning the legitimacy of the detention was raised. Rather, the Court
concluded that the search of Ybarra was invalid because the police had
no reason to believe he had any special connection with the premises, and
the police had no other basis for suspecting that he was armed or in
possession of contraband. See id., at ~93. In this case, only the deten~n is at issqe. The police . knew respondent lived in the house, and

f

f

!

..

696

~~
fo
O~~ERM,
~~~. .:)
~"'rv -~

..p"
- -~

}JJ; ~J
~

1980

~

v""'

Opinion of the Court

II

.

452 U. S.

.

In assessing the validity of respondent's initial detention,
we note first that it constituted a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 6 The State does not contend
otherwise, and the record demonstrates that respondent was
not free to leave the premises while the officers were searching
his home. It is also clear that respondent was not formally
arrested until after the search was completed. The dispute
therefore involves only the constitutionality of a pre-arrest
"seizure" which we assume was . unsupported by probable
cause.
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that an official seizure of the person
must be .supported by probable ·cause, even if no formal arrest is made. In that case police officers located a murder
suspect at a neighbor's house, took him into custody, and
transported him to the police station, where interrogation
ultimately produced a confession. Because the suspect was
not arrested until after he had confessed, and because he
presumably would have been set free if probable cause had
not been established during his questioning, the State argued
that the pre-arrest detention should not be equated with an
arrest and should be upheld as "reasonable" in view of the
serious character of the crime and the fact that the police
had an articulable basis for suspecting that Dunaway was
involved. ld., at 207. The Court firmly rejected the State's
argui!lent, noting that "the detention of petitioner was in
they did not search him until after they had probable cause to arrest and
had done so.
6 "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.'' Terry v. Ohio, 392
u.s. 1, 16.
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important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."
Id., at 212..• . We stated: , r
. .· : .
''Indeed, :any 'exception' that couJd cover a seizure as
intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are
'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.
"The central importance of the probable-cause requirement to the protection of a citizen's privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment's guarantees cannot
be compromised in this fashion. 'The requirement of
probable cause has roots that are deep in our history.'
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime
motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that
'oommon rumor or report, suspicion, or even "strong rea.son to suspect" was not adequate to support ·a warrant
for arrest.' ld., at 101 (footnotes Clmitted). The familiar threshold standard of probable ·cause for Fourth
Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of extensive experience accommodating the factors relevant to the 'rea. sonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and
.,. ·· provides the .relative simplicity and clarity necessary to
. -the implementation of a workable rule. See Brinegar
:: : .v. United States, [338 U. S., at 175-176].'' ld., at 213.
Although we refused in Dunaway to find an exception that
would sw&now· the general rule, our opinion ~!_Cognized that
some seizures significantly less intrusive than 8J) arrest haVe
withstood"'scrulmy under the reasonableness standard
_bO'<ned in ili'e F'"ourth Amendment. In these cases the intru-

·em-

• The Court noted that Dunaway was "taken from a neighbor's home
to a l>Olice ear, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation· room." He was not informed that he was free to leave, he would
.not have been free to leave and would have been physically restrained had
be attempted to do so. 442 U. 8., at 212. · S ~ ...A c..')~ c.'"
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sion on the citizen's privacy "was so much less severe" than
that involved in a traditional arrest that uthe opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police
officer's safety" could support the seizure as reasonable. ld.,
at 209.
In the first such case, Terry_ v. Ohjo, 392 U. S. 1, the Court
recognized the narrow authority of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on less than probable cause.
The Court approved a "frisk" for weapons as a justifiable
response to an officer's reasonable belief that he was dealing
with a possibly armed and dangerous suspect. 7 In the second such case, Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, the Court
relied on Terry to hold that an officer could forcibly stop a
suspect to investigate an informant's tip that the suspect
was armed and carrying narcotics. 8 And in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce1 422 U. S. 873, the Court held that the special
enfurcement problems confronted by roving Border Patrol
agents, though not sufficient to justify random stops of vehi7

In upholding the "frisk" employed by the officer in that case, the
Court assumed, without explicitly stating, that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit forcible stops when the officer has a reasonable suspicion
that a crime has been or is being committed. See 392 U. S., at 32-33
(Harlan, J., concurring) . /d., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). In Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146, the Court made explicit what was implicit
in Terry:
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time."
·
See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873; United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411.
8 The Court noted that the informant's tip was insufficient to justify an
arrest or search based on probable cause under Spinelli v. United States,
393 U. S. 410, and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, but the information
"carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop
of Williams." 407 U. S., at 147.
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cles near the Mexican border ro question their occupants
about their citizenship, id., at 882-884,' were adequate ro
support vehicle stops based on the agents' awareness of specific articulable facts indicating that the vehicle contained
illegal aliens. The Court reasoned that the difficulty in patrolling the long Mexican border and the interest in controlling
the influx of illegal aliens justified the limited intrusion, ·'
usually lasting no more than a minute, involved in the stop.
ld., at 87~0. 10 See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S.
411.
These c~s recognize that ~me seizures admittedly cov-.Lc.;.,.;,
ered by the ]'~h Amendment constttute such limite(! in~ l.l
trusions on the personal security o1 those detained and are ~'ate
justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that ""'-2;'
they may be made on less than proba e cause, so long as
police have an articulable basis for suspectin criminal activitY. n ese cases, as m Dunaway, t e
urt was ~4
ing the Ultimate standard of reasonableness"embodied in the
• In several cases, the Court has concluded that the absence of any
articulable facts available to the officer rendered a detention unreasonable. In .Pelaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 663, the Court held that ~..,
police could not malCe random stops of vehicles in order to check drivers' A ~L~
licenses and vehicle registrations in the absence of "articulable and rea- · ~
B2!!able suspicion" that the motorist was unlicensed or the car unregist~~..;!'·~
In Brown v. 1'exfJ8, 443 U. S. 47, we held that a statute requiring ~~
viduals to identify themselves was unconstitutional as applied because the
police did not have any reasonable suspicion that the petitioner had committed or was committmg a cnme. FmaHy, in Ybarra v.IUinoi&, 444 U. 8.
85, we held that police executing a search warrant at a tavern could not
invoice Terry to frisk a patron unless the officers had individualized suspicion that the patron might be armed or dangerous.
·
10 The detention approved in Brignoni-Ponce did not encompass
search
of the vehicle. The Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United Statu,
413 U. S. 266, that such a search must be supported by probable cause.
In United Statu v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, the Court held that
stops at permanent checkpoints involved even less intrusion to a motorist
than the detention by the roving patrol, and thus a stop at BUch a checkpoint need not even be based on any individualiled BUSpicion. ,
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Fourth Amendment. 11 They are consistent with the general
rule that every arrest, and every seizure having the essential
attributes of a formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is
supported by probable cause. But they demonstrate that
the exception for limited intrusions that may be justified
by special law enforcement interests is not confined to the
mom;ntary7" on-the-street detention accompanied by a frisk
for weapons involved in Terry and Adams. 12 Therefore, in
In his opinion for the Court in Terry, Chief Justice Warren identified
"the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" as "the reasonable., : ' ness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
' citizen's personal securi.!J." 392 U. S., at 19. Before analyzing the spe. cific stop and frisk involved in that case, he stated:
.'
·'
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it
~
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances . And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the
action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132 (1925) ; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96-97 (1964)." !d., at 21-22
(footnotes omitted) .
'
12 JusTICE WHITE, concurring in Dunaway, noted that Terry is not
"an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable
cause." Rather, "the key principle. o( the Fourth Amendment is reason~-the balancing of competing interests." 442 U. S., at2Trlf
the purpose underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible criminal
activity-is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be
able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved
in Terry and Adams. As one commentator observed:
"It is clear that there are several investigative techniques which may be
utilized effectively in the course of a Terry-type stop. The most common
is interrogation, which may include both a request for identification and
inquiry concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained. Sometimes the · officer will communicate with others, either police or private
citizens, in an effort to verify the explanation tendered or to confirm the
identification or determine whether a person of that identity is otherwise
wanted. Or, the suspect may be detained while it is determined if in fact
11
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order to decide whether this case is controlled by the general
rule, it is necessary to examine both the character of the
Q;fficial intrusion ana its justification.

-

J

lll
Of prime importance in 88Sessing the intrusion is the fact
that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's
house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate
had found probable cause to believe that the law was being
violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The
detention of one of .the residents while the premises were
searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his
liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself.11
Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens-unless they
intend flight to avoid arrest-would elect to remain in order
to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermore, the
type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by
the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be
obtained through the search and not through the detention.14
an offense has occurred in the area, a process which might involve checking
certain premises, locating and examining objects abandoned by the suspect,
or talking with other people. If it is known that an offense has occurred
in the area, the suspect may be viewed by witnesses to the crime. There
is no reason to conclude that any investigative methods of the type just
listed are inherently objectionable; they might cast doubt upon the
reasonableness of the detention, however, if their use makes the period of
detention unduly long or involves moving the suspect to another locale."
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978).
11 "As the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the 'physical entry of
the home 1s the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' United States v. U'R.ited Statu District Court, 4(!1 U. S.
297, 313. And we have long adhered to the view that the warrant procedure minimizes the ·danger of needless intrusions of that sort.'' Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S., at 585-586.
·
u Professor LaFave has noted that the reasonableness of a detention
may be determined in part by "whether the police are diligently pur-
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ers, however, the decision will be made ·
openly and deliberately, and considerations ·
of "speed, flexibility, and secrecy" will be
inapposite. Indeed, in view of. management's admitted duty to bargain over· the.
effects of a closing, see ante, at 2580, n. 15,
it is difficult to understand why additional
, bargaining over the the closing itself would
necessarily unduly delay or publicize .the
decision. •·
·
·
·
.. ,
. I am not in ·a position to judge whethe~
mandatory bargaining <over partial closings ·
in all cases is r.onsistent with our national
labor policy, and neither is the Court. ·. The

. State of

~ICH~GAN,

Petitioner,

v.

George SUMMERS.
No. 79-1794.

.

. Argued Feb. 25, 1981.

.

Decided June 22, 1981.

. Defendant was .c harged· with possession
of- heroin and .moved to suppress. The Re,:.
co
. rder's Cou~t of Detroit, Wayne· County,.

primary resP<>nsibility to determi.ne the
scope of -the statutory duty .to bargain has·
been entrusted to the NLRB, which should Robert J. Colombo, J.~ suppressed the he~oin
not be reversed b}r the · courts merely be- and quashed the information, and the Micli- "
cause they might prefer another view.of the igan Co~ of Appeals,. 68 Mich.App. 571, .
statute. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. · 243. N.W.2d 689, affirmed. The state.
488, 495-497, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1~1849, 60 · pealed. The Michigan Supreme Court, 407
L.Ed.2d 420 (1979);- see NLRB v. Erie Re.:. Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226, affirmed. . Cersistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221,236,83 S.Ct..1139, tiorari was granted. The. Supreme Court,
1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963). I therefore Justice Stevens, held that if the evidence
ab>-ree with the Court of Appeals that em.- that a citizen's residence is harboring con.;_
ployers presumptively have a duty to bar- ' traband is sufficient to persuad~ a judicial
gain over a decision to close an operation, -. officer that an invasion of th~ citizen's priand that this presumption can be rebutted vacy is justified, it is _constitutionally ·reaby a showing that bargaining would be sonable to require that citizen to remain
futile, that the closing was due to emergen- ·
cy financial circumstances, or that; for some .. while officers of the law execute a valid
other reason, bargaining would not further warrant to search his home; .thus, for
the purposes of the National · Labor Rela-- Fourth Amendment purposes, a warrant to
tions Act. 627 F.2d 596, 601 (CA2 1980). I search for contraband founded on probable ·
believe· that this · approach is amply sup-' cause implicitly carries with it the limited
ported by recent decisions of the Board. E. authority to detain the occupa~ts at the ·
i :, Brooks-Scan/on, · Inc., 246 N.L.R.B.' No. premises while. a proper. search is conducted:. . 76, 102 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1979); Raskin Pack. Co., 246 N .L.R.B. No." 15, 102 L.R.R.M.
Reversed.
•· :··.
mg
1489 (1979); 1"!. ~ M. Transportation Co.,
Justice Stew~rt filed a dissenting opin.:::·
239 N.L.R.B. 73 (1978). With respect to the ion in which ""
Justice Brennan and Justice
individual facts of this case, however, I Marshall joined.
would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and remand to the Board for further examination of the-evidence. See SEC
l. Arrest 4b63.5(5)
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95, 63
Even if warrant to search defendant's
S.Ct. 454, 462, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).
residence implicitly granted authority to
·search persons on those premises, just as
that authority included authorization to
search furniture and containers in which
particular things described might be cop-

ap- .
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magistrate rather than officer in field has
made critical determination that police
should be given special authorization to
thrust themselves into privacy· of home;
connection of occupant to that home gives
2. Arrest <3=63.5(1)
.
police officer easily identifiable and certain
.Where · police officers executing war- · basis for determining that suspicion of
rant to search house for narcotics encoun- criminal activity justifies detention of that
tered defendant descending front steps, occupant. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4.
they requested his assistance in gaining en- .
7.' Arrest <3=63.5(3)
try and detained him while they searched
If evidence that citizen's residence is
premises, initial detention of defendant conharboring contraband is sufficient to perstituted "seizure" within meaning of
suade judicial officer that invasion of citi· Fourth
Amendment.
U.S.C.A.Const.
zen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionalAmend. 4.
ly reasonable to require that citizen to reSee ·publication Words and Phrases
main while officers of law execute valid
· for other judicial constructions and
- warrant to search his home, and, therefore,
·- definitions.
warrant to search for contraband founded
.'
3. Arrest <3=63.5(1)
on probable· cause implicitly carries with it
Some seizures admittedly covered by limited authority · to detain occupant . of
Fourth Amendment constitute such limited premises while proper search is conducted.
intrusions on personal security of those de- U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4.
tained and are justified by such substan~ial
law enforcement interests that they may be.
Syl!abus •
made on less than probable cause, so long as
When police officers executing a warpolice have articulable basis for suspecting . ,.--......
rant to search a house
for narcotics ..____
encoun;
criminal activity. U.S.C.A.Const .. Amend. 4. tered res ondent descending the front
steps, they requeste 1s assistance in gain4. Arrest <3=63.1
i;g-entry and ~ined him . while ~
Every arrest, and every seizure having
searched the prem1ses. After fmdmg naressential attributes of formal arrest, is un- 'cotics and ascertaining that respondent
reasonable u~less supported by probable owned the house, the police arrested him,
cause. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4.
search~d his person, and found heroin in his
coat pocket. Respondent, who was charged
5. Arrest <3=63.5(3)
In assessing justification for detention with possession of the heroin found on his
of an ~cupant of premises being searched person, moved to suppress the heroin as the
for contraband pursuant to a valid w~rrant, product of an illegal search in violation of
both law enforcement interest and nature the Fourth Amendment. The trial judge
of "articulable facts" supporting detention granted the motion and quashed the inforare relevant. U.S.C.A.Const. Amen'd. 4. mation, and both the Michigan Court of
Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court
6. Arrest <3=63.5(3)
affirmed.
Existence of search warrant p~ovides
Held: The initial detention of responobjective justification for detention of occu- dent, which constituted a "seizure" and was
pant of h~me subject to warrant in that assumed to be unsupported by probable
judicial officer has determined that police cause, did not violate his constitutional
have probable cause to believe that someone right to be secure against an unreasonable
in home is committing a crime and neutral seizure of his person. For Fourth Amendcealed, that authority could not justify initial detention of defendant outside premises
described in warrant.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 4.

-

.

~.

.

.

.

• The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of

the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,337,26 S.Ct. 282,287, 50
L.Ed. 499.
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ment purposes: a warranuo search for cont~ounded on probable ca~se ir;!_P]icitly carries with it the limited author· y to
de m
occupants o .e premi s while
a proper searc IS conducted. Because it
was lawful to require respondent to r~n
ter and . to remain in the house until evidence establishing probable cause to arrest
him was found, his arrest and the search
incident thereto were constitutionally permissible. Pp. _2589-2595. ·
,·
407 Mich. .432, 286 N.W.2d 226, re-,
versed.
..._, .
!
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narcotics, they encounter~ respondent descending the front steps. They requested
his assistance .in gaining entry and detained _
him while they searched the premises. After finding narcotics in the basement and
ascertaining that respondent owned. the
house, the police arrested him, searched his
person, and found in his coat ·,pocket an
env~lope containing 8.5 grams of heroin. 1

Respondent was charged with possession
of the heroin found on his l>erson. · He
moved to suppress the heroin ¥ th~ product . r
../ :..
of an· illegal search in violation of the
Fourth Am~ndment,z · and . the trial judge
Timothy A- Baughman, Detroit, Mich.,'
granted
the motion and quashed the inforfor petitioner. .
mation. That order was affirmed by a di-.
Elliott Schulder, Washington, D. C;,__ for. vided panel of the Michigan Court of Apthe U. S., as amicus curiae, by specialleiwe
peals, 68 Mich.App. 571, 243 N.W.2d 689,
of Court.
and by the Michigan Supreme Court over
Gerald M. Lorence, Detroit, Mich., ,for the dissent of three of its justices. 407
respondent.
Mich. 432,286 N.W.2d 226. We gran¥ the
Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., New York City, for State's petition for certiorari, - - · U.S. the American Civil Liberties Union, as ami- - - , 101 S.Ct. 265, 66 L.Ed.24 127, and
cus curiae, by special leave of Court.
now reverse.
~

Justice STEVENS deliv.ered the opinion
of the Court.
As Detroit police officers were about to
execute a· warrant to search a house for

\
I

l

I
[l] The dispositive question in ' this ~
is whether the initial detention of respon-

1. The execution of the warrant is described in
stances Act of 1971. M.C.L. § 335.341(4)(a);
greater detail in Justice Moody's opinion for
M.S.A. § 18.1070(41)(4)(a). A custodial search
the Michigan Supreme Court:
conducted by Officer Conant revealed a plastic
"Upon arriving at the named address, Officer
bag containing suspected heroin fn the defendRoger Lehman saw the defendant go out the
ant's jacket pocket. It is this heroin, discoverfront door of the house and proceed across the
ed on the person of the defendant, that forms
porch and down the steps. When defendant
the basis of the instant possession charge."
was asked to open the door he replied that he
407 Mich., at 441, 286 N.W.2d, at 226-227.
could not because he left his keys inside, but he
could ring someone over the intercom. Dwight 2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States ·
Calhoun came to the door, but did no~ admit
·Constitution provides:
·the police officers. As a result, the officers
"The right of the people to be secure in their
obtained entrance to the premises by forcing •
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
open the front door. Once admittance had
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
been gained Officer Lehman instructed Officer
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
Conant, previously stationed along the side of
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
the house, to bring the defendant, still on the
affirmation, and particularly describing . the
porch, into the house.
place to be searched, and the"persons or things
"After the eight occupants of the house were
to be seized."
detained, a search of the premises revealed two
The Fourteenth Amendment requires the severplastic bags of suspected narcotics under the
al States to secure these rights. See Payton v.
bar in the basement. After finding the suspectNew York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 ·s.Ct. 1371, .
ed narcotics in the basement and upon deter1374, 63 L.Ed.2d 639; Dunaway v. New York,
mining that the defendant was the owner of the
442 U.S. 200, 207, 99 S.Ct.' 2248, 2253, 60
house, Officer Conant formally arrested the deL.Ed.2d 824.
fendant for violation of the Controlled Sub-
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dent violated his constitutional right to be
secure against an unreasonable seizure of
his person. The State attempts to justify
the eventual search of respondent's person
by arguing . that the authority to search
premi~s granted by the warrant implicitly
included the authority to search persons on
..thOse premises, .just as that authority in- .
eluded an authorization to search furniture
and containers in which the partic'ular
thingS de5cribed might be concealed. But
as the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly
; noted, everi if . othe_r:wise acceptable, this
argument co~ld 'not justify the initial de. tention of respondent outside the premises
described in the warrant. See 68 Mich.
App., at 57&-580, 243 N.W.2d, at 692-693.
If that detention was permissible, there is
· no need to reach the question whether a
search warrant for premises includes the
right to .sea."Ch persons found there, because
when. the police searched respondent, they
· had probable cause to arrest him and had
done so.3 Our appraisal of the validity of
the search ·of respondent's person therefore
depends ~pen a determination whether the

officers had the authority to require him to
re-enter the house and to remain there
while they conducted their search.4
II
[2] In assessing the validity of respondent's initial detention, we note first that it
constituted a "seizure'~ ;ithin the meaning
o~dment. 5 The State
does not contend otherwise, and the record
demonstrates that respondent was not free
to leave the premises while the officers
wete searching his home. It is also clear
that respondent was not formally arrested
until after the search was completed. The
dispute therefore involve!t only the constitu. tionality of a pre-;1rrest "seizure" which we
assume was unsupported by probable cause.
.
.
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
99 ,S.Ct: 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, the Court
reaffirmed the general rule that an official
seizure of the person must be supported by
·probable cause, even if no formal arrest is
made. In that case police offieers located a
murder suspect at a neighbor's house, took

3. Because there were several other occupants · 4. The "seizure" issue in this case should not be
of the house, under Michigan law the evidence
confused with the ."search" issue presented in
that narcotics had been found in the basement
Ybarra v. J/Jinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62
of respondent's house would apparently be inL.Ed.2d 238. In· Ybarra the police executing a
sufficient to support a conviction. See People
search warrant for a public tavern detained and
v. Davenport, 39 Mich.App. 252, 197 N.W.2d
searched all of the customers who happened to
521 (1972). The · Michigan Court -of Appeals
be present. No question .concerning the legitirelied on Davenport to coqclude that the offimacy of the detention was raised. Rather, the
cers did not have probable cause to arrest or
Court concluded that the search of Ybarra was
search respondent even though he was the
inyalid because. the police had no reason to
owner of a house in which contraband was
believe he had any special connection with the
found. 68 Mich.App., at 580-582, 243 N.W.2d,
premises, and the police had n.o other basis for
at 692-693. Judge Bashara, dissenting in the
suspecting that he was armed or in possession
Court of Appeals, 68 Mich.App., at 585, 243
of contraband. See -!44 U.S., at 90-93, 100
N.W.2d, at 695, and t.he three dissenting jusS:Ct., at 341- 343. In this case, only the detentices of the Michigan Supreme court, 407
tion is at issue. The police knew respondent
Mich., at 450, 463-464, 286 N.W.2d, at 231,
lived in the house, and they did not search him
237, pointed out that Davenport, which conuntil after they had probable cause to arrest
cerns the proof necessary to support a convicand had done so.
tion, is not dispositive of the question whether
the police had probable cause to arrest. See
5. "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment
Brinegar v. United States, 383 U.S. 160, 174governs 'seizures' of persons which do not
176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310- 1311," 93 L.Ed. 1879.
eventuate in a trip to the station house and
Regardless of whether the police haQ probable
prosecution for crime--'arrests' in traditional
cause to arrest respondent under Michigan law,
terminology. It must be recognized that when..probable cause within the meaning of the
e-:er a police officer accosts an individual and
Fourth Amendment is not at issue here. Rerestrains his freedom to walk away, he has
spondent does not challenge the conclusion .
'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S.
that the evidence found in his home established
I, 16. 88 S.Ct. 1868. 1877, 20 L.Ed2d 889.
probable cause to arrest him. See Brief for
Respondent 17.
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him into custody and transported him to the
adequate to support a warrant for arrest.'
police station, where interrogation ultiId., at 101 [80 S.Ct., at 170] (footnotes
mately produced a confession. Because the · omitted). The familiar thre,shold stansuspect was not arrested until after he had
dard of probable cause for Fourth
confessed, and because he presumably
Amendment seizures reflects the benefit
·would have been set free if probable cause
of extensive experience accom}nodating
had not been eStablished during his questhe factors relevant to the 'reasonabletioning, the State argued tha:t the pre-arness' requirement of the Fourth Amendrest detention should not be equated with
ment, and provides the relative simplicity
an arrest and should be upheld as "reasonaand clarity necessary to the implementable" in view of 'the serious character of the
tion of a workable rule. See Brinegar ·v.
crime and the fact that the police had an
United States, [338 U.S., at 175-176, 69
articulable basis for suspecting that Duna-.
S.Ct., at 1310-1311]." . Id., at 213, 99
way was involved. Id., at 207, 99 S.Ct.,, at
. S.Ct., at 2256.
2253. The Court firmly rejected the State's
Although we refused in ~ to find
argument, noting that "the detention of
petitioner was in important resi>ects indis- ·an exception that would swallow the genertinguishable from a traditional arrest." Id., al rule, ,?UI' opinion recognized that some
seizures significantly less intrusive than an
at 212, 99 S.Ct., at 2256.& We stated:
~
·have ' withstood scrutiny, under the
"Indeed, any 'exception' that could cover arrest
a seizure as intrusive as that- in this case·. reasonableness standard embodied in the
would threaten to swallow the general- Fourth Amendment. . In these cases the
rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are intrusion on the citizen's privacy "was so
'reasonable' only if based on probable much leSs severe" than that involved in a
cause.
· -traditional arrest that "the opposing inter"The cer{tral importance of the proba- . ests in crime prevention and detection_and
ble-cause z:equirement to the protection in the police officer's safety" could support
of a citizen's privacy afforded by the the seizure as reasonable. Id., at 209, 99
Fourth Amendment's guarantees cannot ~.Ct., at 2254 ·
be compromised in this fashion. 'The reIn the first such case, Terry v. Ohio, 392
quirement of probable cause has ·roots U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, the
that are deep in our . history:' Henry v. Court recognized the narrow authority of
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 [80 S.Ct. police officers who suspect criminal activity
168, 170, 4 L.Ed.2d 134] (1959). Hostility· to make limited intrusions on an individuto seizures based on mere suspicion was a al's personal sec~rity based on less than
prime motivation for the adoption of the probable ·cause. The Court approved . a
Fourth Amendment, and decisions imme- · "frisk" for weapons as a justifiable rediately after its adoption affirmed that sponse to an officer's reasonable belief that
'common rumor_or report, suspicion, or he was dealing with a possibly armed and
even "strong r~n to suspect" was no~ dangerous s~spect. 7 In the second such

-

.

6. The Court noted that Dunaway was "taken
from a neighbor's home to a police car. transported to a police station, and placed in an
interrogation room." He was not informed
that he was free to leave; he would not have
been free to leave and would have been physically restrained had he attempted to do so. 442
U.S., a t 212, 99 S;Ct., at 2256.
7.

In upholding the "frisk" employed by the
officer in that case, the Court assumed, without ·
explicitly stating, that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit forcible stops when the offi-

cer has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has
been or is being committed . . See id., at 32-33,
88 S.Ct., at 1885-1886 (HARLAN, J., concur·
ring). ld., at 34, 88 S.Ct., at 1886 (WHITE, J.,
·concurring). In Adams v. Williams, 401 U.S.
143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed2d 612,
the Court made explicit what was implicit in
Terry:
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while obtaining
more information, m.a y be most reasonable in

I
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case, ~ dams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 border and the interest in controlling the
- S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, the Court relied influx of illegal aliens justified the limited
on Terry to hold that an officer could fo~ci- intrusion, usually lasting no more than a
-bly stop a suspect to investigate an infor- minute, involved in the stop. Id., at 87&mant's tip that the suspect was arined and 880, 95 S.Ct., at 2578, 2579.10 See also United States v. Cortez, U.S. - - , 101
ca~ng narcotics.8 f\nd in United States
_·v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. S.Ct~
90, 6 L.Ed.2d 621.
_ 257~ 45 L.Ed.2d 607, the Court Jteld that
[3
These cases recognize that some
the spec~~forcement proble!ps confront- seizu s admittedly covered by the Fourth
ed by roving Border Patrol agents~ though Amendment constitute such limited intrunot". sufficient· to justify random stops of sions on the personal security of those devehicles near the Mexican bo!<le·r to ques- tained and are justified by such substantial
_, tion their occupants atx>ut their citizenship, l~w enforcement interests that they may be
id., at 882-884, 95 S.Ct., at 2580-2581,9 ·were milae on less than probable cause, so long as
adequate to support vehicle stops based on police ·have an articulable basis for suspectthe agents' awareness of specific articulable . ing criminal activity. In these. cases, as in
facts indicating that the vehicle contained Dunaway, the· Court was applyin the ulti~
illegal aliens. The Court reasoned that the Ull!,te standard of reasonao eness em~ied
11 They are condifficulty in patrolling the long Mexican in the Four!h Amendment.
.
.
.
light of the facts known to the officer at the
time,"
See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574,-45 L.Ed.2d 607; United
States v. Cortez,- U.S.-- , 101 S.Ct. 690,
- 66 L.Ed2d 621.
8. The Court noted that the info'rmant's tip was
insufficient to justify an arrest or search based
on probable cause under Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d
637, and Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84
S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, but the information
"carried enough indicia of reliability to justify
the officer's forcible stop of Williams." 407
U.s.; at 147, 92 S.Ct., at 1924.
9.

In several cases, the Court has concluded that
the absence of any articulable facts available to
the officer rendered a detention unreasonable.
. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, the Court held
that police could not make random stops of
vehicles in order to check drivers licenses and
vehicle registrations in the absence of "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the motor. ist was unlicensed or the car unregistered. In
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61
L.Ed.2d 357, we held that a statute requiring
individuals to identify themselves was unconstitu"tional as applied because the police did not
have any reasonable suspicion that the petitioner had committed or was committing a
crime. Finally, "in Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, we
held that police executing search warrant at a
tavern could not invoke Terry to frisk a patron
unless the officers had individualized suspicion
that the patron might be armed or dangerous.

a

10. The detention approved in Brignoni-Ponce
did not encompass a search of the vehicle. The

Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct 253S, 37 L.Ed2d
596, that such a search must be supported by
probable cause. In United States v. lvlartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d
1 U6, the Court held that stops at permanent
checkpoints involved even less intrusion to a
motorist than the detention by the rovirtg patrol, and thus a stop at such a checkpoint need
not even be based on any individualized suspicion.
II. In his opinion for the Court in Terry, Chief
Justice Warren identified "the central inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment" as "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." 392 U.S., at 19, 88 S.Ct. , at 1878.
Before analyzing the specific stop and frisl<
involved in that case, he stated:
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that
at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the
more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who
-must evaluate the reasonableness of a particulal'- search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged
against an objective standard: · would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States.
267 U.S. 132, (45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543) ·
(1925); Beck V . Ohio, 379 u .s ·. 89, 96-97, [85
S.Ct. 223, 228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142] (1964)." 392
U.S., at 21 - 22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879--1880 (footnotes omitted).
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sistent with the general rule that every tial invasion of the ·privacy of the persons
arrest, and every seizure having the essen- who resided there. The detention of one of
tial attributes of a formal arrest, is unl,"ea- the residents while the premises were
sonable unless it is supported by probable searched, although admittedly a significant
cause. But .they demonstrate that the ex- restraint on his liberty, was surely less inception for li~ited intrusions that may be 1 trusiv_e than the search itself. 13 rndeed, we
justified by special law .enforcement inter- may safely assume that most citi2ens-unests is not confined to the momentary, on- less they intend flight to.- avoid arrestthe-street detention aCcompanied by a frisk would eleet to remain in order to observe
for weapons involved in Terry and Adams.12 the search of their possessions. FurtherTherefore, in order to decide whether . this more,. the type of detention imposed here is
case is controlled by the general rule, it is not likely to be exploited by the officer or
necessary to examine both tlte character a( ~!\duly prolonged. in ~ order to gain . more :
the official intrusion and its justificatio~. \ 'tififormation, because. the information the
. ~· ·
·
'
officers seek normally: will be obtained
··· III
· · ·:: through the- search .and_not through the
Of prime importance in assessing the iri- detention.14 Moreover, beCause the deten-•
trusion is the fact that the police had ·. iion in this case was. in. respondent's own
residence, it could add only minimally to the.
obtained a . warrant" ' to search.·respondent's
I
house for contraband. A neutral and de- public ·stigma associated with the search
tached magistrate had found probable cause· itself and would involve neither the inconto believe that the law was being violated · ·venience nor the indignity associated with a
in that house and had authorized a substan- compelled visit to the police station. 15 In
12. Justice WHITE, · concurring in Duna~ay,
noted that Terry is not "an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of-probable
cause." Rather, "the key principle of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness--the bal- :
ancing of competing interests." 442 U.S., at
219, 99 S.Ct., at 2260 (WHITE, J., concurring).
If the purpose underlying a Terry stop-investi-·
gating possible criminal activity-is · to be
served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for
longer than the brief time period involved in
Terry and Adams. As one commentator observed:
"It is clear that there are several investigative
techniques which may be utilized effectively in
the course of a Terry-type stop. The most ·
common is interrogation, which may include
bOth a request for identification and inquiry
concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained. Sometimes the officer will communicate with others, either police or private
citizens, ,in an effort to verify the explanation
tendered or to confirm the identification or
determine whether a person of that identity· is
otherwise wanted. Or, the su's pect may be
detained while· it ·is determined if in fact an
offense has occurred irr the area, a process .
· which might involve checking certain premises,
locating and examining objects abandoned by
the suspect, or talking with other people. If it
is known that an offense has occurred in the
area , the suspect may be viewed ·by witnesses
to the crime. There is no reason to conclude
that any investigative methods of the type just
/OJ S .Ct.-55

r·.

are

listed
inherently objectionable; they might
cast doubt upon the reasonableness of the detention, however, if their use makes the period ,
of detention unduly long or involves moving
·the suspect to another locale.'" 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978).
.13. "As the Court reiterated just a fe~ years
ago, the 'physical entry of the home is the ~hief
. evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is d·irected.' United States v. United States District Court,-407 U.S. 297, 313, [92
S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed:2d 752]. And we
have long adhered to the. view that the warrant
procedure minimizes the danger of needless
intrusions of that sort." Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 585-586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 137~ · .
1380..

-

14. Professor LaFave has noted that the reasonableness of a detention .may be determined in
part by "[w)hether the police are diligently
pursuing a means of investigation which is likely to resolve the matter one way or another
very soon .. . " 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 9.2, p. 40 (1978).
15. Moreover, unlike the seizure in Dunaway,
which was designed to provide an opportunity
· for interrogation and, did lead to Dunaway"s
' confession, the seizure in this case is not likely·
to have coercive aspects likely to induce self~in
crimination.
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sharp contrast to the custodial interrogation
in Dunaway, the detention of this respondent was "substantially less intrusive" than
-an arrest. 442 U.S., at 210, 99 S.Ct., · at
2255.1'
[5] In asse.Ssing the -justification for the
detention of an <>ccupant of premises being
searched for contraband pursuant to a valid
warrant, both the law'eriforcement interest
and the nature of the "articulable facts"
· supporting the detention are relevant.
Most obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight · in the
event that incrimin~ting evidence is found.
Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importance,-is the interest in. minimizing the
risk of harm to the officers. Although no
special danger to the police .is suggested by
the evidence in this record, the e_xecution of
a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind
of transaction that may give rise to sudden·
violence or . frantic efforts to conceal or
destroy evidence. 17 The risk of harm to
both the police and the occupants 'is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Cf. 2
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9, pp.
150-151 (1978)~ Finally, the orderly com- .
pletion of the search may be facilitated if
the occupants of the premises are present.
Their self-interest may induce them to open

locked doors or locked containers to avoid
the use of force that is not only damaging
to property but may also ·delay the comple'
tion of the task at' hand.
[6] It is also appropriate to cons.ider the
nature of the articulable and"individualized
suspicion on which the police base the detention of the occupant of a home subject to
a search warrant. We have already ,noted
that the detention represents. only an incremental intrusion : on personal liberty when
the search of a home has been authorized
by a valid warrant. The existence. of a
search 'w arrant, however, also provides an
objective justification for the detention. A
judicial officer has determined that police
have probable cause to believe that someone
in the home is committing a crime. Thus a
·neutral magistrate rather than an officer in
the field has made the critical determination that the police should be given a special
authorization to thrust themselves into the
privacy of a home. 18 The connection of an
occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis
for determining that suspicion of criminal
activity justifies a detention of that occupant.
[7) In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 100 S.Ct. 1~71, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, we held

)

16. We do not view the fact · that respondent
was leaving his house.whim the officers antved
to be of constitutional significance. The seizure of respondent on the sidewalk outside was
no more intrusive than the detention · of those
· · residents of the house that the police foun_d
inside.
17. The fact that our holding today deals with a
case in which the police had a warrant does
not, of course, preclude the possibility that
comparable police conduct may be justified by
exigent circumstances in the absence of a warrant. No such question, however, is presented
by this case.
18. Justice Jackson recognized the significance
of this determination in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13- 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 368369, 92 L.Ed. 436:
''The point of the Fourth Amendment, which
often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enfoz:cement the · support of
the usuai inferences which reasonable men
dra w from evidence. rrs-protection consists in

requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of be·ing judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search w a rrant will justify the offi·
cers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and
leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the
·privacy of one's own quarters is, of course, of
grave concern to society, and the law allows
such crime to be reached on proper showing.
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, no.t only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to
dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent."
(Footnotes omitted).

}
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a

that police officers may not enter private privacy is justified. it is constitutionally
residence to make a routine felony arrest reasonable to require that citizen to remain
without first obtaining a warrant. -In that while officers of the law execute a valid
case we rejected the suggestion that only a warrant to search his home. 19 Thus, for
search warrant could adequately protect the Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that'
privacy interests at stake, noting that the a warrant . to search for contraband 2t
distinction between a . search warrant ·and found~ on probable cause implicitly carries
an arrest warrant was. far less significant · with it the limited autho.rity to detain the
than the interposition of the magistrate's · occupants of the premises while a .proper '
determination Of probable cause between search is conducted.21
the zealous officer -and the citizen: ·
Because it was lawful to require respon"It is true that an arrest warrant require-· dent to re-enter and to remain in the house
ment may afford less protection than a until evidence establishing probable cause
search warrant requirement, but it will to arrest him was found, his arrest and the
suffice to· interpose the magistrate's. de- search Incident thereto were constitutionaltermination of probable cause between · ly permissible. The judgment of the SUthe zealous officer and the citizen. If · preme Court of Michigan must therefore be
there is sufficient evidence of a citiZen's . reversed.
felony to .persuade- a
participation in
·It is so ordered. . ·'
judicial officer that his_arrest is' justified,

a

.· '

·it is constitutionally reasonable to require
Justice STEWART, with whom 'Justice
him to open his doors to the officers of
BRENNAN
and Justice MARSHALL join,
the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, an arrest ~varrant founded on . dissenting.
The Court is correct in stating that "some.
probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to enter a dwelling ' seizures- significantly less intrusive than an
in which the suspect lives when there is arrest have withstood scrutiny under the
reason to believe the suspect is within." reasonableness standard embodied in the
445 U.S., at 602-603, 100 S.Ct., at 1388. Fourth Amendm~nt." Ante, at 2591. But
That lrolding is relevant today. If the evi- to escalate this statement into some kind of
to ignore the protections
dence that a citizen's resid~nce is harboring a general rule
contraband is sufficient to persuade a judi- that the Fourth Amendment guarantees to
cial officer that an invasion of the citizen's us all. There are only two types of seizures

is

adopt today does not d~pend upon such an ad
19. In refusing to approve seizures based on less
than probable cause, the Dunaway Court dehoc determination, because the officer is not
clined to adopt a "multifactor balancing test of
required to evaluate either the quantum of
'reasonable police conduct under the circumproof justifying detention or the extent of the
stances' to cover all seizures that do not
intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.
·
~ount to technical arrests." The Court noted:
20. We do not decide whether the same result
"The protections · intended by the Framers
.,;,.ould be justified if the search warrant merely
could ali too easily disappear in the considera-· .
tion and balancing of the multifarious circumauthorized a search for evidence. Cf. Zurcher
stances presented by different cases, especially
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560, 98 S.Ct.
when that balancing may· be done in the first
1970, 1978, 56 L.Ed.2d 525. See alSo id., at
instance by police officers engaged in the 'often
581, 98 S.Ct., at 1989' (STEVENS, J., dissentcompe.titive el)terprise of ferretfng out crime.' "
ing).
442 U.S .• at 21-3, 99 S .Ct., at 2257:
As Justice WHITE noted in his concurrence 21. Although special circumstances, or possibly
in Dunaway, if police are to have workable
a prolonged detention, might lead to a different
rules. the balancing of the competing interests
conclusion in an unusual case, we are perinherent in the Terry principle- "must in large
suaded that this routine detention of residents
part be done on a categorical basis--not in an
of a house while it was being searched for
ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual pocontraband pursuant to a v_alid warrant is not
lice officers.'' 442 U . ~ .. at 219-220, 99 S.Ct.• at
such a case.
2260 (WHITE, J ., concurring). The rule we
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that need not be based on probable caus~.
The first, represented by the Terry line of
cases, is a limited stop to question a person
and to perform a pat-down for weapons
when the police have reason to believe that
he is armed and dangerous. E. g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881,
20 L.Ed.2d 889: The sec~nd is a brief stop
of vehicles near our international borders to
question occupants of the vehicles about
their citizenship. E. ·g. United States v.
. . Brignoni-Ponce; 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct..
2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607.
From these two special exceptions to the
' -}o/V general prohibition on seizures not based on
~ . probable cause, the Court leaps to the very
broad idea that courts may approve a wide
variety of seizures not based on probable
cause, so 'long as the courts find, after hal-ancing the law enforcement purposes of the
police conduct against the severity of their
intrusion, that the seizure appears "reasonable." Ante, at 2592-2593 and nn. 11- 12.
.But those two lines of cases do not represent some sort of exemplary balancing
text for Fourth Amendment cases. Rath~r,
they represent two isolated exceptions to
the general rule that the Fourth Amendment itself has already performed the constitutional balance between police objectives and personal privacy. , The. s~izure
permitted by the Court today, the detention
of a person at his home while the police
execute a search warrant for contraband
inside it, is categorically different from
thos~ two special exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirement, and poses
a significantly greater threat to the prot!lctions guaranteed by the Constitution.
0

.'C.A''

·''

I
The common ·denominator of the Terry
cases and the border checkpoint cases is the
· presence of some governmental interest independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects,
an interest important enough to overcome
the presumptive constitutional restraints on
police conduct. At issue in Terry was
"more than the governmental interest in

investigating crime; in addition there is the
. more imrpediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he is dealing is not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 23, 88 S.Ct.,
at 1881. Though the officer in Terry was
engaged in investigating crime, the governmental purpose that justified the stop and
pat-down was not the investigation itself,
but "the neutralization of danger to the
policeman in the investigative circumstance." Id., at 26, 88 S.Ct., at 1882. Stat- ·
ing its essential holding, the Court said:
"When an officer is justified in believing
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to .take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying
a weapon and to neutralize the threat of
physical harm." I d., at 24, 88 S.Ct.• at 1881.
·Similarly, in Adams v. Williams, 4JYl U.S.
143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, the officer had received an informant's tip, not
amounting to probable cause, that Williams
was carrying narcotics and a gun. The
Court held that the officer acted legally in
reaching into the car and intruding on Williams' person to see if Williams indeed was
in possession of a lethal weapon. In so
holding, the Court made clear that what
justified this intrusion on Williams• person
was not the possibility of finding contraband narcotics, but rather the officer's need
to protect himself from harm by seizing the
s·uspected gun: "The purpose of this limited
search is not to discover evidence of crime,
but to allow the officer to pursue his·investigation without fear of violence .... "
Id., at 146, 92 S.Ct., at 1923, accord, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98
S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331. See Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S.Ct. 338, 343,
62 L.Ed.2d 238.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, the Court approved a limited stop of

I
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vehicles 'by patrols of immigration officers the detention of the respondent.' One was
near the Mexican border, but in doing so it "the legitimate law enforcement interest in
stressed -the unique governmental interest preventing flight in the event that incrimiin preventing the illegal entry of aliens. .. nating evidence is found." Ante, at 2594.
The Court held that brief stops and inquir- The other was that "the orderly completion
ies based on less than probable cause to of the search may be facilitated if the occusearch or arrest were--necessary because the pants of the premises are present."· Ante,
eritry of undocumented ·aliens. creates "sig- at 2594~ Unlike the law enforcement obnificant economic and social problems, com~ jective8. that justified the police conduct in
peting with . citizens and -legal resident Terry and the border stop cases, _th~ obaliens for jobs, and generating extra de- jectives represented nothing more than the
mand for social services." 422 u.s.,.at 879, ordinary police .interest. in discovering evi- .
95 S.Ct., at 2579. And in United StateS v. . dence of crime and apprehending wrongMartinei-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 54.3, - 96 ·s .Ct. doers. ' And the Fourth and Fourteenth
3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, upholding similarly . Amendments impOse significant restraints
brief stops and inquiries at permanent upon these traditional police activities, even
checkpoints, the Court relied on the unique though the police .and the courts may find
difficulty of ' patrolling a 2,000-mile long those restraints unreasonably inconvenient;.
and virtually uninhabited border area,_ ·a
If the police, .acti~g . without probable
difficulty that would prove insuperable if . cause, can seize a person to make him avaii.: ·
the government could st9p a vehicle only on able for arrest in case probable cause is
the basis of probable cause to believe that later developed_to arrest him, the ~uire
that particular vehicle contained illegal en- ment of probable cause for arrest has been
trants. ld., at 552, 96 S.Ct., at 3080:
turned upside-down_ And if the police may
It seems clear, therefore; that before a seize . a person without probable cause in
court can uphold a detention on less than order to "facilitate" the execution of a war~
probable cause on the ground that it is rant that did not authorize his arrest, the
"reasonable" in the light of the competing fundamental principle that the scope of a
interests, the government must demon- search ·and seizure can be justified only by
strate an important purpose beyond the the scope of the .underlying warrant has
normal goa\s of criminal investigation, or suffered serious damage. There is no aumust demonstrate an extraordinary obsta- , thority in this Court for the principle that
cle to such investigation.
the P<>lice can engage in searehes and sei.
·"
zures without probable cause simply be-.
.. · . II
cause to do so enhances ·their abj_lity to
What the Court approves today is justi- conduct investigations which -may eventualfied by no such special governmental inter- ly lead to probable cause. · See Davis ~- ·
est or law enforeement need. There were Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-727; 89 S.Ct. ·
only two governmental purposes supPorting 1394, 1397, 22 L.Ed.2d .676.2
1. As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 2593, the .
record in this case presents no evidence whatsoever that the police feared any threat to their
safety or that ·of others from the conduct of the
respondent, or that they could reasonably have
so feared. The Court says that this nevertheless was the "kind of transaction that may give
ri se to sudden violence .... " Ante, at 2593.
But where the police cannot demonstrate, ori
the basis of specific and articulable facts, a
reasonable belief that a person threatens physical h arm to them or others, the speculation
that other persons in that circumstance might

pose such a threat cannot justify a search or
. sei.zure. Ybarra v: Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92- 93,
100 S.Ct. 338, 342-343, 62 L.Ed.2d 238.
2. In perplexing citation, the Court notes our
holding in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573.
100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, that an arrest
warrant based on probable cause justifies entering a person's home to carry out the arrest,
and declares that Payton "is relevant today."
Ante, at 2594-2595.. But I had thought that the
·very point of the passage of the Court quotes
from Payton, is that the police would be justified
in arresting a person in his· own home because
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. Beyond the issue of the gove~nmental
interest justifying the detention, I question
the Coures view that the detention here is
of the limited, unintrusive .sort that permits
the Court to engage .in a "reasonableness"
balancing test. . As the Court said in Punaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210, 99
S.Ct. 2248, 2255, 6o L.Ed.2d · 824, Terry v.
Ohio "defined a special category of Fourth
Amendment 'seizures' so substantially Jess
intrusive than arrests that the general rule
requiring probable cause to make Fourth
Amendment 'seizures' reasonable could be
replaced by a balancing test." (Emphasis
added.). As we then noted. in Dunaway, the
pat-down searches in. Terry, Adams, and
Mimms were declared legal because they
were extremely limited in time and in the
degree of personal intrusion. Id., at 210211, 99 .S.Ct., at 2255-2256. The Court also
noted that in the border cases, the stops
normally consumed less than a minute and
involved no more than brief interrogation.
Id., at 211, 99 S.Ct., at 2256. Thus, in the
rare cases in which the Court has permitted
an independent balancing of interests, the
police intrusion has been extremely narrow.
Moreover, the Court has required that the
stop and inquiry or search be "reasonably

related in scope to the justification for their
initiation," Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at
29, 88 S.Ct., at 1884, see United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S., at 881, 95
S.Ct., at 2580, and, under that requirement,
the unusual governmental or law enforce-·
ment interests justifying the pat-down
stops and border stops h~ve provided a limiting principle ensuring the narrowness of
the police action. The ,.detention approved.
by the Court today, however, is of a very
different order.
The explicit holding of the Court is that
"a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with
it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search
is conducted." Ante,. at 2595 (footnotes
?mitted). Thou~h on superficial reading,
this language may suggest a minor intrusion of brief duration, a detention "while a
proper search is being conducted" can mean
a detention of several hours.3 The police
thereby make the person a prisoner in his
own home for a potentially very long period
of time. 4 Moreover, because of the questionable nature of the governmental interest asserted by the State and acknowledged
by the Court in this case, the requirement

they had a warrant for his arrest based upon
probable cause to believe that he had violated
the criminal law. Since it is the absence of
such probable cause that. lies at the heart of
this case, I fail to understand Payton's "rele-

citizen would in fact want to ·be present at a
search of his house unless he was fleeing to
avoid arrest. Ante, at 2593. But I must infer
that the res pondent here did not want to be
present in his house during the search. .else he
would not have brought this claim, and the law
cannot penalize him for "fleeing arrest" when
the police did not have probable cause tq arrest
>him. This second reason amounts to the view
that a person cannot as~ert his rights under the
exclusionary rule if he stands to benefit from
the exclusion.
Finally, the Court observes that this sort of
detention is not likely to be exploited or unduly
prolonged by the police, since the officers are
more likely to find the information they seek
through the search than through the detention.
Ante, at 2593. I confess I do not understand this r eason. It seems no more than a
restatement of the view that the police m ay'
detain the person to have him available for
arrest wh en they complete the search, but that
view merely begs · the qu estion whether the
potential dura tion of the search threatens the
person with a lengthy detention.

vance.''

3. The record does not clearly reveal the length
of the search in this case. In Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed.
1399, an FBI search of a one-bedroom apartment for burgJar tools and a pair of chec ks
consumed 5 hours. See also Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 477, 85 S.Ct. 506, 507, 13 L.Ed .2d
431.
4. I also question-- the Court's confident asser' tions about the inoffensive nature of the detention in this case. First, the Court says the
detention was innocuous because it was less
· intrusive than the search that was mandated by
the warrant. Ante, at 2593. This reasoning is,
of course, circular, since the very question of
the severity of the detention arises only because it was not based on a warrant or probable cause.
Second, ,the Court says that the intrusion was
not a serious one because a reasonable-minded
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that the scope of the intrusion be reason-·
ably related to its justification does not
provide a limiting principle for circumscribing the detention. If the purpose of the
detention is to help the police make the
search, the detention can be as long as the
police find it necessary to protract the
· •·
, ..
search.5 ·
In Dunaway, the . Court reaffirmed that
the " 'long-prevailing standards' of probable
cause embody the 'best compromise that has
been found for accommodating [the] often
opposing interests' in 'safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy' and in 'seek[ing] to give
fair leeway for enforcing . the law , in thecommunity's protection.'" . Dunaway v.
New York, supra, 442-U.S., at-208, 99 S.ct.;
at 2254, quoting Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93
L.Ed. 1879. Because the present case
presents no occasion for dep~rting from this
principle, I respectfully dissent..

-.
NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR .
AUTHORITY .
v.

Dennis BELLANCA, etc., et al.
.No. 80-813.
June 22, 1981.

·~r '•

Owners of nightclubs, bars and restaurants brought action ~n which they sought
5. The Court adverts to this problem only by
suggesting th;tt "sp~cial circumstances; or pas·
sibly a prolonged detention, might lead to a
different conclusion in an unusual case." Ante,
at 25.95, n. 21. But the Court provides no
criteria for identifying "special circumstances"
or- for det~nnining when a detention is , "prolonged"; in particular, it fails to tell la·w enforcement officers whether a detention will always be permissible, however protracted, so as

declaratory judgment that New York statute prohibiting toples:;s dancing at licensed
premises was unconstitutional and sought
· injunctive relief. ..The Supreme Court, Erie
County, Speciai Term, John H. Doerr, J..,
'granted plaintiffs summary judgment declaring statute unconstitutional, and State
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 429 N.Y.
S.2d· 616, 50 N.Y.2d 524, 407 N.E.2d 460,
Wachtler, J., affirmed, and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme' Court held that
. statute was constit~tioiial.
·
Reversed.
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgm~nt.

Justice Brennan dissented from summary dispositi~n.
. -. Justice Stevens dissented and filed
opinion.
~·.

·..

I. Intoxicating Liquors ~6
. ·state lias absolute power under Twenty-First Amendment to prohibit totally the
sale of liquor within its boundaries. . U .S.C.
A.Const. Amend.· 21. ·
·
2. Intoxicating Liquors ·~6
State has broad eower. under TwentyFirst Amendment to regulate time, places
and circumstances under which liquor may
be sold. U.S.C.A.Const. Amehd. 21. .
_.:.__•

3. Intoxicating Liquors ~ 15
New York statute prohibiting · topless
dancing in establishment _licensed by state
to serve liquor was not unconstitutional.
N.Y.Alcoholic Beverage Control Law§ 106,
subd. 6a; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 21.
·.it .does not exceed the length of the search of
the house. This ambiguity casts doubt on the
Court's assertion;- ante, at 2595, n. 19, that · its
· holding will not require individual police officers to engage in the sort of on-the-scene, ad
hoc legal judgments which · pose . a serious
threat to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
protections. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 213, 99 S.Ct. 22.48, 2256, 60 L.Ed.2d 824.

.
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

JUSTICE WHITE's draft in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146

My overall reaction to the Florida v. Royer draft is to
be happier with what JUSTICE WHITE does not do than with what he
does do.

There had been some fear that he might condemn the po-

lice behavior too soon, holding, for example, that there had been
an unjustifiable seizure on the concourse.

He does not do this.

Rather, he relies on the fact that the police went beyond a Terry
stop in taking Royer to the closet, seizing his luggage, refusing
to return his ticket and license,
right

to refuse his consent,

etc.

failing to advise him of his
This

is

in accordance with

your views at Conference.
The problem I
about

finding

that

have is with the way JUSTICE WHITE goes

there

was

an

"investigative confinement." 1

On page 10 he begins part III with a summary of the State's contentions:

first,

the State makes a consent argument; second, the

State claims there was a valid Terry stop.

He then says that the

Court "need not address" the State's second argument because it
defers to the Florida court's finding.

For the rest of part III,

pp. 11-13, he explains why the Florida court was correct in rejecting the second argument.

There is no clear focus on the

1.
Dunaway called it an "arrest."
I would be happier to say
that this, too, is an "arrest." It would make analysis easier to
have fewer labels.
Anything beyond an investigative, or Terry,
stop should be an "arrest" or a "confinement." There should not
be further distinctions.

2.

State's

first

argument

(the one he

supposedly

is

addressing),

although occassional passages relate to it.
I

r ·e commend that you ask JUSTICE WHITE to rewrite the

(long) sentence that begins on the bottom of page 10 and carries
over to the top of page 11.
claim.

He does address the State's second

It is the central issue in this case.

say it is addressing the issue.

The Court should

If JUSTICE WHITE follows this

suggestion, part III will still not be a model of clarity, but at
least it will deal with the State's principal arguments and reach
the proper conclusion for the right reasons.
Two passages caught my eye on first reading that proved
unobjectionable on closer analysis.

On page 7, lines 7-9, JUS-

TICE WHITE writes:
The per son approached, however, need not answer any
question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen
to the questions at all and may go on his way.
This sentence is unobjectionable because it refers to a person
about whom

the police do not have

sentence after

it makes

reasonable

suspicion.

this point a little bit clearer.)

(The
It

does not refer to someone like Royer, about whom the police may
have had reasonable suspicion on the basis of the drug courier
profile.

And on page 8, lines 15-19, he writes:

The petitioner does not suggest, nor do we, that [the
Terry, Williams, Brignoni-Ponce] rationale would not
warrant temporary detention for questioning on less
than probable cause where the public interest involved
is the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or
of any other serious crime.
I

cannot

sentence.
right

..

imagine why JUSTICE WHITE

includes such a convoluted

The suggestion seems to be that Terry stops are al-

in drug cases,

assuming that the normal requirements are

3.

satisfied.
you.
for

I am sure that this is an acceptable conclusion for

(There may be a mistake here in the use of "petitioner,"
there is no reason the State would make such a suggestion.

Perhaps JUSTICE WHITE has become confused by the frequency with
which the criminal defendant below is the petitioner here at the
cert stage.

One might think that, by now, everyone would be ac-

customed to having the criminal defendant be the respondent in a
granted case.)
I do have one caveat with respect to everything I have
said here.

There are quite a few calls for

copy does not have the text of any footnotes.
hidden problems.

footnotes,

but our

There may be some

On the other hand, I hope that footnote 2 (the

call is on page 1, line 6 from bottom, after "drug courier profile") will contain some helpful language on the role of the profile.

The panel below thought the profile evidence constituted

probable cause,

389 So.2d, at 1012, while the en bane Court of

Appeal thought

that profile evidence could not even constitute

reasonable

suspicion,

id. ,

at 1019.

I

hope

the Court rejects

both of those extremes, and explains how profile evidence may be
used properly.
Finally I have a number of technical errors.
refers to the Florida Court of
the Florida Court of Appeal.)
TICE WHITE's clerk.

Appeal~,

for example,

(The draft
instead of

I can give these directly to JUS-

mfs 12/09/82
To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

JUSTICE WHITE's draft in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146

My overall reaction to the Florida v. Royer draft is to
be happier with what JUSTICE WHITE does not do than with what he
does do.

There had been some fear that he might condemn the po-

lice behavior too soon, holding, for example, that there had been
an unjustifiable seizure on the concourse.

He does not do this.

Rather, he relies on the fact that the police went beyond a Terry
stop in taking Royer to the closet, seizing his luggage, refusing
to return his ticket and license,
right

to refuse

his consent,

etc.

failing to advise him of his
This

is

in accordance with
I

your views at Conference.
The problem I
about

finding

that

have is with the way JUSTICE WHITE goes

there

was

an

"investigative confinement. nl

On page 10 he begins part III with a summary of the State's contentions:

first,

the State makes a consent argument; second, the

State claims there was a valid Terry stop.

He then says that the
VL.L~
Court "need not address" the State's second argument because it
defers to the Florida court's finding.

"

For the rest of part III,

pp. 11-13, he explains why the Florida court was correct in rejecting the second argument.

There is no clear focus on the

1.
Dunaway called it an "arrest."
I would be happier to say
that this, too, is an "arrest." It would make analysis easier to
have fewer labels.
Anything beyond an investigative, or Terry,
stop should be an "arrest" or a "confinement." There should not
be further distinctions.

2.

State's

first

argument

(the one he

supposedly

is

addressing),

although occassional passages relate to it.
I

recommend that you ask JUSTICE WHITE to rewrite the

(long) sentence that begins on the bottom of page 10 and carries
over to the top of page 11.

He does address the State's second

It is the central issue in this case.

claim.

say it is addressing the issue.

The Court should

If JUSTICE WHITE follows this

-

suggestion, part III will still not be a model of clarity, but at
least it will deal with the State's principal arguments and reach
the proper conclusion for the right reasons.
Two passages caught my eye on first reading that proved
unobjectionable on closer analysis.

On page 7, lines 7-9, JUS-

TICE WHITE writes:
The person approached, however, need not answer any
question put to him: indeed, he may decline to listen
to the questions at all and may go on his way.
This sentence is unobjectionable because it refers to a person
about

whom

sentence

the police do not have reasonable

after

it makes

this point a

suspicion. ~ ~

little bit clearer.)

It

does not refer to someone like Royer, about whom the police may
have had reasonable suspicion on the basis of the drug courier
profile.

And on page 8, lines 15-19, he writes:

The petitioner does not suggest, nor do we, that [the
Terry, Williams, Brignoni-Ponce] rationale would not
warrant temporary detention for questioning on less
than probable cause where the public interest involved
is the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or
of any other serious crime.
I

cannot

sentence.

imagine why JUSTICE WHITE

includes such a convoluted ~

The suggestion seems to be that Terry stops are al-

right in drug cases,

assuming that the normal requirements are

~

f

I

3.

satisfied.
you.
for

I am sure that this is an acceptable conclusion for

(There may be a mistake here in the use of "petitioner,"
there is no reason the State would make such a suggestion.

Perhaps JUSTICE WHITE has become confused by the frequency with
which the criminal defendant below is the petitioner here at the
cert stage.

One might think that, by now, everyone would be ac- ~

customed to having the criminal defendant be the respondent in

a)

/?'

/'

granted case.)
I do have one caveat with respect to everything I have
said here.

There are quite a few calls for

hidden problems.

footnotes,

but our

On the other hand, I hope that footnote 2 (the

call is on page 1, line 6 from bottom, after "drug courier profile") will contain some helpful language on the role of the profile.

The panel below thought the profile evidence constituted

probable cause,

389 So.2d, at 1012, while the en bane Court of

Appeal thought

that profile evidence could not even constitute

reasonable

suspicion,

id.,

at 1019.

I

hope

the Court rejects

both of those extremes, and explains how profile evidence may be
used properly.
Finally I have a number of technical errors.
refers to the Florida Court of
the Florida Court of Appeal.)
TICE WHITE's clerk.

Appeal~,

for example,

(The draft
instead of

I can give these directly to JUS-

T~

lfp/ss 12/10/82

WHITER SALLY-POW
80-2136 Royer v. Florida

Dear Byron:
I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to
take a look at your draft opinion.
Although I still would join your judgment, I
would find it difficult to join the opinion in its present
form.

Possibly our views are not entirely congruent as to

investigative stops on reasonable or articulable
suspicion.

A~tRo~ ~ou cite Terry, Adams and Brignoni-

~

Ponce (but not Summers) , I view these cases as
~

establishing the principle of such a stop.
characterized this in various terms.
as an investigative stop.

~

We have

I think of it simply

In Fourth Amendment

2.

terminology, it is a temporary seizure for investigative
purpose.
I thought this was the more important of the two
issues in the case.

There is a genuine need, in view of

the confusion created by Mendenhall, to make clear that
the

~

use ~

airports in the drug traffic presents special

circumstances in which investigative stops on articulable
and reasonable suspicion are entirely proper.

This does

not come through clearly from your draft.
Enclosed is memorandum in which I have tried to
indicate generally the way I would approach this case.

My

concern, of course, is with the substance rather than any
particular mode of expression.

~I

3.

I am grateful for the chance to do a little
"missionary work" before we end up in another Mendenhall
type situation with several opinions.
Sincerely,

lfp/ss 12/10/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mike

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 10, 1983

80.-2136 Royer
Justice White's opinion is not acceptable to me,
and I agree with most - if not all - of your comments.
I would appreciate your drafting a memorandum for
me to send Justice White.

Rather than attempt cosmetic

changes in his opinion, I would like to give him a
memorandum that would - in effect - be the heart of an
opinion (substantively} that we would write.

I would say to

him that if his opinion were revised substantially in accord
with the views in my memo, I would gladly join him.
Otherwise, I will write separately and join only the
judgment.
I had rather switch my vote and find there was
"consent" than to join BRW's opinion in its present form.
Justice White agrees, and has said to me recently, that he
could find "consent" to search the luggage, but goes the
other way on a very "close call".
Your bench memo is essentially in accord with my
thinking.

Of course, the memo to Justice White must be very

much condensed.
I start from the view, Mike, that we took this
case hoping to have a Court opinion that would afford
guidance particularly with respect to airport stops •

...

2.

Byron's opinion could be written about generally similar
facts anywhere.

It is particularly opaque - and as you say

~ "convoluted A in discussing what is critical for me:

the

right to make investigative stops in airports as an
essential technique for curbing drug traffic.

To be sure,

the principle of an investigative stop should be
consistently stated.

But the circumstances in which the

principle is applied have varied, and will continue to vary.
In each situation, the principle is applied by a weighing of
the rights of the individual to be free from police
harrassment against the societal interests that are
implicated.

These societal interests have varied in Terry

(Adams was generally similar), Brignoni-Ponce, and in JPS's
opinion in Summers.

As indicated in my Mendenhall opinion,

the societal interests with respect to the drug traffic - in
the setting of an airport - is distinctive and important.
I note here that BRW's opinion does not mention
Summers.

Although the facts there were quite different,

JPS's opinion may be the single best elaboration of the
investigative stop principle:

i.e., a sort of intermediate

level "seizure" to permit further investigation.
The memorandum to be prepared, obviously, should
address the two issues in this case that you identify:
first, was the initial stop and questioning lawful; and,
second, was there an arrest in the special circumstances of
the "two on one" interrogation in the "closet", with the
police in possession of the suspect's baggage and ticket?

3.

You are familiar with my answers to both of these.
There is a possible third question:

did an arrest occur

when Royer was asked to accompany the police to a private
area for further interrogation.

The short answer to this is

that Royer consented, although given the reasonable
suspicion that existed, I think the police certainly had the
right to retain the luggage and the ticket until they could

~

have the luggage by a "marijuana dog".

It would helpful if

~

we could say this.

I am not sure that it is necessary in

this case.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

~.

,}

lfp/ss 12/10/82
MEMORANDUM
Dec. 10, 1983

DATE:

Jr.
8a-2136 Royer

Justice Whi.te's opinion is not acceptable to me, ·'
and I agree with most - if not all - of your comments.
I

would appreciate your drafting a memorandum for

me to send Justice White.

Rather than attempt cosmetic
"\'(

"

~'f"''

lil

,. i:':

changes in his opinion, I would like to give him a

,,..
~({<

f,

...

.....

memorandum that would - in effect - be the heart of an · .,, ·.
opinion (substantively) that we would write.

I would say to

him that lf his opinion were revised substantially in accord
with the views in my memo, ! would glaoly join him.
Otherwise, I will write separately

an~

ioin only the

judgment.
I had rather switch my vote and find there was
"consent" than to join BRW's opinion in its

pr~sent

form.

Justice White aqrees, and has said to me recently, that he
could find "consent" to search the luggage, but goes the

J"

"

'

other way on a very "close call". , · ·
.r ,

thinking.

Your bench memo is essentially in accord with my
Of course, the memo to Justice White must be very

much condensed.
1I start from the view, Mike, that

~>.t

~e

'

took this

case hoping to have a Court opinion that would afford
guidance particularly with respect to airport stops.
'.·

..

2.

Byron's opinion could be written about generally similar
facts anywhere.

It is particularly opaque - and as you say

- "convoluted" in discussing what is critical for me:

the

right to make investigative stops in airports as an
essential technique for curbing drug traffic.

To be sure,

the principle of an investigative stop should be
consistently stated.

But the circumstances in which the

principle is applied have varied, and will continue to vary.
In each situation, the principle is applied by a weighing of
the rights of the individual to be free from police
harrassment against the societal interests that are
implicated.

These societal interests have varied in 'rerrv

(Adams was generally similar), Brignoni-Ponce, and in JPS's
opinion in Summers.

As indicated in my Mendenhall opinion,

the societal interests with respect to the drug traffic - in
the settinq of an airport - is distinctive and important.
"

I note here that 3RW's opinion noes not mention
Summers.

~lthough

th~

facts there were quite different,

JPS's opinion may be the single best elaboration of the
investigative stop principle:

i.e., a sort of intermediate

level "seizure" to permit further investigation.
The memorandum to be prepared, obviously, should
address the two issues in this case that you identify:
first, was the initial stop and questioning

lawful~

and,

second, was there an arrest in the special circumstances of
the "two on one" interrogation in the "closet", with the
police in possession of the suspect's baggage and ticket?

"'_.'1(

.",.,. :I;::.-.,

\

--··~·~ ···!+_, w. .~!Jrir.

. .,,.._ , ....

,._

3.

You are familiar with my answers to both of these.
There is a possible third question:

did an arrest occur

when Royer was asked to accompany the police to a private
area for further interrogation.

The short answer to this is

that Royer consented, although given the reasonable
suspicion that existed, I think the police certainly had the
right to retain the luggage and the ticket until they could
have the luggage by a "marijuana dog".
we could say this.

I

am not sure that it is necessary in

this case.

r... P.P., Jr.
ss

"-r.

..

Tt would helpful if

.

mfs 12/10/82
Draft Memorandum to JUSTICE WHITE

No. 80-2146 -- Florida v. Royer

Two issues are central in this case: the legality of the
initial enounter between police and the respondent in the concourse and the legality of the encounter in the "closet" when the
respondent gave his consent to the search.

Although this case

turns on the second issue, I think the first is more significant.
I doubt we would have granted cert solely to review the Florida
court's determination that these particular facts constituted an
arrest.

~~~

The Inital Encounter

{(;;~~~~~e~hat

a person who has not been

"arrested" may nevertheless be "seized" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

"[W]henever a police officer accosts an indi-

vidual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
that person."

Terry v. Ohio,

Michigan v. Summers,
tez,

449 U.S.

(1977);

411

452

(1981);

United States

Adams v.

Williams,

u.s.

v.

392 U.S.
692

1, 16

Brignoni-Ponce,
143

(1968).

See also

(1981); United States v. Cor-

Pennsylvania v.

407 U.S.

'seized'

(1972).

Mimms,
422

u.s.

434 U.S.
873

106

(1975);

Although such a "sei-

zure" does not require probable cause, it does require "an artieulable basis for suspecting criminal activity."
In the present case,
Terr

stop)

there was a 1 imi ted "seizure"

(a

in the airport concourse when the officers asked the

respondent to accompany them after taking and keeping his plane
ticket

•'

and

driver's

license.

The

case

is

similar

to

United

2.

States

v.

Mendenhall,

u.s.

446

544

(1980),

where

the

seizure

question was "extremely close," id., at 560 n.l {opinion of POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
here the

indicia of seizure are significantly stronger.

Mendenhall,

But

As

in

the officers wore no uniforms, made no threats, and

displayed no weapons.

And as in Mendenhall, the respondent was

not informed that he was free to refuse to cooperate.

The sig-

nificant difference is that Mendenhall's ticket and license were
returned

to her

immediately.

The Court specifically relies on

this fact, 446 U.S., at 558, and

~ssent ~~

aJt.t ___t be

£act

"'

that the agents took her ticket and license "for a time" as "an
objective facto[r)
ing,"

id.,

at

that would tend to support a

570

&

n.3

(WHITE,

J.,

'seizure' find-

dissenting).

Here

it

is

clear that the ticket was not returned to the respondent, and it
appears that the license was simply placed with the respondent's
other things after he emptied his pockets.
It is noteworthy that the officers' actions were not in
accord with the DEA's standard instructions.

The DEA Manual in-

structs the pol ice in block capitals, "ALWAYS ADVISE THE SUSPECT

u.s.

THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO REFUSE TO CONSENT TO A SEARCH."

Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Legal Problems
in

Airport

Interceptions

of

Domestic

[hereinafter cited as "DEA Manual"].
less

emphatic

on

tickets

and/or ID immediately."

and

respondent's

Couriers

61

(1980)

The Manual is only slightly

identification:

"Return

ticket

Id., at 129 (emphasis in original).

the officers here had followed these
the

Drug

ticket and

If

instructions by returning

license immediately,

this would be

3.

essentially the same close case as Mendenhall.
also

informed

him

that

they

sought

which he had the right to refuse,

his

And if they had

voluntary cooperation,

it would not even be a close

case.
The seizure on the concourse, however, does not invalidate the subsequent consent, for it was supported by reasonable,
articulable suspicion.

There is no particular magic in the "drug

courier profile," for

the profile neither is nor is intended to

be anything more than an investigative tool.

As a practical mat-

ter, the drug courier profile is highly subjective.

One district

judge described it as "chameleon-like," observing that "it seems
to change itself to fit the facts of each case."
v.

Westerbann-Martinez,

435 F.

Supp.

690,

698

United States

(E.D.N.Y.

1977).

In United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich.
1977),
case

a DEA agent "testified that the profile in a particular

consists

subjectivity

of

anything

should

not

be

that

arouses

surprising,

his
for

the profile

designed to be anything more than an investigative tool.
analogizes agents

This

suspicions."

is not
The DEA

identifying couriers with a profile to other

professionals making professional decisions with the aid of "an
informal mental checklist" of relevant factors:
[A doctor], for example, in making a diagnosis, must
compare the patient's symptoms to a mental checklist of
characteristics which he knows indicate certain diseases.
He probably learned that checklist originally
in medical school and has modified it over the years
from his own experience and that of fellow doctors ..••
DEA Manual, at 149.
The DEA's analogy strikes me as relevant.

A doctor can-

not decide to operate solely on the basis of a few symptoms un-

4.

less those symptoms are highly probative, but he can use a list
of symptoms as an aid to exercising his independent professional
judgment.

The legitimacy of the decision depends not on the ex-

istence of a

few symptoms,

but on the quality of the doctor's

judgment in the overall circumstances.

The same is true for sei-

zures

As

based

agents,

on

"profile

evidence."

the

DEA

reminds

"Reasonable Suspicion will be established by what is in

your head, not what may be written on paper somewhere."
152.

its

Id., at

There is nothing wrong with using a profile, but its limi-

tations must be recognized--both by the agents in the field and
by the courts.
suspicion

Whether there was probable cause or articulable

should be determined using

regardless

of what

legitimate

the

traditional analysis,

investigative tools

the officers

used to develop their suspicions.
At the time the respondent was seized, the officers knew
the following:

(1) The respondent was nervous, apparently seeking

to avoid detection.

(2) The respondent was travelling from Miami

to New York on a one-way ticket purchased with cash.

( 3)

The

respondent had two heavily laden American Tourister suitcases.
(4)

The respondent was travelling under an alias.

Not only was

his ticket in the name "Holt," but he had identified his luggage
with the name "Holt."

(5) The respondent did not put an address

or telephone number on his luggage.
Standing alone, none of the factors is overwhelming, but
most have

some

probabative

value.

An

experienced

officer

can

tell the difference between "white knuckle flyer" nervousness and
wrongdoer nervousness, but the courts should require him to ar-

5.

ticulate his specific findings in each case.
The fourth factor is the most persuasive.

That was done here.
It was clear that the

respondent was trying to hide something from someone.
factor also carries some weight.

The fifth

While many people do not wish

to display their address and telephone number, they at least have
baggage tags that allow the information to be obtained if necessary.

The respondent obviously did not want his ownership of the

bags established if they fell into official hands.
In sum,

therefore,

the officers seized the respondent,

but this seizure was justified by their reasonable, articulable
suspicion.

The Confinement in the Closet
We have held that a confinement short of a formal arrest
may be "indistinguishable from a traditional arrest,"
New York,

442 U.S.

cause to support
Terry

exception

200,

it.
to

212

(1979),

Thus

this

far

Dunaway v.

and thus require probable

we have narrowly construed the

probable

cause

requirement.

Here

the

police went beyond anything we have sanctioned under the exception.
seizure
the

In addition to the factors that supported a finding of a
in

police

the concourse,
had

seized

the

two additional factors were present:
respondent's

moved him to the police room.

luggage,

and

they had

He was still not told that he was

free to refuse his cooperation, and his ticket and license were
still not

returned

to him.

In

the

total circumstances of the

case, the confinement was therefore an "arrest."

.•

6.

As one of the officers conceded,
without

probable

cause.

Although

the

this arrest was made

police

had

suspicion that the respondent was carrying drugs,
rise to the level of probable cause.

a

reasonable

this did not

The most they could claim

was probable cause to believe that he was doing something that he
did not want to publicize, but there could have been any number
of reasons for his fear of publicity.

See DEA Manual 2

(Of 43

searches by LaGuardia Airport Unit in 1978, 16 resulted in drug
seizures but 13 resulted in discovey of illegal aliens.); United
States

v.

Bowles,

625

F.2d

526,

534

n.lO

(CAS

1980)

(22% of

searches at Atlanta Airport during 7 months in 1977 produced evidence of criminal activity other than transporting narcotics).
In sum,
dent,

therefore,

the officers "arrested" the respon-

and the arrest was not

justified by probable cause.

Ac-

cordingly, his consent to the search of his luggage was not validly obtained.

lfp/ss 12/13/82
MEMORANDUM
80-2146 Florida v. Royer
This memorandum, stating my views on this case,
will repeat - with a different emphasis - a good deal of
what you have said.
The Investigative Stop
Of the two issues, I consider the legality of the
initial encounter with the police to be by far the more
significant.

I thought we granted cert with the hope of

getting a Court opinion on airport investigative stops.

My

recollection is that you and I both voted against granting
in view of the presence of the second issue, i.e., the
confrontation and search in the "closet".

This issue is of

no particular importance except to the parties in this case.
The Court has repeatedly held that a person who has
not been "arrested" may nevertheless be "seized" briefly

2.

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

"[W]henever a

police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16

(1968).

Terry

See also Michigan v.

Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)*: United States v. Cortez, 449

u.s.

411 (1981):

*John's op1n1on in Summers, though a dressing a different
factual situation, has a rather good summary of the
~
rationale of investigative seizures. You rely on DunJWay a
good deal, but the police conduct there was far removed even
~ "arrest"
in this case. I odna ' t th j nk D~a'i .J. s

4.

Fourth Amendment when the agents escorted her from the
public area to the . • • office for questioning and a strip
search".

446

u.s.,

at 574.

As I read the various opinions

in Mendenhall, there were five of us who thought the initial
stop and questioning was lawful, though our reasons varied.
Until Royer found himself confronted in the
"closet" away from the concourse, I think there was no
question of unlawful conduct by the police.

On the facts of

this case, one could say that Royer had consented to the
initial questioning, to exhibiting his ticket and
identifications, and even to going with the police to a
private room.

I would say, however, in the setting of an

airport - and given the extent to which drugs are moved from
airport to airport by couriers - that trained agents (such

as the

DEA) ~mptively may

rely on the "courier

profile" to stop a suspect for identification.

v

I agree that

the "profile" in this case may hijf been less than compelling

50

up to the time the disparity in names was discovered.

Yet,

unless an officer can detain a suspected person for the
minute or two necessary for identification, drug couriers
will be coached simply to "walk away" and refuse to identify
themselves.

I am not suggesting that these modest stops may

be made of everyone without any suspicion, but I would give

~

experienced officers - in the context of an airport

the

~

benefit of doubt in most cases.
stop for

Brignoni-Ponce supports a

identification~ ~__;..~k1c/~-"

q; ~ ~}

~

~~~~r~

therefore would hold that the officers were

justified in stopping Royer for identification purposes, and
that when the discrepancy in name appeared they also were
justified in detaining him for further questioning.
The public interest in preventing drug traffic is

great,

and~intrusion upon a

traveler's privacy when

stopped in an airport for brief questioning is minimal.
public is accustomed to considerable regulation and

The

-r --- ~~

L;

~ t.-1- ..,~

~a.,~~-~~~ 6
~ ~ ~~~- ~--"1 -&.c_~
restraints when traveling by air.

People, including guards

and air
go through the
even asked to accompany an officer to a private room because
the detector kept emitting signals.

I escaped being

searched only by exhibiting my Supreme Court identification.
I add here that the DEA manual instructs its
agents to advise a suspect that he has a right to refuse to
consent to a search, although I do not believe "search" is
defined.

The manual also instructs agents to return tickets

and ID evidence immediately.

Perhaps you will wish to cite

the manual in a footnote as evidence of an appropriate - but
not necessarily the only - procedure to be followed.

----~
-
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The Search of the Suitcases
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7.

Your opinion quite satisfactorily discusses the
"search" issue.

As we have agreed in our several

conversations, even this is a close question because of the
trial court's findings of "consent", and the fact that Royer
did agree.

I am still willing - as Harry would say - "to go

along" -with the view that Royer's agreement to the search
was coerced under the circumstances you properly emphasize.
But I would be hesitant to join an opinion, or perhaps even
the judgment, unless we also said - more explicitly than
your present draft - that at least until Royer arrived at
the "closet" the officers were justified in what they did.
We should not permit people who travel under
assumed names, and otherwise arguably meet the "drug courier
profile", to walk away with their luggage.

If a trained dog

detects narcotics, the suspect could be held briefly to
permit the obtaining of a warrant.

The circumstances then

8.
could be viewed as exigent, and an arrest on probable cause
would be justified.

* * *
The above memo is longer than I had contemplated.

A good deal of what I have said is background for my own
rather deeply held conviction that law enforcement should
not be handicapped any more than the Constitution clearly
requires in their effort to curb the narcotics traffic that
is the major source of lawlessness in our country.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss 12/13/82
MEMORANDUM
80-2146 Florida v. Royer
~his

memorandum, stating my views on this case,

will repeat - with a different emphasis - a good deal of
what you have said.
The Investigative Stop
Of the two issues, I consider the legality of the
initial encounter. with the police to be by far the more sig,·

nificant.

I thought we granted cert with the hope of get-

ting a Court opinion on airport investigative stops.

My

recollection is that you and I both voted against granting
in view of the presence of the second tssue, i.e., the confrontation and search in the "closet".

This issue is of no

particular importance except to the parties in this case.
The Court has repeatedly held that a person who has
not been •arrested" may nevertheless be "seized" briefly
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

"{W]henever a

police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."
Ohio, 392
452

u.s.

u.s.

1, 16 (1968).

Terry v.

See also Michigan v.

692 (1981)*1 United States v. Cortez, 449

su~mers,

u.s.

411

*John's opinion in Summers, though addressing a ~ifferent
factual situation, has a rather. good summary of the rationale of investigative seizures. It may be helpful to use
it. You rely on Dunaway a good deal, but the police conduct
there was far removed even from the •arrest" in this case.

'I

2.

(1981) : Pennsylvania v. Mlmms, 434 U.s. 106 (1977)

\

,~.

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
liams, 407

u.s.

143 (1972).

u.s.

1

Un i ten

873 (1975), Adams v. '\i'lil-

Although such a "seizure" does

not require probable cause, it does require "an articulable .
basis for suspecting criminal activity."
Although these principles are well settled, there
has ;never been a Court opinion applying them in the special ·
circumstances of an airport stop.

Since M.e ndenhall, ther.e ·ff+.,.

has been more than a little confusion -,'ta1 situation to

~11-lich

I am afraid my opinion contr tbuted. . You and t cH f.fered in
Mendenhall as to whether there .were sufficient artlculable
grounds for the initial stop and auestioning.
that the grounds were ,adequate, and - unlike
sidered this the special type of

"seizure~.

cases commencing with Terry have

recoqniz~.rl;"

~.

I thoughf 1
Potte~ · -

I con-

that our prior '"
Your

ultim,.a. ~~

position in Mendenhall was based -primarily on the fact that
"undoubtedly {she] waA 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when the agents escorted her
1 ic ar'ea to the •

fro~

the pub-

• office for questioning and a strip

search" • . 446 u.s., at 574.

As I read the various opinions

in Mendenhall, there were five of us who thought the i.niti.a1
stop and questioning was lawful, though our reasons varied • .
Until Royer found himself confronted i.n the "closet" away from the concourse, I think there was no question
of unlawful conduct by the police.

On the facts of this

case, one could say that Royer had consented to the initial '
questioning, to exhibiting his ticket and identi.fi.cations,

3.

and even to going with the police to a private room.

I

would say, however, in the setting of an airport- and given
the extent t.o which drugs are moved from 1!\irport to airport
by couriers - that trained agents (such as the DEA) presump-

tively

m~y

rely on the "courier profile" to stop a suspect

for identification .

I agree that the "profile" in this case

may have been less than compelling up to the time the disparity in names was discovered.

Yet , unless an officer can
cl:lo

j

detai.n a suspecter'3 person for the minute or two necessary
...

for identification, orug couriers will be coacheti simply to
"walk away" and refuse to

t~entify

themselves.

;.:'

l'i~ J
~., '" ~:

I am not

suggesting that these mooest stops may be made of everyone
without any suspicion, but I would give experienced officers
- in the special context of an airport - the benefit of
doubt in most cases.

Brignoni-Ponce supports a stop for

identification in the special context of aliens being smuggled into our country .
,.-r

The public interest in preventing drug traffic is
great, and the intrusion upon a traveler's privacy when
stopped in an airport for brief questioning is minimal.

The

..

public is accustomed to considernble regulation and restraints when traveling by air.

'People, including guards

and air line employees always are close by .

This is quite a

different environment from a street encounter with police
where the suspect may be alone.

We all have to go through

the metal detectors, and we often see
one occasion I was

ev~n

peo~le

questione~.

On

askeo to accompany an officer to a
·':!'
'"'ii

"
l:,J

.'l

..

4.

private room because the detector kept emitting signals.

1

escaped being searched only by exhibiting my Supreme Court
identification.

,;f,

i::f

that the DEA manual instructs its
agents to advise a suspect that he has a right to refuse to
consent to a search, although
defined.

I

do not believe "search" is ,

The manual also instructs agents to return tickets

and ID evidence immediately.

Perhaps you will. wish to cite

the manual in a footnote . as €'Vidence of an appropriate - but
not necessarily the only - procedure to be followed.
In sum,

I

therefore would hold that the officers

were justified in stopoinq Royer for irhmtifi.cation purposes, and that when the discrepancy in name appeared they
also were justified in detaining him for further

que~tion-

~

(

::t:~

..1

"I

.• ,

ing.

The Search of the Suitcases
!,!.

Your opi.nion quite satisfactorily discusses the

"search" issue.

As we have agreed in our several conversa-

tions, even this is a close question because of

th~

trial

court's findings of "consent" 1 E\nd the fact that Royer c'tin
agre'e .

I am still willing - as Harry would say - "to go

along" -with the view that Royer's agreement to the search
was coerced under the circumstances you properly

empha~ize.

But I would be hesitant to join an opinion, or perhaps even
the judgment 1 unless we also said - more expli.ci tly than

('

\l·

;

.

5.

your present draft - that at least until Royer arrived at
the "closet" the officers were justified in what they did.
We should not permit pPople who travel under assumed names, and otherwise arguably meet the "drug courier
profile", to walk away with their luggage.

Jf a trained dog

detects narcotics, the suspect could be held briefly to permit the obtaining of a warrant .
could be viewed as exigent, and
~roulc1

The circumstances then
~n

arrest on probable cause

be justified.

* * *
The above memo is longer than I had contemplaten.
~

good deal of what I have said is

rather deeply

hel~

b~ckground

for my

o~n

conviction that law enforcement should

not be handicapped any more than the Constitution clearly
requires in their effort to curb the narcotics traffic that

.li

I

j

i

~

is the major source of lawlessness in our. country.

r.... F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM
80-2146 Florida v. Royer
This memorandum, stating my views on this case,
will repeat - with a different emphasis - a good deal of
what you have said.
The Investigative Stop
Of the two issues, I consider the legality of the
initial encounter with the police to be by far the more significant.

I thought we granted cert with the hope of get-

ting a Court opinion on airport investigative stops.

My

recollection is that you and I both voted against granting
in view of the presence of the second issue, i.e., the confrontation and search in the "closet".

This issue is of no

particular importance except to the parties in this case.
The Court has repeatedly held that a person who has
not been "arrested" may nevertheless be "seized" briefly
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

"(W]henever a

police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."
Ohio, 392

u.s.

1, 16 (1968).

Terry v.

See also Michigan v. Summers,

452 U.S. 692 (1981)*; United States v. Cortez, 449

u.s.

411

*John's opinion in Summers, though addressing a different
factual situation, has a rather good summary of the rationale of investigative seizures. It may be helpful to use
it. You rely on Dunaway a good deal, but the police conduct
there was far removed even from the "arrest" in this case.

2.

(1981)

~

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434

States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
liams, 407

u.s.

143 (1972).

u.s.

u.s.

106 (1977)

~

United

873 (1975): Adams v. Wil-

Although such a "seizure" does

not require probable cause, it does require "an articulable
basis for suspecting criminal activity."
Although these principles are well settled, there
has never been a Court opinion applying them in the special
circumstances of an airport stop.

Since Mendenhall, there

has been more than a little confusion - a situation to which
I am afraid my opinion contributed.

You and I differed in

Mendenhall as to whether there were sufficient articulable
grounds for the initial stop and questioning.

I thought

that the grounds were adequate, and - unlike Potter - I considered this the special type of "seizure" that our prior
cases commencing with Terry have recognized.

Your ultimate

position in Mendenhall was based primarily on the fact that
"undoubtedly [she] was 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when the agents escorted her from the public area to the • • . office for questioning and a strip
search".

446

u.s.,

at 574.

As I read the various opinions

in Mendenhall, there were five of us who thought the initial
stop and questioning was lawful, though our reasons varied.
Until Royer found himself confronted in the "closet" away from the concourse, I think there was no question
of unlawful conduct by the police.

On the facts of this

case, one could say that Royer had consented to the initial
questioning, to exhibiting his ticket and identifications,

',1

•

·~

3.

and even to going with the police to a private room.

I

would say, however, in the setting of an airport- and given
the extent to which drugs are moved from airport to airport
by couriers - that trained agents (such as the DEA} presumptively may rely on the "courier profile" to stop a suspect
for identification.

I agree that the "profile" in this case

may have been less than compelling up to the time the disparity in names was discovered.

Yet, unless an officer can

detain a suspected person for the minute or two necessary
for identification, drug couriers will be coached simply to
"walk away" and refuse to identify themselves.

I am not

suggesting that these modest stops may be made of everyone
without any suspicion, but I would give experienced officers
- in the special context of an airport - the benefit of
doubt in most cases.

Brignoni-Ponce supports a stop for

identification in the special context of aliens being smuggled into our country.

9/
~

~

The public interest in preventing drug traffic is

great, and the intrusion upon a traveler's privacy when
stopped in an airport for brief questioning is minimal.

The

public is accustomed to considerable regulation and restraints when traveling by air.

People, including guards

and air line employees always are close by.

This is quite a

different environment from a street encounter with police
where the suspect may be alone.

We all have to go through

the metal detectors, and we often see people questioned.
one occasion I was even asked to accompany an officer to a

On

4.

private room because the detector kept emitting signals.

I

escaped being searched only by exhibiting my Supreme Court
identification.

\

'2:.-,

I add here that the DEA manual instructs its
agents to advise a suspect that he has a right to refuse to
consent to a search, although I do not believe "search" is
defined.

The manual also instructs agents to return tickets

and ID evidence immediately.

Perhaps you will wish to cite

the manual in a footnote as evidence of an appropriate - but
not necessarily the only - procedure to be followed.
In sum, I therefore would hold that the officers
were justified in stopping Royer for identification purposes, and that when the discrepancy in name appeared they
also were justified in detaining him for further questioning.

The Search of the Suitcases
Your opinion quite satisfactorily discusses the
"search" issue.

As we have agreed in our several conversa-

tions, even this is a close question because of the trial
court's findings of "consent", and the fact that Royer did
agree.

I am still willing - as Harry would say - "to go

along" -with the view that Royer's agreement to the search
was coerced under the circumstances you properly emphasize.
But I would be hesitant to join an opinion, or perhaps even
the judgment, unless we also said - more explicitly than

5.

your present draft - that at least until Royer arrived at
the "closet" the officers were justified in what they did.
We should not permit people who travel under assumed names, and otherwise arguably meet the "drug courier
profile", to walk away with their luggage.

If a trained dog

detects narcotics, the suspect could be held briefly to permit the obtaining of a warrant.

The circumstances then

could be viewed as exigent, and an arrest on probable cause
would be justified.

* * *
The above memo is longer than I had contemplated.
A good deal of what I have said is background for my own
rather deeply held conviction that law enforcement should
not be handicapped any more than the Constitution clearly
requires in their effort to curb the narcotics traffic that
is the major source of lawlessness in our country.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

December 14, 1982

v. Royer

Dear Byron:
I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to
look at your draft opinion.
,.

r.•··-"

Subject to the comments below, I will be glad to join
you. On a preliminary readi.ng, I was under the impreGsion
that your draft could be read as suggesting a narrowing of
our "investigative stops" cases even in the setting of an
airport.
• ~ )!i',,,_, ,.•
A more careful readinq allays my concern to a great extent. My interest in this case (and ultimate willingness to
grant it) was the hope that we could shed helpful light on
the large problem of investigative stops at airports i.n the
"war" on traffic in drugs. I would not have voted to take
the case simply to decide, as we ultimate do here, that the
search was coerced.
Part II of your draft, in which preliminary observations
are rnade, does address investigative stops in general terms.
I suggest that you consider. quoting from John's opinion •'
in Summers (452 u.s. 692, particularly the paragraph that
begins on page 699. In footnote 9 on that page, John also
draws the distinction between random stops and investigative
stops rnade on the basis of "articulable and reasonable suspicion" . .. ,
Summers also is authority for requiring a court in an
investigative stop case - "to examine both the character of
the official intrusion and its justification". As John
says, "special law enforcement interests" may constitute a
justification. These exist to a high degree in this type· of
case. Moreover, an investigative stop in an airport- such
as that involved in this case - constitutes a minimum intrusion on ones privacy.

2.

Here, Byron, I repeat in substance views I expressed in
Mendenhall. The public interest in preventing drug traffic
is great, the problems of detection are unique, and the intrusion upon a travel£-r'R privac' when stopped in an airport
for brief questioning is minimal. ~he public is accustomed
to considerable regulation and restra.ints when traveU.ng by
air. People, including guards and air line employees always
are close by. This is quite a different environment from a
street encounter with police where the ~uspect may he alone.
We all have to go through the metal detectors, and we often
see people questioned. As I mentioned, I was even asked to
accompany an officer to a private room because the detector
kept emitting signals. I escaped heing searched only by
exhibiting my Supreme Court identification.
Your dissent
from including in
intrusion against
and problems that

in Mendenhall in no way inhibits you now
this opinion a weighing of the degree of
these special law enforcement interests
are implicated.

t have one other specific point. You rely a good deal
on Dunaway. To be sure, there is lanquaqe in Dunaway that
is not Inappropriate here. Yet the facts were so egregious
that I view the case itself as essentially irrelevant. Do
you think your emphasis of Dunaway may be rea1 more broadly
than the facts of that case woul~ justify.
'

I

have put a question Mark or two in the margin of your

draft.
If you could make changes along the foregoing lines, I
will be happy to join yon - though I agree that whether
there was consent to the search of the suitcases is an extremely close question.
Sincerely,
•·

···' Justice White
LFP/vde
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J. BRENNAN , JR.
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RE:

No. 81-2146

Florida v. Royer

Dear Chief:
Byron has agreed to undertake the opinion for the
Court in the above.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 4, 1983

No. 80-2146

Florida v. Royer

Dear Byron,
I will await the dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice White

Copies to the Conference
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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Justice White
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2146

~~

~~

FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. MARK ROYER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UIHJ1!!18 S'fz\'f:SS COURT OF
APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
[January - , 1983]
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are required in this case to determine whether the
Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, properly applied
the precepts of the Fourth Amendment in holding that respondent Royer was being illegally detained at the time of his
purported consent to a search of his luggage.
I

On January 3, 1978, Royer was observed at Miami International Airport by two plain-clothes detectives of the Dade
County, Florida, Public Safety Department assigned to the
County's Organized Crime Bureau, Narcotics Investigation
Section. 1 Detectives Johnson and Magdalena believed that
Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the
so-called "drug courier profile." 2 Royer, apparently un' The facts set forth in this opinion are taken from the en bane decision of
the Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District, 389 So. 2d 1015,
1015-18 (Fla. App. 1980), and from the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress contained in the Joint Appendix. App. 11A-116A.
2
The "drug courier profile" is an abstract of characteristics found to be
typical of persons transporting illegal drugs. In Royer's case, the detectives attention was attracted by the following actions which were considered to be within the profile: a) Royer was carrying American Tourister
luggage, which appeared to be heavy, b) he was young, appeared to be between 25-35, c) he was casually dressed, d) Royer appeared pale and ner-

~
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aware of the attention he had attracted, purchased a one-way
ticket to New York City and checked his two suitcases, placing on each suitcase an identification tag bearing the name
"Holt" and the destination, "LaGuardia". As Royer made
his way to the concourse which led to the airline boarding
area, the two detectives approached him, identified themselves as policemen working out of the sheriff's office and
asked if Royer had a "moment" to speak with them; Royer
said "Yes".
Upon request, but without oral consent, Royer produced
for the detectives his airline ticket and his driver's license.
The airline ticket, like the baggage identification tags, bore
the name "Holt," while the driver's license carried respondent's correct name, "Royer." When the detectives asked
about the discrepancy, Royer explained that a friend had
made the reservation in the name of "Holt." Royer became
noticeably more nervous during this conversation, whereupon the detectives informed Royer that they were in fact
narcotics investigators and that they had reason to suspect
him of transporting narcotics.
The detectives did not return his airline ticket and identification but asked Royer to accompany them to a room, approximately forty feet a~ay, adjacent to the concourse.
Royer said nothing in response but went with the officers as
he had been asked to do. The room was later described by
Detective Johnson as a "large storage closet", located in the
stewardess' lounge and containing a small desk and two
chairs. Without Royer's consent or agreement, Detective
Johnson, using Royer's baggage checks stubs, retrieved the
"Holt" luggage from the airline and brought it to the room
where respondent and Detective Magdalena were waiting.
vous, looking around at other people, e) Royer paid for his ticket in cash
with a large number of bills, and f) rather than completing the airline identification tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had space for a
name, address, and telephone number, Royer wrote only a name and the
destination. 389 So. 2d, at 1016; App. 27A-40A.
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Royer was asked if he would consent to a search of the suitcases. Without orally responding to this request, Royer
produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which the
detective then opened without seeking further assent from
Royer. Drugs were found in that suitcase. According to
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did not know the
combination to the lock on the second suitcase. When asked
if he objected to the detective opening the second suitcase,
Royer said "no, go ahead," and did not object when the detective explained that the suitcase might have to be broken
open. The suitcase was pried open by the officers and more
marijuana was found. Royer was then told that he was
under arrest. Approximately fifteen minutes elapsed from
the time the detectives intially approached respondent until
his arrest upon the discovery of the contraband.
Prior to his trial for felony possession of marijuana, 3 Royer
made a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search of the suitcases. The trial court found that Royer's
consent to the search was "freely and voluntarily given," and
that, regardless of the consent, the warrantless search was
reasonable because "the officer doesn't have the time to run
out and get a search warrant because the plane is going to
take off." 4 Following the denial of the motion to suppress,
Royer changed his plea from "not guilty" to "nolo contendere," specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress. 5 Royer was convicted.
The District Court of Appeal, sitting en bane, reversed
Royer's conviction. 6 The court held that Royer had been inFla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2) (1975).
• The trial court's decision on the motion to suppress, App. 114A-116A,
is unreported.
' Under Florida law, a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of
guilty.
6
On appeal, a panel of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District, found that viewing the totality of the circumstances, the finding of
consent by the trial court was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. App. 1979). The panel decision was vacated and re3
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voluntarily confined within the small room without probable
cause; that the involuntary detention had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
at the time his consent to the search was obtained, and that
the consent to search was therefore invalid because tainted
by the unlawful confinement. 7
Several factors led the court to conclude that respondent's
confinement was tantamount to arrest. Royer had "found
himself in a small enclosed area being confronted by two police officers-a situation which presents an almost classic definition of imprisonment." 389 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. App.
1980). The detectives' statement to Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics also bolstered the finding
that Royer was "in custody" at the time the consent to search
was given. Ibid. In addition, the detectives' possession of
Royer's airline ticket and their retrieval and possession of his
luggage made it clear, in the District Court of Appeal's view,
that Royer was not free to leave. Ibid.
At the suppression hearing Royer testified that he was
under the impression that he was not free to leave the officers' presence. The Florida Court of Appeal found that this
apprehension "was much more than a well-justified subjective belief," for the State had conceded at oral argument before that court that "the officers would not have permitted
Royer to leave the room even if [Royer] had erroneously
hearing en bane granted. 389 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. App. 1980). It is the decision of the en bane court that is reviewed here.
7
The Florida court was also of the opinion that "a mere similarity with
the contents of the drug courier profile is insufficient even to constitute the
articulable suspicion required to justify" the stop authorized by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). It went on to hold that even if it followed a contrary rule, or even if articulable suspicion occurred at some point prior to
Royer's consent to search, the facts did not amount to probable cause that
would justify the restraint imposed on Royer. Supp. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 51-52. As will become clear, we disagree on the reasonable-suspicion issue but do concur that probable cause to arrest was lacking.
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thought he could." Ibid. The nomenclature used to describe
Royer's confinement, the court found, was unimportant because under Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979),
"[a] police confinement which ... goes beyond the limited restraint of a Terry investigatory stop may be constitutionally
justified only by probable cause." 389 So. 2d, at 1019. Detective Johnson, who conducted the search, had specifically
stated at the suppression hearing that he did not have probable cause to arrest Royer until the suitcases were opened and
their contents revealed. Ibid. In the absence of probable
cause, the court concluded, Royer's consent to search, given
only after he had been unlawfully confined, was ineffective to
justify the search. Ibid. Because there was no proof at all
that a "break in the chain of illegality" had occurred, the
court found that Royer's consent was invalid as a matter of
law. Id., at 1020. We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 454 U. S. 1079 (1981), and now affirm.

-----

II
Some preliminary observations are in order. First, it is
unquestioned that without a~ant to search Royer's luggage and in the absence of,foxigent circumstances, the validity of the search depended on Royer's purported consent.
Neither is it disputed that where the validity of a search rests
on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.
v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 329 (1979); Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,233-234 (1973); Bumperv. North
Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 548--549 (1968); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255
u.s 313, 317 (1921).
Second, law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing

)

'
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to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210 n. 12 (1979);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 31, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Nor would the
fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring
some level of objective justification. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 555 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at
32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). He may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to
listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those
grounds. United States v. Mendenhall, supra, at 556 (opinion of Stewart, J.). If, however, there is no detention-no
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-then
no constitutional rights have been infringed.
Third, it is also clear that not all seizures of the person
must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime.
Prior to Terry v. Ohio, supra, any restraint on the person
amounting to a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment was invalid unless justified by probable cause.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 207-209 (1979).
Terry created a limited exception to this general rule: certain
seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there
is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is
about to commit a crime. In that case, a stop and a frisk for
weapons were found unexceptionable. Adams v. Williams,
407 U. S. 143 (1972), applied the same approach in the context of an informant's report that an unnamed individual, in a
nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and a gun. Although
not expressly authorized in Terry, United States v. Brignoni-
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Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975), was unequivocal in saying that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a
temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to
the purpose of the stop. In Brignoni-Ponce, that purpose
was to verify or dispel the suspicion that the immigration
laws were being violated, a governmental interest that was
sufficient to warrant temporary detention for limited questioning. Royer does not suggest, nor do we, that a similar
rationale would not warrant temporary detention for questioning on less than probable cause where the public interest
involved is the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or
of any other serious crime.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), involved another circumstance in which a temporary detention on less
than probable cause satisfied the ultimate test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. There the occupant of a
house was detained while a search warrant for the house was
being executed. We held that the warrant made the occupant sufficiently suspect to justify his temporary seizure.
The "limited intrusion on the personal security" of the person
detained was justified "by such substantial law enforcement
interests" that the seizure could be made on articulable suspicion not amounting to probable cause. I d., at 699.
Fourth, Terry and its progeny nevertheless created only
limited exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to arrest. Detentions may be
"investigative" yet violative of the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause. In the name of investigating a person
who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the police
may not carry out a full search of the person or of his automobile or other effects. Nor may the police seek to verify their
suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest.
Dunaway v. New York, supra, made this clear. There, the
suspect was taken to the police station from his home and,
without being formally arrested, interrogated for an hour.
The resulting incriminating statements were held inadmissi-

..
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ble: reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative. Id., at 211-212. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590
(1975), and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969), are to
the same effect.
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures has always been interpreted to prevent
a search which is not limited to the particularly described
"place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,"
U. S. Const., Amend. IV, even if the search is based upon
probable cause. The Amendment's protection is not diluted
in those situations where it has been determined that legitimate law enforcement interests justify a warrantless search:
the search must be limited in scope to that which is justifed
by the particular purposes served by the exception. For example, a warrantless search is permissible incident to a lawful arrest because of legitimate concerns for the safety of the
officer and to prevent the destruction of evidence by the
arrestee. E. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763
(1969). Nevertheless, such a search is limited to the person
of the arrestee and the area immediately within his control.
I d., at 762. Terry v. Ohio, supra, also embodies this principle: "The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
392 U. 8., at 19.
The reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires no less when
the police action is a seizure permitted on less than probable
cause because of legitimate law enforcement interests. The
scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of
probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a
limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect.
The scope of the intrusion permitted will, of course, vary to
some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of
each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is neces-
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sary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time. See, e.g., United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 881-882; Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146. It is, of course, the State's burden
to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.
Fifth, Dunaway and Brown hold that statements given
during a period of illegal detention are inadmissable even
though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal
detention and not the result of an independent act of free will.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S., at 21~219; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 601-602. In this respect those cases reiterated one of the principal holdings of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).
Sixth, if the events in this case amounted to no more than a
permissible police encounter in a public place or a justifiable
Terry-type detention, Royer's consent to search his luggage,
if voluntary, would have been effective to legalize the search
of his two suitcases. Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S.
411, 424--425 (1976). The Court of Appeal, in the case before
us, however, concluded not only that Royer had been seized
when he gave his consent to search his luggage but also that
the bounds of an investigative stop had been exceeded. In
its view the "confinement" in this case went beyond the limited restraint of a Terry investigative stop, and Royer's consent was thus tainted by the illegality, a conclusion that required reversal in the absence of probable cause to arrest.
The question before us is whether the record warrants that
conclusion. We think that it does.

III
The State proffers three reasons for holding that when
Royer consented to the search of his luggage, he was not
being illegally detained. First, it is submitted that the en-
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tire encounter was consensual and hence Royer(fe; was not
being held against his will at all. We find this submission untenable. Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his
driver's license were no doubt permissible in themselves, but
when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents,
told Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics,
and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while
retaining his ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
These circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority such that "a reasonable person would have believed
he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U. S. 544, 554 (Opinion of Stewart, J.).
Second, the State submits that if Royer was seized, there
existed reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a temporary detention and that the limits of a Terry-type stop were
never exceeded. We agree with the State that when the of- J
fleers discovered that Royer was travelling under an assumed name, this fact, and the facts already known to the officers-paying cash for a one-way ticket, the mode of
checking the two bags, and Royer's appearance and conduct
in general-were adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of
carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his lug- I
gage while they attemp e to verify or dispel their suspicions '
ina manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative
detention. We also agree that had Royer voluntarily consented to the search of his luggage while he was justifiably
being detained on reasonable suspicion, theproducts of the
search would be admissible against him. We have concluded, however, that at the time Royer produced the key to
his suitcase, the detention to which he was then subjected
was a severe intrusion on his personal liberty, more serious
than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity.
By the time Royer was informed that the officers wished to
examine his luggage, he had identified himself when ap-
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proached by the officers and had attempted to explain the
discrepancy between the name shown on his identification
and the name under which he had purchased his ticket and
identified his luggage. Obviously, the officers were not satisfied, for they informed him they were narcotics agents and
had reason to believe that he was carrying illegal drugs.
They requested him to accompany them to the police room.
Royer went with them. He found himself in a small room-a
large closet-equipped with a desk and two chairs. He was
alone with two police officers who again told him that they
thought he was carrying narcotics. He also found that the
officers, without his consent, had retrieved his checked luggage from the airlines. Obviously, what had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the
police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions. The officers had Royer's ticket, they
had his identification, and they had seized his luggage. It
was never suggested to Royer that he was free to board his
plane if he so chose, and he reasonably believed that he was
being detained. At least as of that moment, any consensual
aspects of the encounter had evaporated, and we cannot fault
the Florida Court of Appeal in concluding that Terry v. Ohio
and the cases following it did not justify the restraint to
which Royer was then subjected. As a practical matter,
Royer was under arrest. Consistent with this conclusion,
the State conceded in the Florida courts that Royer would
not have been free to leave the interrogation room had he
asked to do so. 8 Furthermore, the state's brief in this Court
interprets the testimony of the officers at the suppression
hearing as indicating that had Royer refused to consent to a
search of his luggage, the officers would have held the lug8

In its brief and at oral argument before this Court, the State contests
whether this concession was ever made. We have no basis to question the
statement of the Florida court.

80-2146-0PINION
12

FLORIDA v. ROYER

gage and sought a warrant to authorize the search. Brief for
Petitioner 6. 9
We also doubt that the prosecution in this case has satisfactorily demonstrated that it employed the least intrusive
means to pursue its suspicions. First, by returning his
9
Our decision here is consistent with the Court's judgment in United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, the respondent was walking along an airport concourse when she was approached by
two federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers. As in the present
case, the officers asked for Mendenhall's airline ticket and some identification; the names on the ticket and identification did not match. When one
of the agents specifically identified himself as attached to the DEA, Mendenhall became visibly shaken and nervous. 446 U. S., at 548.
After returning the ticket and identification, one officer asked Mendenhall if she would accompany him to the DEA airport office, 50 feet away for
further questions. Once in the office, Mendenhall was asked to consent to
a search of her person and her handbag; she was advised of her right to
decline. Id., at 548. In a private room following further assurance from
Mendenhall that she consented to the search, a policewoman began the
search of Mendenhall's person by requesting that Mendenhall disrobe. As
she began to undress, Mendenhall removed two concealed packages that
appeared to contain heroin and handed them to the policewoman. Id., at
549. The Court of Appeals determined that the initial "stop" of Mendenhall was unlawful because not based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. In the alternative, the court found that even if the intial stop
was permissible, the officer's request that Mendenhall accompany him to
the DEA office constituted an arrest without probable cause.
This Court reversed. Two Justices were of the view that the entire encounter was consensual and that no seizure had taken place. Three other
Justices assumed that there had been a seizure but held that there was reasonable suspicion to warrant it; hence a voluntary consent to search was a
valid basis for the search. Thus, the five Justices voting to reverse appeared to agree that Mendenhall was not being illegally detained when she
consented to be searched. The four dissenting Justices also assumed that
there had been a detention but were of the view that reasonable grounds
for suspecting Mendenhall did not exist and concluded that Mendenhall was
thus being illegally detained at the time of her consent.
The case before us differs in important respects. Here, Royer's ticket
and identification remained in the possession of the officers throughout the
encounter; the officers also seized and had possession of his luggage. As a
practical matter, Royer could not leave the airport without them. In
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ticket and driver's license, and informing him that he was
free to go if he so desired, the officers may have obviated any
claim that the encounter was anything but a consensual matter from start to finish. Second, there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory
detention, such as from an airport concourse to a more private area. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106,
109-111 (1977) (per curiam). There is no indication in this
case that such reasons prompted the officers to transfer the
site of the encounter from the concourse to the interrogation
room. It appears, rather, that the primary interest of the
officers was not in having an extended conversation with
Royer but in the contents of his luggage, a matter which the
officers did not pursue orally with Royer until after the encounter was relocated to the police room. The record does
not reflect any facts which would support a finding that the
legitimate law enforcement purposes which justified the detention in the first instance were furthered by removing
Royer to the police room prior to the officer's attempt to gain
his consent to a search of his luggage. As we have noted,
had Royer consented to a search on the spot, the search could
have been conducted with Royer present in the area where
the bags were retrieved by Officer Johnson and any evidence
recovered would have been admissible against him. If the
search proved negative, Royer would have been free to go
much earlier and with less likelihood of missing his flight,
which in itself can be a very serious matter in a variety of
circumstances.
Third, the State has not touched on the question whether it
would have been feasible to investigate the contents of
Mendenhall, no luggage was involved, the ticket and identification were
immediately returned, and the officers were careful to advise that the suspect could decline to be searched. Here, the officers had seized Royer's
luggage and made no effort to advise him that he need not consent to the
search.
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Royer's bags in a more expeditious way. The courts are not \
strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the presence of
controlled substances in luggage. 10 There is no indication
here that this means was not feasible and available. If it had

°Courts of Appeals are in disagreement as to whether using a dog to
detect drugs in luggage is a search, but no Court of Appeals has held that
more than an articulable suspicion is necessary to justify this kind of a warrantless search if indeed it is a search. See e. g., United States v. Sullivan, 625 F. 2d 9, 13 (CA4 1980) (no search), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 923
(1981); United States v. Burns, 624 F. 2d 95, 101 (CAlO 1980) (same);
United States v. Beale, 674 F. 2d 1327, 1335 (CA9 1982) (sniff is an intrusion requiring reasonable suspicion), cert. pending, No. 82-674. Furthermore, the law of the circuit from which this case comes was and is that "use
of [drug-detecting canines] constitute[s] neither a search nor a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goldstein, 635 F. 2d
356, 361 (CA5), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 962 (1981).
See United States v.
Viera, 644 F. 2d 509, 510 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 867 (1981). Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to September 30, 1981, are binding precedent on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F. 2d 1206, 1207 (CA111981).
In any event, we hold here that the officers had reasonable suspicion to )
believe that Royer's luggage contained drugs, and we assume that the use
of dogs in the investigation would not have entailed any prolonged detention of either Royer or his luggage which may involve other Fourth
Amendment concerns. See United States v. Place, 660 F. 2d 44 (C~
1981), cert. granted, No. 81-1617, U. S. (1982). In United
<..
States v. Beale, supra, for example, after briefly questioning two suspects
who had checked baggage for a flight from the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida,
airport, the officers proceeded to the baggage area where a trained dog
alerted to one of the checked bags. Meanwhile, the suspects had boarded
their plane for California, where their bags were again sniffed by a trained
dog and they were arrested. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated a judgment convicting the suspects on the ground that articulable
suspicion was necessary to justify the use of a trained dog to sniff luggage
and that the existence or not of that requirement should have been determined in the District Court. 674 F. 2d, at 1335. In the case before us, \
the officers, with founded suspicion, could have detained Royer for the
brief period during which Florida authorities at busy airports seem able to
carry out the dog-sniffing procedure.
1

80-214&-0PINION
FLORIDA v. ROYER

15

been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momentarily detained while this investigative procedure was carried
out. Indeed, it may be that no detention at all would have
been necessary. A negative result would have freed Royer
in short order; a positive result would have resulted in his
justifiable arrest on probable cause.
We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for
distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for
determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the
courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will
provide unarguable answers to the question whether there
has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, we must render judgment, and we think that the Florida Court of Appeal cannot
be faulted in concluding that the limits of a Terry-stop had
been exceeded.
IV
The State's third and final argument is that Royer was not
being illegally held when he gave his consent because there
was probable cause to arrest him at that time. Officer Johnson testified at the suppression hearing and the Florida
Court of Appeal held that there was no probable cause to arrest until Royer's bags were opened, but the fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded
on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose
the State from justifying Royer's custody by proving probable cause and hence removing any barrier to relying on
Royer's consent to search. Peters v. New York, decided
with Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66-67 (1968). We
agree with the Florida Court of Appeal, however, that there
was no probable cause to arrest Royer at the time he purported to give his consent to the search of his luggage. The
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facts are that a nervous young man with two American
Tourister bags paid cash for an airline ticket to a "target
city". These facts led to inquiry, which in turn revealed that
the ticket had been bought under an assumed name. The
proffered explanation did not satisfy the officers. We cannot
agree with the State, if this is its position, that every nervous
young man paying cash for a ticket to New York City under
an assumed name and carrying two heavy American
Tourister bags may be arrested and held to answer for a serious felony charge.

v

Because we affirm the Florida Court of Appeal's conclusion
that Royer was being illegally detained when he consented to
the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was
tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the
search. The judgment of the Florida Court of Appeal is
accordingly
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are required in this case to determine whether the
Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, properly applied
the precepts of the Fourth Amendment in holding that respondent Royer was being illegally detained at the time of his
purported consent to a search of his luggage.
I
On January 3, 1978, Royer was observed at Miami International Airport by two plain-clothes detectives of the Dade
County, Florida, Public Safety Department assigned to the
County's Organized Crime Bureau, Narcotics Investigation
Section. 1 Detectives Johnson and Magdalena believed that
Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the
so-called "drug courier profile." 2 Royer, apparently un1

The facts set forth in this opinion are taken from the en bane decision of
the Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District, 389 So. 2d 1015,
1015--18 (Fla. App. 1980), and from the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress contained in the Joint Appendix. App. 11A-116A.
2
The "drug courier profile" is an abstract of characteristics found to be
typical of persons transporting illegal drugs. In Royer's case, the detectives attention was attracted by the following actions which were considered to be within the profile: a) Royer was carrying American Tourister
luggage, which appeared to be heavy, b) he was young, appeared to be between 25--35, c) he was casually dressed, d) Royer appeared pale and ner-

_
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aware of the attention he had attracted, purchased a one-way
ticket to New York City and checked his two suitcases, placing on each suitcase an identification tag bearing the name
"Holt" and the destination, "LaGuardia". As Royer made
his way to the concourse which led to the airline boarding
area, the two detectives approached him, identified themselves as policemen working out of the sheriff's office and
asked if Royer had a "moment" to speak with them; Royer
said "Yes".
Upon request, but without oral consent, Royer produced
for the detectives his airline ticket and his driver's license.
The airline ticket, like the baggage identification tags, bore
the name "Holt," while the driver's license carried respondent's correct name, "Royer." When the detectives asked
about the discrepancy, Royer explained that a friend had
made the reservation in the name of "Holt." Royer became
noticeably more nervous during this conversation, whereupon the detectives informed Royer that they were in fact
narcotics investigators and that they had reason to suspect
him of transporting narcotics.
The detectives did not return his airline ticket and identification but asked Royer to accompany them to a room, approximately forty feet away, adjacent to the concourse.
Royer said nothing in response but went with the officers as
he had been asked to do. The room was later described by
Detective Johnson as a "large storage closet", located in the
stewardess' lounge and containing a small desk and two
chairs. Without Royer's consent or agreement, Detective
Johnson, using Royer's baggage checks stubs, retrieved the
"Holt" luggage from the airline and brought it to the room
where respondent and Detective Magdalena were waiting.
vous, looking around at other people, e) Royer paid for his ticket in cash
with a large number of bills, and f) rather than completing the airline identification tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had space for a
name, address, and telephone number, Royer wrote only a name and the
destination. 389 So. 2d, at 1016; App. 27A-40A.
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Royer was asked if he would consent to a search of the suitcases. Without orally responding to this request, Royer
produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which the
detective then opened without seeking further assent from
Royer. Drugs were found in that suitcase. According to
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did not know the
combination to the lock on the second suitcase. When asked
if he objected to the detective opening the second suitcase,
Royer said "no, go ahead," and did not object when the detective explained that the suitcase might have to be broken
open. The suitcase was pried open by the officers and more
marijuana was found. Royer was then told that he was
under arrest. Approximately fifteen minutes elapsed from
the time the detectives intially approached respondent until
his arrest upon the discovery of the contraband.
Prior to his trial for felony possession of marijuana, 3 Royer
made a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search of the suitcases. The trial court found that Royer's
consent to the search was "freely and voluntarily given," and
that, regardless of the consent, the warrantless search was
reasonable because "the officer doesn't have the time to run
out and get a search warrant because the plane is going to
take off." 4 Following the denial of the motion to suppress,
Royer changed his plea from "not guilty" to "nolo contendere," specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress. 5 Royer was convicted.
The District Court of Appeal, sitting en bane, reversed
Royer's conviction. 6 The court held that Royer had been in3
Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2) (1975).
• The trial court's decision on the motion to suppress, App. 114A-116A,
is unreported.
• Under Florida law, a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of
guilty.
• On appeal, a panel of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District, found that viewing the totality of the circumstances, the finding of
consent by the trial court was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. App. 1979). The panel decision was vacated and re-

I
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voluntarily confined within the small room without probable
cause; that the involuntary detention had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
at the time his consent to the search was obtained, and that
the consent to search was therefore invalid because tainted
by the unlawful confinement. 7
Several factors led the court to conclude that respondent's
confinement was tantamount to arrest. Royer had "found
himself in a small enclosed area being confronted by two police officers-a situation which presents an almost classic definition of imprisonment." 389 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. App.
1980). The detectives' statement to Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics also bolstered the finding
that Royer was "in custody" at the time the consent to search
was given. Ibid. In addition, the detectives' possession of
Royer's airline ticket and their retrieval and possession of his
luggage made it clear, in the District Court of Appeal's view,
that Royer was not free to leave. Ibid.
At the suppression hearing Royer testified that he was
under the impression that he was not free to leave the officers' presence. The Florida Court of Appeal found that this
apprehension "was much more than a well-justified subjective belief," for the State had conceded at oral argument before that court that "the officers would not have permitted
Royer to leave the room even if [Royer] had erroneously
hearing en bane granted. 389 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. App. 1980). It is the decision of the en bane court that is reviewed here.
7
The Florida court was also of the opinion that "a mere similarity with
the contents of the drug courier profile is insufficient even to constitute the
articulable suspicion required to justify" the stop authorized by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). It went on to hold that even if it followed a contrary rule, or even if articulable suspicion occurred at some point prior to
Royer's consent to search, the facts did not amount to probable cause that
would justify the restraint imposed on Royer. Supp. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 51-52. As will become clear, we disagree on the reasonable-suspicion issue but do concur that probable cause to arrest was lacking.
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thought he could." Ibid. The nomenclature used to describe
Royer's confinement, the court found, was unimportant because under Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979),
"[a] police confinement which . . . goes beyond the limited restraint of a Terry investigatory stop may be constitutionally
justified only by probable cause." 389 So. 2d, at 1019. Detective Johnson, who conducted the search, had specifically
stated at the suppression hearing that he did not have probable cause to arrest Royer until the suitcases were opened and
their contents revealed. Ibid. In the absence of probable
cause, the court concluded, Royer's consent to search, given
only after he had been unlawfully confined, was ineffective to
justify the search. Ibid. Because there was no proof at all
that a "break in the chain of illegality" had occurred, the
court found that Royer's consent was invalid as a matter of
law. I d., at 1020. We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 454 U. S. 1079 (1981), and now affirm.
II
Some preliminary observations are in order. First, it is
unquestioned that without a warrant to search Royer's luggage and in the absence of exigent circumstances, the validity of the search depended on Royer's purported consent.
Neither is it disputed that where the validity of a search rests
on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.
v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 329 (1979); Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 233-234 (1973); Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 548-549 (1968); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255
u.s 313, 317 (1921).
Second, law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing

..
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to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210 n. 12 (1979);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 31, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Nor would the
fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring
some level of objective justification. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 555 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at
32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). He may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to
listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those
grounds. United States v. Mendenhall, supra, at 556 (opinion of Stewart, J.). If, however, there is no detention-no
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-then
no constitutional rights have been infringed.
Third, it is also clear that not all seizures of the person
must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime.
Prior to Terry v. Ohio, supra, any restraint on the person
amounting to a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment was invalid unless justified by probable cause.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 207-209 (1979).
Terry created a limited exception to this general rule: certain
seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there
is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is
about to commit a crime. In that case, a stop and a frisk for
weapons were found unexceptionable. Adams v. Williams,
407 U. S. 143 (1972), applied the same approach in the context of an informant's report that an unnamed individual, in a
nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and a gun. Although
not expressly authorized in Terry, United States v. Brignoni-
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Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975), was unequivocal in saying that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a
temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to
the purpose of the stop. In Brignoni-Ponce, that purpose
was to verify or dispel the suspicion that the immigration
laws were being violated, a governmental interest that was
sufficient to warrant temporary detention for limited questioning. Royer does not suggest, nor do we, that a similar
rationale would not warrant temporary detention for questioning on less than probable cause where the public interest
involved is the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or
of any other serious crime.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), involved another circumstance in which a temporary detention on less
than probable cause satisfied the ultimate test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. There the occupant of a
house was detained while a search warrant for the house was
being executed. We held that the warrant made the occupant sufficiently suspect to justify his temporary seizure.
The "limited intrusion on the personal security" of the person
detained was justified "by such substantial law enforcement
interests" that the seizure could be made on articulable suspicion not amounting to probable cause. I d., at 699.
Fourth, Terry and its progeny nevertheless created only
limited exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to arrest. Detentions may be
"investigative" yet violative of the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause. In the name of investigating a person
who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the police
may not carry out a full search of the person or of his automobile or other effects. Nor may the police seek to verify their
suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest.
Dunaway v. New York, supra, made this clear. There, the
suspect was taken to the police station from his home and,
without being formally arrested, interrogated for an hour.
The resulting incriminating statements were held inadmissi-
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ble: reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative. Id., at 211-212. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590
(1975), and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721. (1969), are to
the same effect.
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures has always been interpreted to prevent
a search which is not limited to the particularly described
"place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,"
U. S. Const., Amend. IV, even if the search is based upon
probable cause. The Amendment's protection is not diluted
in those situations where it has been determined that legitimate law enforcement interests justify a warrantless search:
the search must be limited in scope to that which is justifed
by the particular purposes served by the exception. For example, a warrantless search is permissible incident to a lawful arrest because of legitimate concerns for the safety of the
officer and to prevent the destruction of evidence by the
arrestee. E. g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763
(1969). Nevertheless, such a search is limited to the person
of the arrestee and the area immediately within his control.
Id., at 762. Terry v. Ohio, supra, also embodies this principle: "The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
392 U. 8., at 19.
The reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires no less when
the police action is a seizure permitted on less than probable
cause because of legitimate law enforcement interests. The
scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of
probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a
limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect.
The scope of the intrusion permitted will, of course, vary to
some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of
each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is neces-
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sary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time. See, e.g., United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 881--882; Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146. It is, of course, the State's burden
to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.
Fifth, Dunaway and Brown hold that statements given
during a period of illegal detention are inadmissable even
though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal
detention and not the result of an independent act of free will.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S., at 218--219; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 601-602. In this respect those cases reiterated one of the principal holdings of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).
Sixth, if the events in this case amounted to no more than a
permissible police encounter in a public place or a justifiable
Terry-type detention, Royer's consent to search his luggage,
if voluntary, would have been effective to legalize the search
of his two suitcases. Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S.
411, 424-425 (1976). The Court of Appeals in the case before
us, however, concluded not only that Royer had been seized
when he gave his consent to search his luggage but also that
the bounds of an investigative stop had been exceeded. In
its view the "confinement" in this case went beyond the limited restraint of a Terry investigative stop, and Royer's consent was thus tainted by the illegality, a conclusion that required reversal in the absence of probable cause to arrest.
The question before us is whether the record warrants that
conclusion. We think that it does.

III
The State proffers three reasons for holding that when
Royer consented to the search of his luggage, he was not
being illegally detained. First, it is submitted that the en-
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tire encounter was consensual and hence Royer h was not
being held against his will at all. We find this submission untenable. Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his
driver's license were no doubt permissible in themselves, but
when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents,
told Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics,
and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while
retaining his ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
These circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority such that "a reasonable person would have believed
he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U. S. 544, 554 (Opinion of Stewart, J.).
Second, the State submits that if Royer was seized, there
existed reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a temporary detention and that the limits of a Terry-type stop were
never exceeded. We agree with the State that when the officers discovered that Royer was travelling under an assumed name, this fact, and the facts already known to the officers-paying cash for a one-way ticket, the mode of
checking the two bags, and Royer's appearance and conduct
in general-were adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of
carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions
in a manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative
detention. We also agree that had Royer voluntarily consented to the search of his luggage while he was justifiably
being detained on reasonable suspicion, the products of the
search would be admissible against him. We have concluded, however, that at the time Royer produced the key to
his suitcase, the detention to which he was then subjected
was a severe intrusion on his personal liberty, more serious
than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity.
By the time Royer was informed that the officers wished to
examine his luggage, he had identified himself when ap-
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proached by the officers and had attempted to explain the
discrepancy between the name shown on his identification
and the name under which he had purchased his ticket and
identified his luggage. Obviously, the officers were not satisfied, for they informed him they were narcotics agents and
had reason to believe that he was carrying illegal drugs.
They requested him to accompany them to the police room.
Royer went with them. He found himself in a small room-a
large closet-equipped with a desk and two chairs. He was
alone with two police officers who again told him that they
thought he was carrying narcotics. He also found that the
officers, without his consent, had retrieved his checked luggage from the airlines. Obviously, what had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the
police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions. The officers had Royer's ticket, they
had his identification, and they had seized his luggage. It
was never suggested to Royer that he was free to board his
plane if he so chose, and he reasonably believed that he was
being detained. At least as of that moment, any consensual
aspects of the encounter had evaporated, and we cannot fault
the Florida Court of Appeal in concluding that Terry v. Ohio
and the cases following it did not justify the restraint to
which Royer was then subjected. As a practical matter,
Royer was under arrest. Consistent with this conclusion,
the State conceded in the Florida courts that Royer would
not have been free to leave the interrogation room had he
asked to do so. 8 Furthermore, the state's brief in this Court
interprets the testimony of the officers at the suppression
hearing as indicating that had Royer refused to consent to a
search of his luggage, the officers would have held the lugIn its brief and at oral argument before this Court, the State contests
whether this concession was ever made. We have no basis to question the
statement of the Florida court.
8
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gage and sought a warrant to authorize the search. Brief for
Petitioner 6. 9
We also doubt that the prosecution in this case has satisfactorily demonstrated that it employed the least intrusive
means to pursue its suspicions. First, by returning his
9
Our decision here is consistent with the Court's judgment in United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, the respondent was walking along an airport concourse when she was approached by
two federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers. As in the present
case, the officers asked for Mendenhall's airline ticket and some identification; the names on the ticket and identification did not match. When one
of the agents specifically identified himself as attached to the DEA, Mendenhall became visibly shaken and nervous. 446 U. S., at 548.
After returning the ticket and identification, one officer asked Mendenhall if she would accompany him to the DEA airport office, 50 feet away for
further questions. Once in the office, Mendenhall was asked to consent to
a search of her person and her handbag; she was advised of her right to
decline. Id., at 548. In a private room following further assurance from
Mendenhall that she consented to the search, a policewoman began the
search of Mendenhall's person by requesting that Mendenhall disrobe. As
she began to undress, Mendenhall removed two concealed packages that
appeared to contain heroin and handed them to the policewoman. I d., at
549. The Court of Appeals determined that the initial "stop" of Mendenhall was unlawful because not based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. In the alternative, the court found that even if the intial stop
was permissible, the officer's request that Mendenhall accompany him to
the DEA office constituted an arrest without probable cause.
This Court reversed. Two Justices were of the view that the entire encounter was consensual and that no seizure had taken place. Three other
Justices assumed that there had been a seizure but held that there was reasonable suspicion to warrant it; hence a voluntary consent to search was a
valid basis for the search. Thus, the five Justices voting to reverse appeared to agree that Mendenhall was not being illegally detained when she
consented to be searched. The four dissenting Justices also assumed that
there had been a detention but were of the view that reasonable grounds
for suspecting Mendenhall did not exist and concluded that Mendenhall was
thus being illegally detained at the time of her consent.
The case before us differs in important respects. Here, Royer's ticket
and identification remained in the possession of the officers throughout the
encounter; the officers also seized and had possession of his luggage. As a
practical matter, Royer could not leave the airport without them. In
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ticket and driver's license, and informing him that he was
free to go if he so desired, the officers may have obviated any
claim that the encounter was anything but a consensual matter from start to finish. Second, there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory
detention, such as from an airport concourse to a more private area. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106,
109-111 (1977) (per curiam). There is no indication in this
case that such reasons prompted the officers to transfer the
site of the encounter from the concourse to the interrogation
room. It appears, rather, that the primary interest of the
officers was not in having an extended conversation with
Royer but in the contents of his luggage, a matter which the
officers did not pursue orally with Royer until after the encounter was relocated to the police room. The record does
not reflect any facts which would support a finding that the
legitimate law enforcement purposes which justified the detention in the first instance were furthered by removing
Royer to the police room prior to the officer's attempt to gain
his consent to a search of his luggage. As we have noted,
had Royer consented to a search on the spot, the search could
have been conducted with Royer present in the area where
the bags were retrieved by Officer Johnson and any evidence
recovered would have been admissible against him. If the
search proved negative, Royer would have been free to go
much earlier and with less likelihood of missing his flight,
which in itself can be a very serious matter in a variety of
circumstances.
Third, the State has not touched on the question whether it
would have been feasible to investigate the contents of
Mendenhall, no luggage was involved, the ticket and identification were
immediately returned, and the officers were careful to advise that the suspect could decline to be searched. Here, the officers had seized Royer's
luggage and made no effort to advise him that he need not consent to the
search.
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Royer's bags in a more expeditious way. The courts are not
strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the presence of
controlled substances in luggage. 10 There is no indication
here that this means was not feasible and available. If it had

'° Courts of Appeals are in disagreement as to whether using a dog to
detect drugs in luggage is a search, but no Court of Appeals has held that
more than an articulable suspicion is necessary to justify this kind of a warrantless search if indeed it is a search. See e. g., United States v. Sullivan, 625 F. 2d 9, 13 (CA4 1980) (no search), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 923
(1981); United States v. Burns, 624 F. 2d 95, 101 (CAlO 1980) (same);
United States v. Beale, 674 F. 2d 1327, 1335 (CA9 1982) (sniff is an intrusion requiring reasonable suspicion), cert. pending, No. 82-674. Furthermore, the law of the circuit from which this case comes was and is that "use
of [drug-detecting canines] constitute[s] neither a search nor a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Goldstein, 635 F. 2d
356, 361 (CA5), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 962 (1981).
See United States v.
Viera, 644 F. 2d 509, 510 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 867 (1981). Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to September 30, 1981, are binding precedent on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F. 2d 1206, 1207 (CAll 1981).
In any event, we hold here that the officers had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Royer's luggage contained drugs, and we assume that the use
of dogs in the investigation would not have entailed any prolonged detention of either Royer or his luggage which may involve other Fourth
Amendment concerns. See United States v. Place, 660 F. 2d 44 (CAl
1981), cert. granted, No. 81-1617, - - U. S. - - (1982). In United
States v. Beale, supra, for example, after briefly questioning two suspects
who had checked baggage for a flight from the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida,
airport, the officers proceeded to the baggage area where a trained dog
alerted to one of the checked bags. Meanwhile, the suspects had boarded
their plane for California, where their bags were again sniffed by a trained
dog and they were arrested. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated a judgment convicting the suspects on the ground that articulable
suspicion was necessary to justify the use of a trained dog to sniff luggage
and that the existence or not of that requirement should have been determined in the District Court. 674 F. 2d, at 1335. In the case before us,
the officers, with founded suspicion, could have detained Royer for the
brief period during which Florida authorities at busy airports seem able to
carry out the dog-sniffing procedure.
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been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momentarily detained while this investigative procedure was carried
out. Indeed, it may be that no detention at all would have
been necessary. A negative result would have freed Royer
in short order; a positive result would have resulted in his
justifiable arrest on probable cause.
We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for
distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure or for
determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the
courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will
provide unarguable answers to the question whether there
has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, we must render judgment, and we think that the Florida Court of Appeal cannot
be faulted in concluding that the limits of a Terry-stop had
been exceeded.
IV
The State's third and final argument is that Royer was not
being illegally held when he gave his consent because there
was probable cause to arrest him at that time. Officer Johnson testified at the suppression hearing and the Florida
Court of Appeal held that there was no probable cause to arrest until Royer's bags were opened, but the fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded
on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose
the State from justifying Royer's custody by proving probable cause and hence removing any barrier to relying on
Royer's consent to search. Peters v. New York, decided
with Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66--67 (1968). We
agree with the Florida Court of Appeal, however, that there
was no probable cause to arrest Royer at the time he purported to give his consent to the search of his luggage. The
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facts are that a nervous young man with two American
Tourister bags paid cash for an airline ticket to a "target
city". These facts led to inquiry, which in turn revealed that
the ticket had been bought under an assumed name. The
proffered explanation did not satisfy the officers. We cannot
agree with the State, if this is its position, that every nervous
young man paying cash for a ticket to New York City under
an assumed name and carrying two heavy American
Tourister bags may be arrested and held to answer for a serious felony charge.

v

Because we affirm the Florida Court of Appeal's conclusion
that Royer was being illegally detained when he consented to
the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was
tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the
search. The judgment of the Florida Court of Appeal is
accordingly
Affirmed.
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Dear Byron:
Your proposed opinion is outstanding in so many
respects that I wish it didn't raise for me some serious
reservations.
At conference, you will remember that I took the
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position that the state court's decision was relatively
narrow.

The court simply held that at some point after

the initial stop the officers' seizure of Royer matured
into an arrest unsupported by probable cause.

His

90nsent to the search of his suitcases, therefore, was
tainted by the illegal arrest.

I felt that there was

ample support in the record for that conclusion and that
the state court should be affirmed on this ground.

To do

so, I thought, would avoid (1) difficult questions
surrounding the legality of the initial stop and (2) if
legal under Terry, the permissible sbope of
'

investigations attendant to such stops.

.•

-2-

Frankly, if we are forced to reach the question of
the legality of the initial stop, I would hold that it
was a "seizure" unsupported by the reasonable suspicion
required by Terry.

Although I don't think a Fourth

Amendment "seizure" occurs when police simply approach
citizens on the street and ask them questions, once
officers, as here, have identified themselves and asked a
traveller to provide identification and his airline
ticket I think the traveller has been "seized" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that such a seizure
must be supported by reasonable suspicion. 1 I thought you
./

said as much in your dissent in Mendenhall, see 446 U.S.
..
~ .
at 570, 570 n.4, and were supported by~language in Terry,
392

u.s.

t

at 16 ("It must be recognized that whenever a

police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom_to walk away, he has 'seized' that person").

/

At

least arguably, Potter's standard in Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 554, also supports this view. ;/he officers in this
case did not have reasonable suspicion to support the
initial stop.

The case is thus on all fours with your

dissent in Mendenhall • . 446
I

u.s.

at 571-73.

However, I would avoid the question because I do not
think it is necessary to the decision.
i

I'd do so

particularly because certain parts of your opinion
strongly suggest that you would find the i n itial stop to
. be legal.

In note 7, you appear to reject the state

..
-3-

court's view (expressed in dictum) that mere similarity
with the drug courier profile is insufficient to
constitute the articulable suspicion required for a Terry
stop. On page 10 you state that "asking for and examining
Royer's ticket and his driver's license were no doubt
permissible in themselves •••• "

As I explained above, I

disagree and the facts you subsequently cite to justify a
finding of a "seizure" under Potter's standard in
Mendenhall amount, I think, to much more_than a simple
"seizure"; they amount to a full-fledged arrest.

On page

13, you suggest that if Royer had consented to a search
on the spot, "the search could have

b~en

conducted with

.

Royer present 1n the area where the ~·" bags were retrieved
I

by Officer Johnson and any evidence recovered would have
been admissible against him."

Doesn't this necessarily

assume the legality of the initial stop?

Otherwise the

evidence would not be admissible.
- I also would avoid the question of the permissible

scope of a legitimate Terry "investigative stop."

Based

on an apparent assumption that the initial stop was
legal, however, you appear to address the permissible
scope of the attendant investigation. You suggest, for
example, that the state could

ha~e

used trained dogs to
)

inspect Royer's luggage.
for two reasons.
I

.1

This suggestion is troublesome

Ought we not set aside any questions as

to a "dog-sniff" case since we've •granted Place to

-4-

address just these questions?

Won't some of your

language in note 10 anticipate our decision in that case?
It is possible that we could decide that a "dog-sniff"
does involve a search and that such a search must be
based on probable cause rather than on reasonable
Yet you state ~t the . end of note 10 that "the

suspicion.

officers, with founded suspicion, could have detained
Royer for the brief period during which Florida
authorities at busy airRorts seem able to carry out the
dog-sniffing procedure."

I also wonder whether the Court

would agree with the statements in your opinion that
suggest such a .search would be justified as part of a
•

Terry stop.

.

.J

•

In Terry, the frisk fot weapons was upheld
~

.

u

solely on the ground of the compelling salety interests
involved.

In Brignoni-Ponce, we endorsed investigative

stops in which officers are permitted to question drivers
and passengers about their citizenship and immigration
status, and to ask them to explain suspicious
circumstances, but we expressly stated that "any further
detention or search must be based on consent or probable
cause."

422

u.s.

at 882.

The extent of the

investigation contemplated by your opinion appears to go
far beyond the limited holdings of those two cases.
I have one final comment.

l

I think it is possible to

read your discussion at the bottom of page 6 and at the
top of page 7 to suggest that a strong
governmental
'

~ ~-

..

- ~- -

·----. - ·-··-. - -. ·'

·- -

...

-5-

interest may justify a temporary detention or
investigative stop on something less than Terry cause.
wonder if this is what you

meant~

if not, might it not be

helpful to make more clear that Terry standards apply
even to Brignoni-Ponce-type stops.
I agree, of course, with your conclusion in this
case and hope you can relieve my worries so that I can
join your opinion.

I

I ' l l certainly try.
Sincerely,

~J

WJB, Jr.

Justice White

•

~llFttmt

QJonrt of tlft~tb $5tattg

~!rington. ~-

Of.

20,?){.~

CHAMBERS OF"

January 8, 1983

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

80-2146 -

Florida v. Royer

Dear Bill,
It would appear to me that we are
should go ahead and circulate your views .

at issue and

that you

You are quite right that I do not view the initial stop as a
seizure. Neither did a seizure occur when the officers asked for
and Royer voluntarily produced his ticket and driver's license.
If that much is unclear in the draft, I shall eliminate any
confusion. For me, the seizure did not occur until the officers,
without Royer's consent, retained possession of his ticket and
driver's license after · examining the~, .1 therefore effectively
eliminating Royer's freedom of movement. Of 1 course, any other
restraint of the person, verbal or physical, that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that he was being detained would be
enough.
Hence, I think Royer was seized on the concourse, but I also
think that by that time the officers had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Royer was carrying drugs and could temporarily
detain him.
They then exceeded the speed limit for Terry stops,
hence fainting Royer's consent to search.
As for the reference to trained dogs, I had no thought of
attempting to bring this case down prior to Place. In any event,
no Court of Appeals had disagreed with what I say about what use
of trained dogs is permissible.
No doubt, if the Court holds
that dog-sniffing requires probable cause or if their use as part
of a Terry stop is rejected, what I say would not fly at all.
But that depends on how the votes fall.
l

Also, I think one has to strain very hard to read the
carryover paragraph on pp. 6-7 as suggesting that Brignoni-Ponce
stop~ .for
questioning may be made on less than reasonable
susp1c1on.
I have never thought that to be the case.
As Lewis
put it, 422 u.s., at 873, "We hold that when an officer's
observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he
may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that
provoke suspicion."
Thus, I would not even have used the word
"even" as you did on p. 5 of your letter.
There will be writing on the other side, no doubt insisting
that the officers be given more room than the circulating draft
indicates they should have.
That makes the situation about par
for the course.
Sincerely yours,

4-

Justice Brennan
cpm
be:

1ustice Powell and Justice Stevens

.:§ltp'fnnt Q}onrt of tltt ~.ro ;§butS'
Jlufrington. ~. <lJ. 2llgi'l-~
CHAI-4BERS OF"

January 8, 1983

,JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

80-2146:

Florida v. Royer

Dear Lewis and John,
Since you two have joined the circulating draft in Royer, I
am taking the liberty of sending to you Bill Brennan's letter to
me and my response. As I said to Bill, I think he and I are at
issue.
I am reluctant to agree with the views about seizures
that Bill expresses in his lette,r, and I would much rather say
what I say than to leave the matter up in the air.

'

Since these encounters go on every day in many places in the
country, it is important to give some guidance / and I will regret
it if there is not a court for giving the police as much room as
the circulating draft gives them. Of course, if the three of us
stay put, and the Justices who voted to reverse would give the
police even more rein, it will be clear enough that drug
enforcement officers can go at least as far as the three of us
think they can.
It rna also be that if the draft is furth
broken down into discrete parts, some of the Justices on the
o
Lde will find some things in which they can join.
Sincerely yours,

,/Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
cpm

. ......

J~

January 11, 1983

80-2146 Plori.rla v. Royer

Dear Byron:
I agree that it is a good idea to divide your
opinion into discrete parts.

tt is particularly important, as your letter of
the 8th suggests, to give the police the guidance that 1
think the opinion will do. I would think that at least two
other Justices would be pleased to join the portion of your
opinion that recognizes the right of police, where reasonable suspicion exists, to stop and question a suspect
briefly.
Thank you for sharing Bill Brennan's views with
John and me. I agree that you and Bi lJ are "at i.ssue", and
I will stay with you.
John's opinion last Term in Ross clarified the law
respect to the automobile exception. It would be a
shame if we lose this opportunity to make a comparable clarification with respect to investigative stops, as would be
accomplished by your opinion.

~ with

Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

'

~-~.,

.

Justice Stevens

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

c!

Justice Rehnquist

Circulated:

FEB 8 ISSJ

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2146
FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. MARK ROYER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court's meandering opinion contains in it a little something for everyone, and although it affirms the reversal of a
judgment of conviction, it can scarcely be said to bespeak a
total indifference to the legitimate needs of law enforcement
agents seeking to curb trafficking in dangerous drugs. Indeed, in both manner and tone , the opinion brings to mind the
old nursery rhyme:
"The King of France
With forty thousand men
Marched up the hill
And then marched back again."
The opinion nonetheless, in my view, betrays a mind-set
more useful to those who officiate at shuffleboard games, primarily concerned with which particular square the disc has
landed on, than to those who are seeking to administer a
system of justice whose twin purposes are the conviction of
the guilty and the vindication of the innocent. The Court
loses sight of the very language of the Amendment which it
purports to interpret:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " (Emphasis added).
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The opinion likewise loses sight of the very sound admonition
made more than 40 years ago in Brinegar v. United States,
338 U. S. 160 (1949), and oft quoted since that time, that
"[t]he rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception." I d., at 176.
Analyzed simply in terms of its "reasonableness" as that
term is used in the Fourth Amendment, the conduct of the
investigating officers toward Royer would pass muster with
virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly steeped
in the mysteries of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Analyzed even in terms of the most meticulous regard for our often conflicting cases, it seems to me to pass
muster equally well.
I

The facts of this case, which are doubtless typical of those
facing narcotics officers in major airports throughout the
country, may be usefully stated in a somewhat different manner than that followed in the opinion of the Court. Officers
Magdalena and Johnson, members of the "Smuggling Detail"
of the Dade County Public Safety Department created in response to a growing drug problem at the Miami Airport,
were on duty at that airport on January 3, 1978. Since this
is one of the peak periods of the tourist season in South Florida and the Caribbean, we may presumably take judicial notice that the airport was in all probability very crowded and
busy at that time.
The detectives first saw Royer walking through the airport
concourse. He was a young man, casually dressed, carrying
two heavily-laden suitcases. The officers described him as
nervous in appearance, and looking around in a manner which
suggested that he was trying to detect and avoid police officers. Before they approached him, the officers followed
Royer to a ticket counter. He there requested a ticket for
New York City, and in paying for it produced a large roll of
cash in small denomination bills from which he peeled off the
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necessary amount. He then affixed two baggage tags to his
luggage and checked it. Rather than filling out his full
name, address, and phone number in the spaces provided on
the tags, Royer merely wrote the words "Holt" and "La
Guardia" on each tag.
At this point, the officers approached Royer, identified
themselves, and asked if he had a moment to talk. He answered affirmatively, and the detectives then asked to see
his airline ticket and some identification. 1 Although his
ticket was for the name "Holt," his driver's license was in the
name of "Mark Royer." When asked to explain this discrepancy, he said that a friend named Holt had made the ticket
reservation. This explanation, of course, did not account for
his use of the name "Holt" on the baggage tags which he had
just filled out.
By this time Royer had become all the more obviously nervous. The detectives told Royer that they suspected he was
transporting narcotics, and asked if he would accompany
them for further questioning to a room adjacent to the concourse "to get out of the general population of the Airport."
--So. 2d - - , (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. En Bane 1981).
Royer agreed to go. The room was no more than 40 feet
from the ticket counter; it was described in the testimony of
one of the officers as a "large storage closet" off a stewardess'
lounge converted into a room used by the Smuggling Detail,
id., at - - ; the room contained a desk and two chairs. At
this time the detectives also, without Royer's consent, retrieved Royer's suitcases from the place where they had been
checked through on the flight to New York and brought them
to the room off the concourse.
Once inside, the detectives asked Royer if he would consent to a search of the luggage so that they could dispel or
' The Court recites these facts by noting that while Royer "produced"
the ticket and identification, he did so "without oral consent." Ante, at
2. See note 2, infra.
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confirm their suspicion that he was smuggling narcotics.
The Court's opinion describes what then happened in a masterpiece of circumlocution:
"Without orally responding to this request, Royer produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which the
detective then opened without seeking further assent
from Royer. Drugs were found in that suitcase. According to Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did
not know the combination to the lock on the second suitcase. When asked if he objected to the detective opening the second suitcase, Royer said, ~no, go ahead,' and
did not object when the detective explained that the suitcase might have to be broken open. The suitcase was
pried open by the officers and more marijuana was
found. Royer was then told that he was under arrest.
Approximately fifteen minutes elapsed from the time the
detectives initially approached respondent until his
arrest upon the discovery of the contraband." Ante, at
3.2
The Court inferentially concedes, as of course it must, that
at the time the suitcases were opened and 65 pounds of marijuana were disclosed, the officers had probable cause to arrest and detain Royer. But working backward through this
very brief encounter, the Court manages to sufficiently fault
the officers' conduct so as to require that Royer's conviction
for smuggling drugs be set aside. Analyzed in terms of the
"reasonableness" which must attend any search and seizure
under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, I find it
impossible to conclude that any step in the officers' efforts to
apprehend Royer fails to meet that test.
2
Why it should make the slightest difference that Royer did not "orally"
consent to the opening of the first bag, when in response to the request by
the officers that he consent to a search Royer produced a key and unlocked
it, is one of the many opaque nuances of the Court's opinion.
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The Court concedes that when the officers first approached
Royer, they had "grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying
drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage
while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions ...
." Ante, at 10. See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S.
692, 697-700 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146
(1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). I agree that
their information reached at least this level. 3 The detectives had learned, among other things, that (1) Royer was
carrying two heavy suitcases; (2) he was visibly nervous,
exhibiting the behavior of a person trying to identify and
evade police officers; (3) at a ticket counter in a major import
center for illicit drugs, he had purchased a ticket for a city
that is a major distribution center for such drugs; (4) he paid
for his ticket from a large roll of small denomination bills,
avoiding the need to show identification; (5) in filling out his
baggage tags, Royer listed only a last name and the airport of
destination, failing to give his full name, address, and phone
I also agree with the Court's intimation that when the detectives first
approached and questioned Royer, no seizure occurred and thus the constitutional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment were not invoked. Ante,
at 6. "[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S.
544, 551-557 (1980) (Stewart, J., announcing the judgment of the Court);
id., at 560, n. 1 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); United States v. Herbst,
641 F. 2d 1161, 1166 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 851 (1981); United
States v. Berd, 634 F. 2d 979, 984-985 (CA5 1981); United States v.
Turner, 628 F. 2d 461, 462-465 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 988
(1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F. 2d 429, 432-433, and n. 6 (CA5 1980);
United States v. Fry, 622 F. 2d 1218, 1220-1221 (CA5 1980); United States
v. Elmore, 595 F . 2d 1036, 10~1042 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 447 U. S.
910 (1980). But, since the detectives had a reasonable suspicion that
Royer was involved in criminal activity, the encounter was permissible
even under Fourth Amendment standards .
8

..
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number in the provided spaces. 4
The Florida court felt that even these facts did not amount
to articulable suspicion, reasoning that this behavior was "at
least equally, and usually far more frequently, consistent
with complete innocence." 5 - - So. 2d, at - - . This
evaluation of the evidence seems to me singularly akin to observing that because a stranger who was loitering near a
building shortly before an arsonist set fire to the building
• The facts of this case bear a strong resemblance to those we examined
in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). In that case, DEA
agents in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport observed Mendenhall as she
was the last passenger to deplane from a flight originating in Los Angeles.
Once inside the terminal, Mendenhall, who appeared very nervous, slowly
scanned the populace of the concourse and then walked very slowly toward
the baggage area. Rather than claim any baggage, however, Mendenhall
asked for directions to the Eastern Airlines ticket counter. At the
counter, which was located in another terminal, Mendenhall, who carried
an American Airlines ticket for a flight from Detroit to Pittsburgh, asked
for an Eastern Airlines ticket for the same trip. Before Mendenhall could
board the Eastern Airlines flight, agents stopped her for questioning.
Three members of this Court concluded that, based on these observations,
agents had a reasonable suspicion which justified the stop.
Id., at
560-565 (POWELL, J., concurring in part).
Two members of the Court
did not reach the question, finding instead that Mendenhall had never been
"seized." Id., at 546-557 (Stewart, J., delivering the judgment of the
Court). To the extent that the present case differs from Mendenhall, the
basis for a reasonable suspicion is stronger on the facts before us now.
• The Florida District Court of Appeal took specific exception to the officers' conclusion that Royer appeared to be nervously attempting to evade
police contact. The lower court said that since police officers are not psychiatrists, this conclusion "must be completely disregarded." - - So.
2d, at--, n. 4. This Court, however, has repeatedly emphasized that a
trained police officer may draw inferences and make deductions that could
elude any untrained person observing the same conduct. See, e. g.,
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We have noted as an
example the behavior of a suspect who appears to the officer to be evading
police contact. See, e. g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 564
(Stewart, J., delivering the judgment of the Court); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 884--885 (1975).

80-214~DISSENT

FLORIDA v. ROYER

7

could not be detained against his will for questioning solely on
the basis of that fact, the same conclusion would be reached
even though the same stranger had been found loitering in
the presence of four other buildings shortly before arsonists
had likewise set them on fire. Any one of these factors relied upon by the Miami police may have been as consistent
with innocence as with guilt; but the combination of several of
these factors is the essence of both "articulable suspicion"
and "probable cause." 6
6
While the Court does not address the use of "drug courier profiles" in
narcotics investigations, it affirms a decision where the Florida District
Court of Appeal took the liberty to fashion a bright-line rule with regard to
the use of these profiles. The state court concluded that conformity with a
"drug courier profile," "without more," is insufficient to establish even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. - - So. 2d, at-- n. 6.
In 1974 the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration instituted training programs for its narcotics officers wherein instruction was
given on a "drug courier profile." A "profile" is, in effect, the collective or
distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers. As one DEA agent explained:
"Basically its a number of characteristics which we attribute or which we
believe can be used to pick out drug couriers. And these characteristics
are basically things that normal travelers do not do . . . . Essentially,
when we started this detail at the airport, we didn't really know what we
were looking for. The majority of our cases, when we first started, involved cases we made based on information from law enforcement agencies
or from airline personnel. And as these cases were made, certain characteristics were noted among the defendants. At a later time we began to
see a pattern in these characteristics and began using them to pick out individuals we suspected as narcotic couriers without any prior information."
United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Few statistics have been kept on the effectiveness of "profile" usage,
but the data available suggests it has been a success. In the first few
months of a "profile" program at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 141 persons were searched in 96 different encounters; drugs were discovered in 77
of the searches. See United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538
(E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F. 2d 385 (CA6 1977), cert denied, 434 U. S.
1011 (1980). A DEA agent working at the La Guardia Airport in New
York City estimated that some sixty percent of the persons identified as
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The point at which I part company with the Court's opinion
is in the assessment of the reasonableness of the officers' conduct following their initial conversation with Royer. The
Court focuses on the transfer of the place of the interview
having "profile" characteristics are found to be carrying drugs. United
States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494, 501, n. 8 (CA2 1979).
Because of this success, state and local law enforcement agencies also
have instructed narcotics officers according to "drug courier profiles." It
was partly on the basis of "profile" characteristics that Detectives Johnson
and Magdalena initially began surveillance of Royer. Certainly in this
case the use of the "profile" proved effective.
Use of "drug courier profiles" has played an important part in a number
of lower court decisions. See, e. g., United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626
F. 2d 218 (CA21980); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F. 2d 1338 (CA2 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U. S. 907 (1980); United States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494
(CA2 1979); United States v. Diaz, 503 F. 2d 1025 (CA3 1974); United
States v. Sullivan, 625 F. 2d 9 (CA4 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 923
(1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F. 2d 429 (CA5 1980); United States v.
Ballard, 573 F. 2d 913 (CA5 1978); United States v. Smith, 574 F. 2d 882
(CA6 1978); United States v. Scott, 545 F. 2d 38 (CA8 1976), cert. denied
429 U. S. 1066 (1977); United States v. Beck, 598 F. 2d 497 (CA91979). In
fact, the function of the "profile" has been somewhat overplayed. Certainly, a law enforcement officer can rely on his own experience in detection and prevention of crime. Likewise, in training police officers, instruction focuses on what has been learned through the collective experience of
law enforcers. The "drug courier profile" is an example of such instruction. It is not intended to provide a mathematical formula that automatically establishes grounds for a belief that criminal activity is afoot. By the
same reasoning, however, simply because these characteristics are accumulated in a "profile," they are not to be given less weight in assessing
whether a suspicion is well founded. While each case will turn on its own
facts, sheer logic dictates that where certain characteristics repeatedly are
found among drug smugglers, the existence of those characteristics in a
particular case is to be considered accordingly in determining whether
there are grounds to believe that further investigation is appropriate. Cf.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
The "drug courier profile" is not unfamiliar to this Court. We have held
that conformity with certain aspects of the "profile" does not automatically create a particularized suspicion which will justify an investigatory
stop. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). Yet our deci-
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from the main concourse of the airport to the room off the
concourse and observes that Royer "found himself in a small
room-a large closet-equipped with a desk and two chairs.
He was alone with two police officers who again told him that
they thought he was carrying narcotics. He also found that
the officers, without his consent, had retrieved his checked
luggage from the airlines." Ante, at 11.
Obviously, this quoted language is intended to convey
stern disapproval of the described conduct of the officers.
To my mind, it merits no such disapproval and was eminently
reasonable. Would it have been preferable for the officers to
have detained Royer for further questioning, as they concededly had a right to do, without paying any attention to the
fact that his luggage had already been checked on the flight
to New York, and might be put aboard the flight even though
Royer himself was not on the plane? Would it have been
more "reasonable" to interrogate Royer about the contents of
his suitcases, and to seek his permission to open the suitcases
when they were retrieved, in the busy main concourse of the
Miami Airport, rather than to find a room off the concourse
where the confrontation would surely be less embarrassing to
Royer? If the room had been large and spacious, rather
sion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), made it clear
that a police officer is entitled to assess the totality of the circumstances in
the light of his own training and experience and that instruction on a "drug
courier profile" would be a part of his accumulated knowledge. This process is not amenable to bright-line rules such as the Florida court tried to
establish. We are not dealing
"with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the Jaw of
probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are
permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers. Finally,
the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of
law enforcement." United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418. See also
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979).
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than small, if it had possessed three chairs rather than two,
would the officers' conduct have been made reasonable by
these facts?
The Court's answers to these questions, to the extent that
it attempts any, are scarcely satisfying. It commences with
the observation that it doubts "that the prosecution in this
case has satisfactorily demonstrated that it employed the
least intrusive means to pursue its suspicions." Ante, at 12.
Earlier in its opinion, this familiar principle of First Amendment law is suddenly carried over into Fourth Amendment
law by the citation of two cases, United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146, neither one of which lends any support to the principle as a part of Fourth Amendment law.
The Court goes on to say that had the officers returned
Royer's ticket and driver's license, the encounter clearly
would have been consensual. The Court also states that
while there were good reasons to justify moving Royer from
one location to another, the officers' motives in seeking to examine his luggage renders these reasons unavailing-a conclusion the reason for which wholly escapes me. Finally, the
Court suggests that the officers might have examined
Royer's bags in a more expeditious way, such as the use of
trained dogs.
All of this to my mind adds up to little more than saying
that if my aunt were a man, she would be my uncle. The
officers might have taken different steps than they did to investigate Royer, but the same may be said of virtually every
investigative encounter that has more than one step to it.
The question we must decide is what was unreasonable about
the steps which these officers took with respect to this suspect in the Miami Airport on this particular day. On this
point, the Court stutters, fudges, and hedges:
"Obviously, what had begun as a consensual inquiry in a
public place had escalated into an investigatory proce-
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dure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm
their suspicions." Ante, at 11.
Obviously. But since even the Court concedes that there
was articulable suspicion warranting an investigatory detention, the fact that the inquiry had become an "investigatory
procedure in a police interrogation room" would seem to have
little bearing on the proper disposition of a claim that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court goes on to
say:
"At least as of that moment, any consensual aspects of
the encounter had evaporated, and we cannot fault the
Florida Court of Appeal in concluding that Terry v. Ohio
and the cases following it did not justify the restraint to
which Royer was then subjected. As a practical matter,
Royer was under arrest." Ibid.
Does the Court intimate that if the Florida Court of Appeal
had reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the holdings of Terry and the cases which follow it, it would affirm
that holding? 7 Does it mean that the 15-minute duration of
the total encounter, and the even lesser amount of elapsed
time during which Royer was in the "interrogation room,"
was more than a "Terry" investigative stop can ever consume? These possible conclusions are adumbrated, but not
stated; if the Court's opinion were to be judged by standards
appropriate to Impressionist paintings, it would perhaps receive a high grade, but the same cannot be said if it is to be
See also ante, at 9 ("The question before us is whether the record warrants that conclusion."); ante, at 15 ("[W]e think that the Florida Court of
Appeal cannot be faulted in concluding that the limits of a Terry-stop had
been exceeded.). Certainly we owe no such deference to the Florida
court's conclusion. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515-516
(1963) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 181 (1953)); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 38&-386 (1927).
7
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judged by the standards of a judicial opinion.
Since the Court concedes the existence of "articulable suspicion" at the time of the officers' first conversation with
Royer, the only remaining question is whether the detention
of Royer during that period of time was permissible under
the rule enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Although Terry itself involved only a protective pat down for
weapons, subsequent cases have expanded the permissible
scope of such a "seizure." In Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S.
143 (1972), we upheld both a search and seizure of a pistol
being carried by a suspect seated in a parked automobile. In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976), we
allowed government officials to stop, and divert for visual inspection and questioning, automobiles which were suspected
of harboring illegal aliens. These stops, including waiting
time, could clearly have approximated in length the time
which Royer was detained, and yet Martinez-Fuerte allowed
them to be made "in the absense of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints." 428 U. S., at 562
(emphasis supplied). Unless we are to say that commercial
drug trafficking is somehow quantitatively less weighty on
the Fourth Amendment scale than trafficking in the illegal
aliens, I think the articulable suspicion which concededly focused upon Royer justified the length and nature of his
detention.
The reasonableness of the officers' activity in this case did
not depend on Royer's consent to the investigation. Nevertheless, the presence of consent further justifies the action
taken. The Court does not seem to dispute that Royer consented to go to the room in the first instance. Certainly that
conclusion is warranted by the totality of the circumstances.
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 227 (1973). The
facts are similar to those addressed in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), where a majority of the Court
determined that consent to accompany police officers had
been voluntary. Royer was not told that he had to go to the

80-2146---DISSENT
FLORIDA v. ROYER

13

room, but was simply asked, after a brief period of questioning, if he would accompany the detectives to the room.
Royer was informed as to why the officers wished to question
him further. There were neither threats nor any show of
force. Detectives Johnson and Magdelena were not in uniform and did not display weapons. The detectives did not
touch Royer and made no demands. In fact, Royer admits
that the detectives were quite polite. 8
The Court concludes that somewhere between the beginning of the 40 foot journey and the resumption of conversation in the room the investigation became so intrusive that
Royer's consent "evaporated" leaving him "[a]s a practical
matter ... under arrest." Ante, at 11. But if Royer was
legally approached in the first instance and consented to accompany the detectives to the room, it does not follow that
his consent went up in smoke and he was "arrested" upon entering the room. As we made clear in Mendenhall, logical
analysis would focus on whether the environment in the room
rendered the subsequent consent to a search of the luggage
involuntary.
As we said in Mendenhall, "the fact that she was [in the
room] is little or no evidence that she was in any way coerced." 446 U. S., at 559. Other than the size of the room,
described as "a large storage closet," 9 there is nothing in the
8
Contrary to the Florida court's view, this phase of the encounter contrasts sharply with the circumstances we examined in Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979). In that case, police officers deliberately
sought out the suspect at a neighbor's house and, with a show of force,
brought the suspect to police headquarters in a ·police car, placed him in an
interrogation room, and questioned him extensively after giving him a
Miranda warning. Unlike in Dunaway, Royer, after brief questioning,
was asked to cooperate by accompanying the officers to a room no more
than 40 feet away, so that the questioning could proceed out of the view of
the general public.
9
The characterization of the room as a "closet" is quite misleading.
The room contained one desk and two chairs. It was large enough to allow
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record which would indicate that Royer's resistance was
overborne by anything about the room. Royer, who was in
his fourth year of study at Ithaca College at the time and has
since graduated with a degree in communications, simply
continued to cooperate with the detectives as he had from the
beginning of the encounter. Absent any evidence of objective indicia of coercion, and even absent any claim of such indicia by Royer, the size of the room itself does not transform
a voluntary consent to search into a coerced consent.
But even if I am wrong in my conclusion that Royer's detention did not exceed the bounds of a permissible Terry
stop, I am satisfied that the officers possessed probable cause
to arrest Royer at the conclusion of their initial conversation
with him. The most comprehensive definition of "probable
cause" which I can find in our cases is that contained in Brinegar v. United States:
"'The substance of all the definitions' of probable cause
'is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' McCarthy v.
De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the
Carroll opinion. 267 U. S. at 161. And this 'means
less than evidence which would justify condemnation' or
conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for the Court more
than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch
339, 348. Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come
to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists
where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the offithree persons to enter with two heavy suitcases. It also is relevant that it
was the Flordia court, not Royer, who focused on the size of the room.
Royer appealed his conviction arguing that his consent to a search was
invalid as a matter of law because he was not informed that he could refuse
consent. A panel of the Florida court properly rejected this contention
relying on Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 234 (1973), were we
said that "proof of knowledge of a right to refuse [is not] the sine qua non
of an effective consent to a search." In was during rehearing by the court
en bane that the conviction was reversed with a divided court finding that
when Royer was taken into the private room he was in effect placed under
arrest.
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cers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an
offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162." 338 U. S., at 175
(footnotes omitted).
Even before approaching Royer to talk to him, the detectives
knew that he was carrying two heavy suitcases, and that he
was visibly nervous, exhibiting the behavior of a person trying to evade any encounters with police officers. At a ticket
counter in a major import center for illicit drugs, Miami, he
had purchased a ticket for a city that is a major distribution
center for such drugs, New York. He paid for his ticket
from a large roll of small denomination bills, thus avoiding
the need to show any identification. In filling out his baggage tags, Royer listed only a last name and the airport of
destination, thus evidencing his unwillingness to supply his
full name, address, and phone number as indicated on the
tag.
When approached by the detectives, the driver's license
which Royer showed them was in the name of "Mark Royer,"
even though the baggage was checked in the name of "Holt."
Royer's explanation was that a friend named Holt had made
the ticket reservation. While this might account for the
ticket being held in the name of one Holt, it did not in any
way account for Royer's use of only the last name "Holt" on
the baggage information tag, or his refusal to fill in the first
name, address, and telephone number required on the tag.
The officers were thereby fully justified in concluding that
Royer had intended to check and ship the two bags under an
assumed name. As he tried to give his explanation, Royer
became even more nervous.
In my opinion, giving some weight to the judgments of
trained law enforcement officers attached to the Miami
Smuggling Detail, these officers, although they obviously had
"less than evidence which would justify condemnation,"
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Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813), did have "a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt," Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S., at 175. Thus when applying this rule in
the "practical, nontechnical" way that Brinegar instructs, it
must be concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Royer at the moment they requested that he go to the
room off the concourse.
For any of these several reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Florida District Court of Appeal.
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constructive to divide your opinion into several parts.
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to see your recirculation, a.s I thought he would find
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reference to the "~rug courier profile" reliance. Despite
the criticism that it is open to subjective judgments, the
record indicates that its use has been remarkably productive.
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Re:

81-2146 - Florida v. Royer

Dear Lewis:
I have re-read the opinions in this case, and I entertain the
hope you will decide not to stay with the proposed Court's opinion one that is giving Bill Brennan pause.
If it would help, I am willing to try to get Bill Rehnquist
to modify the somewhat flippant opening that weakens the very strong
case for reversing this monstrous nonsense of the Florida court.
It is an opinion that will surely make Miami the world center
for drug pushers - if it is not already so.
If things stand, I am considering a separate dissent stating
that this is the kind of judicial aberration that justly undermines
public confidence in the courts. I can say it undermines my
confidence in the system.
I hope you will take another hard look.
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Justice Powell
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81-2146 Florida v. Royer
Dear Chief:
I have not overlooked your recent letter
suggesting that I reconsider my vote in this case.
I am distressed that the Court has fractionated.
As I said in the brief conversation we had about this case
a few weeks ago, I am persuaded that Byron's opinion
merits our support.

He has moved from mv understanding of

his position in Mendenhall, and accepted what I thought
was your position - certainly mine - as to the right to
stop and question on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, he does not limit this to airports, but adopts
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it as a general principle.
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It~ principle

to think Byron's opinion is constructive.

that prompts me

I know that you are concerned primarily about
his judgment.

He would affirm the Florida court's

conclusion that the search of the suitcase was unlawful.
I agree with Byron that under the circumstances the
"consent" was coerced:

Royer was alone in the presence of

two officers in a small windowless room.
retained of his ticket and luggage.

They had

There was no way

respondent could have left under these circumstances and
very few people would have had the presence of mind to say
nothing.
I hope that Byron will divide his opinion into
several parts, some of which I am confident you can join.
I believe Bill Brennan is the only person who has not
taken a position.

The very fact that he has not joined

Byron may suggest serious reservations as to what Byron

has written.

I hope that Bill does not persuade Byron to

make changes.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
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I have not overlooked your recent letter suggesting that I reconsider my vote in this case.
~

I am distressed that the Court has fractionated.
I said in the brief conversation we had about this cas~ a
few weeks ago, I am persuaded that Byron's opinion merits
our support. He has moved from my understanding of his position in Mendenhall, and accepted what I thought was your
position - certainly mine - as to the right to stop and
question on the basis of reasonable sus-picion. Moreover, he
does not limit this to airports, but adopts it as a general
principle. It is this principle that prompts me to think
Byron's opinion is constructive.

~~ As

I know that you are concerned primarily about his
judgment. He would affirm the Florida court's conclusion
that the search of the suitcase was unlawful. I agree with
Byron that under the circumstances the "consent" was coerced: Royer was alone in the presence of two officers in a
small windowless room. They had retained his ticket and
luggage. There was no way respondent could have left under
these circumstances and very few people would have had the
presence of mind to say nothing.

I hope that Byron will divide his opinion into
several parts, some of which I am confident you can join. I
believe Bill Brennan is the only person who has not taken a
• position. The very fact that he has not joined Byron may
suggest serious reservations as to what Byron has written.
I hope that Bill does not persuade Byron to make changes.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
•·
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2146

FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. MARK.ROYER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE -tf?lfl'fED S'fA'fES COURT OF
APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
[March - , 1983]

JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result.
In this case the Florida District Court of Appeal's decision
rested on its holding that at some point after the initial stop
the officers' seizure of Royer matured into an arrest unsupported by probable cause. Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1015,
1019 (Fla. App. 1980) (en bane). Royer's consent to the
search of his suitcases, therefore, was tainted by the illegal
arrest. Id., at 1019-1020. The District Court of Appeal's
conclusion is amply supported by the record and by our decision in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979). I
therefore concur in the Court's judgment affirming the District Court of Appeal's judgment. But the Court reaches
certain issues that it clearly need not reach to support the
affirmance.
To the extent that the Court endorses the legality of the
officers' initial stop of Royer, see post, at--, n. 3 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), it was wholly unnecessary to reach that
question. For even assuming the legality of the initial stop,
the Court correctly holds, and I agree, that the officers' subsequent actions clearly exceeded the permissible bounds of a
Terry "investigative" stop. Ante, at - - , - - . "[A]ny
'exception' that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in
this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that
Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on
probable cause." Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 213.
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Thus, most of the Court's discussion of the permissible scope
of Terry investigative stops is also unnecessary to the
decision.
I emphasize that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), was a
very limited decision that expressly declined to address the
"constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon
less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation." Id., at 19, n. 16. Terry simply held that
under certain carefully defined circumstances a police officer
"is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing . . .
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him." Id., at 30. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143
(1972), endorsed "brief" investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion, id., at 145--146, but the search for weapons
upheld in that case was very limited and was based on Terry's
safety rationale. I d., at 146. In Adams, we stated that the
purpose of the "limited" weapons search was "not to discover
evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence .... " Ibid. In United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), we held that
"when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." Id., at 881.
We based this holding on the importance of the governmental
interest in stemming the flow of illegal aliens, on the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop, and on the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border. Ibid. We noted the limited
holdings of Terry and Adams and while authorizing the police
to "question the driver and passengers about their citizenship
and immigration status, and ... ask them to explain suspicious circumstances," we expressly stated that "any further
detention or search must be based on consent or probable
cause." Id., at 881-882. See also Dunaway v. New York,

- - - - ---
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442 U. S., at 208-212 (discussing the narrow scope of Terry
and its progeny).
The scope of a Terry-type "investigative" stop and any attendant search must be extremely limited or the Terry exception would "swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures [and searches] are 'reasonable' only if based on
probable cause." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S., at 213.
In my view, any suggestion that the Terry reasonable suspicion standard justifies anything but the briefest of detentions
or the most limited of searches finds no support in the Terry
line of cases.*
In any event, I dissent from the Court's dicta that the initial stop of Royer was legal. For plainly Royer was "seized"
for purposes of the Fourth Amendent when the officers asked
him to produce his driver's license and airline ticket. Terry
stated that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person." 392 U. S., at 16. Although I agree that "not all
*I interpret the Court's requirement that the investigative methods
employed pursuant to a Terry stop be "the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of
time," ante, at--, to mean that the availability of a less intrusive means
may make an otherwise reasonable stop unreasonable. I do not interpret
it to mean that the absence of a less intrusive means·can make an otherwise
unreasonable stop reasonable.
In addition, contrary to the Court's apparent suggestion, I am not at all
certain that the use of trained narcotics dogs constitutes a less intrusive
means of conducting a lawful Terry investigative stop. See ante, at
- - - -. Such a suggestion finds no support in our cases and any question concerning the use of trained dogs to detect the presence of controlled
substances in luggage is clearly not before us.
In any event, the relevance of a least intrusive means requirement
within the context of a Terry investigative stop is not clear to me. As I
have discussed, a lawful stop must be so strictly limited that it is difficult to
conceive of a less intrusive means that would be effective to accomplish the
purpose of the stop.
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personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons," id., at 19, n. 16, and that policemen
may approach citizens on the street and ask them questions
without 'seizing' them for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, once an officer has identified himself and asked a traveller for identification and his airline ticket, the traveller has
been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
By identifying themselves and asking for Royer's airline
ticket and driver's license the officers, as a practical matter,
engaged in a "show of authority" and "restrained [Royer's]
liberty." Ibid. It is simply wrong to suggest that a traveller feels free to walk away when he has been approached by
individuals who have identified themselves as police officers
and asked for, and received, his airline ticket and driver's
license.
Before Terry, only "seizures" of persons based on probable
cause were held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S., at 208-209. As we stated
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however, Terry
and Adams "establish that in appropriate circumstances the
Fourth Amendment allows a properly limited 'search' or 'seizure' on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest
or to search for contraband or evidence of crime." 422
U. S., at 881. But to justify such a seizure an officer must
have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity · based on
"specific and articulable facts . . . [and] rational inferences
from those facts .... " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 21. See
also Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979). In this case,
the officers decided to approach Royer because he was carrying American Tourister luggage, which appeared to be
heavy; he was young; he was casually dressed; he appeared to
be pale and nervous and was looking around at other people;
he paid for his airline ticket in cash with a large number of
bills; and he did not completely fill out the identification tags
for his luggage, which was checked to New York. See ante,
at
, n. 2. These facts clearly are not sufficient to
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provide the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the officers' subsequent seizure of Royer. Indeed, considered individually or collectively, they are perfectly consistent with innocent behavior and cannot possibly
give rise to any inference supporting a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. The officers' seizure of Royer, therefore, was illegal.
Although I recognize that the traffic in illicit drugs is a
matter of pressing national concern, that cannot excuse this
Court from exercising its unflagging duty to strike down official activity that exceeds the confines of the Constitution.
We must not allow our zeal for effective law enforcement to
blind us to the peril to our free society that lies in this Court's
disregard of the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2146

FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. MARK ROYER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
[March - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The plurality's meandering opinion contains in it a little
something for everyone, and although it affirms the reversal
of a judgment of conviction, it can scarcely be said to bespeak
a total indifference to the legitimate needs of law enforcement agents seeking to curb trafficking in dangerous drugs.
Indeed, in both manner and tone, the opinion brings to mind
the old nursery rhyme:
"The King of France
With forty thousand men
Marched up the hill
And then marched back again."
The opinion nonetheless, in my view, betrays a mind-set
more useful to those who officiate at shuffleboard games, primarily concerned with which particular square the disc has
landed on, than to those who are seeking to administer a
system of justice whose twin purposes are the conviction of
the guilty and the vindication of the innocent. The plurality
loses sight of the very language of the Amendment which it
purports to interpret:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " (Emphasis added).
Analyzed simply in terms of its "reasonableness" as that
term is used in the Fourth Amendment, the conduct of the
investigating officers toward Royer would pass muster with
virtually all thoughtful, civilized persons not overly steeped
in the mysteries of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Analyzed even in terms of the most meticulous regard for our often conflicting cases, it seems to me to pass
muster equally well.
I
The facts of this case, which are doubtless typical of those
facing narcotics officers in major airports throughout the
country, may be usefully stated in a somewhat different manner than that followed in the opinion of the plurality. Officers Magdalena and Johnson, members of the "Smuggling
Detail" of the Dade County Public Safety Department created in response to a growing drug problem at the Miami Airport, were on duty at that airport on January 3, 1978. Since
this is one of the peak periods of the tourist season in South
Florida and the Caribbean, we may presumably take judicial
notice that the airport was in all probability very crowded
and busy at that time.
The detectives first saw Royer walking through the airport
concourse. He was a young man, casually dressed, carrying
two heavily-laden suitcases. The officers described him as
nervous in appearance, and looking around in a manner which
suggested that he was trying to detect and avoid police officers. Before they approached him, the officers followed
Royer to a ticket counter. He there requested a ticket for
New York City, and in paying for it produced a large roll of
cash in small denomination bills from which he peeled off the
necessary amount. He then affixed two baggage tags to his
luggage and checked it. Rather than filling out his full
name, address, and phone number in the spaces provided on
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the tags, Royer merely wrote the words "Holt" and "La
Guardia" on each tag.
At this point, the officers approached Royer, identified
themselves, and asked if he had a moment to talk. He answered affirmatively, and the detectives then asked to see
his airline ticket and some identification. 1 Although his
ticket was for the name "Holt," his driver's license was in the
name of "Mark Royer." When asked to explain this discrepancy, he said that a friend named Holt had made the ticket
reservation. This explanation, of course, did not account for
his use of the name "Holt" on the baggage that he had just
filled out.
By this time Royer had become all the more obviously nervous. The detectives told Royer that they suspected he was
transporting narcotics, and asked if he would accompany
them for further questioning to a room adjacent to the concourse "to get out of the general population of the Airport."
-So. 2d - , -(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. En Bane 1981).
Royer agreed to go. The room was no more than 40 feet
from the ticket counter; it was described in the testimony of
one of the officers as a "large storage closet" off a stewardess'
lounge converted into a room used by the Smuggling Detail,
id., at - - ; the room contained a desk and two chairs. At
this time the detectives also, without Royer's consent, retrieved Royer's suitcases from the place where they had been
checked through on the flight to New York and brought them
to the room off the concourse.
Once inside, the detectives asked Royer if he would consent to a search of the luggage so that they could dispel or
confirm their suspicion that he was smuggling narcotics.
The plurality's opinion describes what then happened:
"Without orally responding to this request, Royer pro' The plurality recites these facts by noting that while Royer "produced"
the ticket and identification, he did so "without oral consent." Ante, at 2.
See note 2, infra.
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duced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which the
detective then opened without seeking further assent
from Royer. Drugs were found in that suitcase. According to Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did
not know the combination to the lock on the second suitcase. When asked if he objected to the detective opening the second suitcase, Royer said, 'no, go ahead,' and
did not object when the detective explained that the suitcase might have to be broken open. The suitcase was
pried open by the officers and more marijuana was
found. Royer was then told that he was under arrest.
Approximately fifteen minutes elapsed from the time the
detectives initially approached respondent until his
arrest upon the discovery of the contraband." Ante, at
3.2
The plurality inferentially concedes, as of course it must,
that at the time the suitcases were opened and 65 pounds of
marijuana were disclosed, the officers had probable cause to
arrest and detain Royer. But working backward through
this very brief encounter, the plurality manages to sufficiently fault the officers' conduct so as to require that Royer's
conviction for smuggling drugs be set aside. Analyzed in
terms of the "reasonableness" which must attend any search
and seizure under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, I find it impossible to conclude that any step in the officers' efforts to apprehend Royer fails to meet that test.
The plurality concedes that after their initial conversation
with Royer, the officers had "grounds for suspecting Royer
of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his
luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions .... " Ante, at 10. See also Michigan v. Summers,
2
Why it should make the slightest difference that Royer did not "orally"
consent to the opening of the first bag, when in response to the request by
the officers that he consent to a search Royer produced a key and unlocked
it, is one of the many opaque nuances of the plurality's opinion.
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452 U. S. 692, 697-700 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S.
143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968). I
agree that their information reached at least this level. 3
The detectives had learned, among other things, that (1)
Royer was carrying two heavy suitcases; (2) he was visibly
nervous, exhibiting the behavior of a person trying to identify and evade police officers; (3) at a ticket counter in a major
import center for illicit drugs, he had purchased a ticket for a
city that is a major distribution center for such drugs; (4) he
paid for his ticket from a large roll of small denomination
bills, avoiding the need to show identification; (5) in filling out
his baggage tags, Royer listed only a last name and the airport of destination, failing to give his full name, address, and
phone number in the provided spaces, and (6) he was travelling under an assumed name. 4
I also agree with the plurality's intimation that when the detectives
first approached and questioned Royer, no seizure occurred and thus the
constitutional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment were not invoked.
Ante, at 6. "[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens
involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S.
544, 551-557 (1980) (Stewart, J., announcing the judgment of the Court);
id., at 560, n. 1 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); United States v. Herbst,
641 F. 2d 1161, 1166 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 851 (1981); United
States v. Berd, 634 F. 2d 979, 984-985 (CA5 1981); United States v.
Turner, 628 F. 2d 461, 462-465 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 988
(1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F. 2d 429, 432-433, and n. 6 (CA5 1980);
United States v. Fry, 622 F. 2d 1218, 1220-1221 (CA5 1980); United States
v. Elmore, 595 F. 2d 1036, 103S-1042 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 447 U. S.
910 (1980).
'The facts of this case bear a strong resemblance to those we examined
in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). In that case, DEA
agents in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport observed Mendenhall as she
was the last passenger to deplane from a flight originating in Los Angeles.
Once inside the terminal, Mendenhall, who appeared very nervous, slowly
scanned the populace of the concourse and then walked very slowly toward
3
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The Florida court felt that even these facts did not amount
to articulable suspicion, reasoning that this behavior was "at
least equally, and usually far more frequently, consistent
with complete innocence." 5 - - So. 2d, at - - . This
evaluation of the evidence seems to me singularly akin to observing that because a stranger who was loitering near a
building shortly before an arsonist set fire to the building
could not be detained against his will for questioning solely on
the basis of that fact, the same conclusion would be reached
even though the same stranger had been found loitering in
the presence of four other buildings shortly before arsonists
had likewise set them on fire. Any one of these factors relied upon by the Miami police may have been as consistent
the baggage area. Rather than claim any baggage, however, Mendenhall
asked for directions to the Eastern Airlines ticket counter. At the
counter, which was located in another terminal, Mendenhall, who carried
an American Airlines ticket for a flight from Detroit to Pittsburgh, asked
for an Eastern Airlines ticket for the same trip. Before Mendenhall could
board the Eastern A1rlines flight, agents stopped her for questioning.
Three members of this Court concluded that, based on these observations
alone agents had a reasonable suspicion which justified the stop.
I d., at
560-565 (POWELL, J., concurring in part).
Two members of the Court
did not reach the question, finding instead that Mendenhall had never been
"seized." Id., at 546-557 (Stewart, J., delivering the judgment of the
Court). To the extent that the present case differs from Mendenhall, the
basis for a reasonable suspicion is stronger on the facts before us now.
5
The Florida District Court of Appeal took specific exception to the officers' conclusion that Royer appeared to be nervously attempting to evade
police contact. The lower court said that since police officers are not psychiatrists, this conclusion "must be completely disregarded." - - So.
2d, at--, n. 4. This Court, however, has repeatedly emphasized that a
trained police officer may draw inferences and make deductions that could
elude any untrained person observing the same conduct. See, e. g.,
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We have noted as an
example the behavior of a suspect who appears to the officer to be evading
police contact. See, e. g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 564
(Stewart, J., delivering the judgment of the Court); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 884-885 (1975).
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with innocence as with guilt; but the combination of several of
these factors is the essence of both "articulable suspicion"
and "probable cause." 6
6

While the plurality does not address the use of "drug courier profiles"
in narcotics investigations, it affirms a decision where the Florida District
Court of Appeal took the liberty to fashion a bright-line rule with regard to
the use of these profiles. The state court concluded that conformity with a
"drug courier profile," "without more," is insufficient to establish even reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. - - So. 2d, at-- n. 6.
In 1974 the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration instituted training programs for its narcotics officers wherein instruction was
given on a "drug courier profile." A "profile" is, in effect, the collective or
distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers. As one DEA agent explained:
"Basically its a number of characteristics which we attribute or which we
believe can be used to pick out drug couriers. And these characteristics
are basically things that normal travelers do not do . . . . Essentially,
when we started this detail at the airport, we didn't really know what we
were looking for. The majority of our cases, when we first started, involved cases we made based on information from law enforcement agencies
or from airline personnel. And as these cases were made, certain characteristics were noted among the defendants. At a later time we began to
see a pattern in these characteristics and began using them to pick out individuals we suspected as narcotic couriers without any prior information."
United States v. McClain , 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Few statistics have been kept on the effectiveness of "profile" usage,
but the data available suggests it has been a success. In the first few
months of a "profile" program at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 141 persons were searched in 96 different encounters; drugs were discovered in 77
of the searches. See United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F . Supp. 535, 538
(ED Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F. 2d 385 (CA6 1977), cert denied, 434 U. S.
1011 (1980). A DEA agent working at the La Guardia Airport in New
York City estimated that some 60% percent of the persons identified as
having "profile" characteristics are found to be carrying drugs. United
States v. Price , 599 F. 2d 494, 501, n. 8 (CA2 1979).
Because of this success, state and local law enforcement agencies also
have instructed narcotics officers according to "drug courier profiles. " It
was partly on the basis of "profile" characteristics that Detectives Johnson
and Magdalena initially began surveillance of Royer. Certainly in this
case the use of the "profile" proved effective .

..
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The point at which I part company with the plurality's
opinion is in the assessment of the reasonableness of the officers' conduct following their initial conversation with Royer.
The plurality focuses on the transfer of the place of the interUse of "drug courier profiles" has played an important part in a number
of lower court decisions. See, e. g., United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626
F. 2d 218 (CA2 1980); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F. 2d 1338 (CA2 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U. S. 907 (1980); United States v. Price, 599 F. 2d 494
(CA2 1979); United States v. Diaz, 503 F. 2d 1025 (CA3 1974); United
States v. Sullivan, 625 F. 2d 9 (CA4 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 923
(1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F. 2d 429 (CA5 1980); United States v.
Ballard, 573 F. 2d 913 (CA5 1978); United States v. Smith, 574 F. 2d 882
(CA6 1978); United States v. Scott, 545 F. 2d 38 (CA8 1976), cert. denied
429 U. S. 1066 (1977); United States v. Beck, 598 F. 2d 497 (CA9 1979). In
fact, the function of the "profile" has been somewhat overplayed. Certainly, a law enforcement officer can rely on his own experience in detection and prevention of crime. Likewise, in training police officers, instruction focuses on what has been learned through the collective experience of
law enforcers. The "drug courier profile" is an example of such instruction. It is not intended to provide a mathematical formula that automatically establishes grounds for a belief that criminal activity is afoot. By the
same reasoning, however, simply because these characteristics are accumulated in a "profile," they are not to be given less weight in assessing
whether a suspicion is well founded. While each case will turn on its own
facts, sheer logic dictates that where certain characteristics repeatedly are
found among drug smugglers, the existence of those characteristics in a
particular case is to be considered accordingly in determining whether
there are grounds to believe that further investigation is appropriate. Cf.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
The "drug courier profile" is not unfamiliar to this Court. We have held
that conformity with certain aspects of the "profile" does not automatically create a particularized suspicion which will justify an investigatory
stop. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). Yet our decision in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), made it clear
that a police officer is entitled to assess the totality of the circumstances in
the light of his own training and experience and that instruction on a "drug
courier profile" would be a part of his accumulated knowledge. This process is not amenable to bright-line rules such as the Florida court tried to
establish. We are not dealing
"with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of
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view from the main concourse of the airport to the room off
the concourse and observes that Royer "found himself in a
small room-a large closet-equipped with a desk and two
chairs. He was alone with two police officers who again told
him that they thought he was carrying narcotics. He also
found that the officers, without his consent, had retrieved his
checked luggage from the airlines." Ante, at 11.
Obviously, this quoted language is intended to convey
stern disapproval of the described conduct of the officers.
To my mind, it merits no such disapproval and was eminently
reasonable. Would it have been preferable for the officers to
have detained Royer for further questioning, as they concededly had a right to do, without paying any attention to the
fact that his luggage had already been checked on the flight
to New York, and might be put aboard the flight even though
Royer himself was not on the plane? Would it have been
more "reasonable" to interrogate Royer about the contents of
his suitcases, and to seek his permission to open the suitcases
when they were retrieved, in the busy main concourse of the
Miami Airport, rather than to find a room off the concourse
where the confrontation would surely be less embarrassing to
Royer? If the room had been large and spacious, rather
than small, if it had possessed three chairs rather than two,
would the officers' conduct have been made reasonable by
these facts?
The plurality's answers to these questions, to the extent
that it attempts any, are scarcely satisfying. It commences
with the observation that it doubts "that the prosecution in
this case has satisfactorily demonstrated that it employed the
probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are
permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers. Finally,
the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of
law enforcement." United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418. See also
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979).
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least intrusive means to pursue its suspicions." Ante, at 12.
Earlier in its opinion, this familiar principle of First Amendment law is suddenly carried over into Fourth Amendment
law by the citation of two cases, United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S., at 146, neither one of which lends any support to the principle as a part of Fourth Amendment law.
The plurality goes on to say that had the officers returned
Royer's ticket and driver's license, the encounter clearly
would have been consensual. The plurality also states that
while there were good reasons to justify moving Royer from
one location to another, the officers' motives in seeking to examine his luggage renders these reasons unavailing-a conclusion the reason for which wholly escapes me. Finally, the
plurality suggests that the officers might have examined
Royer's bags in a more expeditious way, such as the use of
trained dogs.
All of this to my mind adds up to little more than saying
that if my aunt were a man, she would be my uncle. The
officers might have taken different steps than they did to investigate Royer, but the same may be said of virtually every
investigative encounter that has more than one step to it.
The question we must decide is what was unreasonable about
the steps which these officers took with respect to this suspect in the Miami Airport on this particular day. On this
point, the plurality stutters, fudges, and hedges:
"Obviously, what had begun as a consensual inquiry in a
public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm
their suspicions." Ante, at 11.
Obviously. But since even the plurality concedes that there
was articulable suspicion warranting an investigatory detention, the fact that the inquiry had become an "investigatory
procedure in a police interrogation room" would seem to have
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little bearing on the proper disposition of a claim that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. The plurality goes on
to say:
"At least as of that moment, any consensual aspects of
the encounter had evaporated, and we cannot fault the
Florida Coert of Appeal in concluding that Terry v. Ohio
and the cases following it did not justify the restraint to
which Royer was then subjected. As a practical matter,
Royer was under arrest." Ibid.
Does the plurality intimate that if the Florida Court of Appeal had reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the
holdings of Terry and the cases which follow it, it would affirm that holding? 7 Does it mean that the 15-minute duration of the total encounter, and the even lesser amount of
elapsed time during which Royer was in the "interrogation
room," was more than a "Terry" investigative stop can ever
consume? These possible conclusions are adumbrated, but
not stated; if the plurality's opinion were to be judged by
standards appropriate to Impressionist paintings, it would
perhaps receive a high grade, but the same cannot be said if
it is to be judged by the standards of a judicial opinion.
Since the plurality concedes the existence of "articulable
suspicion" at least after the initial conversation with Royer,
the only remaining question is whether the detention of
Royer during that period of time was permissible under the
rule enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Although Terry itself involved only a protective pat down for
weapons, subsequent cases have expanded the permissible
See also ante, at 9 ("The question before us is whether the record warrants that conclusion."); ante, at 15 ("[W]e think that the Florida Court of
Appeal cannot be faulted in concluding that the limits of a Terry-stop had
been exceeded.). Certainly we owe no such deference to the Florida
court's conclusion. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 51fr-516
(1963) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 181 (1953)); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385--386 (1927).
7
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scope of such a "seizure." In Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S.
143 (1972), we upheld both a search and seizure of a pistol
being carried by a suspect seated in a parked automobile. In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976), we
allowed government officials to stop, and divert for visual inspection and questioning, automobiles which were suspected
of harboring illegal aliens. These stops, including waiting
time, could clearly have approximated in length the time
which Royer was detained, and yet Martinez-Fuerte allowed
them to be made "in the absense of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints." 428 U. S., at 562
(emphasis supplied). Unless we are to say that commercial
drug trafficking is somehow quantitatively less weighty on
the Fourth Amendment scale than trafficking in the illegal
aliens, I think the articulable suspicion which concededly focused upon Royer justified the length and nature of his
detention. 8
The reasonableness of the officers' activity in this case did
not depend on Royer's consent to the investigation. Nevertheless, the presence of consent further justifies the action
taken. The plurality does not seem to dispute that Royer
consented to go to the room in the first instance. Certainly
that conclusion is warranted by the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 227
(1973). The facts are similar to those addressed in United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), where a majority
of the Court determined that consent to accompany police officers had been voluntary. Royer was not told that he had to
go to the room, but was simply asked, after a brief period of
8
The detention of Royer would also pass muster under this Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence if the officers had "a reasonable ground
for belief of guilt" prior to their adjournment to the room. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175 (1949). But since the officers clearly had
an articulate suspicion to justify the detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), the probable cause issue need not be decided in this case.
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questioning, if he would accompany the detectives to the
room. Royer was informed as to why the officers wished to
question him further. There were neither threats nor any
show of force. Detectives Johnson and Magdelena were not
in uniform and did not display weapons. The detectives did
not touch Royer and made no demands. In fact, Royer admits that the detectives were quite polite. 9
The plurality concludes that somewhere between the beginning of the 40 foot journey and the resumption of conversation in the room the investigation became so intrusive
that Royer's consent "evaporated" leaving him "[a]s a practical matter ... under arrest." Ante, at 11. But if Royer
was legally approached in the first instance and consented to
accompany the detectives to the room, it does not follow that
his consent went up in smoke and he was "arrested" upon entering the room. As we made clear in Mendenhall, logical
analysis would focus on whether the environment in the room
rendered the subsequent consent to a search of the luggage
involuntary.
As we said in Mendenhall, "the fact that she was [in the
room] is little or no evidence that she was in any way coerced." 446 U. S., at 559. Other than the size of the room,
described as "a large storage closet," 10 there is nothing in the
9
Contrary to the Florida court's view, this phase of the encounter contrasts sharply with the circumstances we examined in Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979). In that case, police officers deliberately
sought out the suspect at a neighbor's house and, with a show of force,
brought the suspect to police headquarters in a police car, placed him in an
interrogation room, and questioned him extensively after giving him a
Miranda warning. Unlike in Dunaway, Royer, after brief questioning,
was asked to cooperate by accompanying the officers to a room no more
than 40 feet away, so that the questioning could proceed out of the view of
the general public.
10
The characterization of the room as a "closet" is quite misleading.
The room contained one desk and two chairs. It was large enough to allow
three persons to enter with two heavy suitcases. It also is relevant that it
was the Flordia court, not Royer, who focused on the size of the room.
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record which would indicate that Royer's resistance was
overborne by anything about the room. Royer, who was in
his fourth year of study at Ithaca College at the time and has
since graduated with a degree in communications, simply
continued to cooperate with the detectives as he had from the
beginning of the encounter. Absent any evidence of objective indicia of coercion, and even absent any claim of such indicia by Royer, the size of the room itself does not transform
a voluntary consent to search into a coerced consent.
For any of these several reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Florida District Court of Appeal.

Royer appealed his conviction arguing that his consent to a search was
invalid as a matter of law because he was not informed that he could refuse
consent. A panel of the Florida court properly rejected this contention
relying on Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 234 (1973), were we
said that "proof of knowledge of a right to refuse [is not] the sine qua non
of an effective consent to a search." In was during rehearing by the court
en bane that the conviction was reversed with the court finding that when
Royer was taken into the private room he was in effect placed under
arrest.
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The plurality opinion today has discussed helpfully the principles applicable to investigative stops for questioning.

Since I

was the author of one of the opinions in Mendenhall, id., at 560,
I write briefly to repeat that the public has a compelling interest in identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in illicit drugs for personal profit.
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1 As the plurality notes, ante, at 12, n. 9, five Justices in
Mendenhall were of the view that the respondent in that case had
not been illegally detained, and therefore that she had consented
to be searched.
2 since 1974

the Drug Enforcement Administration has assigned

highly skilled agents to the major airports as part of a nationwide program to intercept drug couriers. These agents are guided
in part by a "drug courier profile" that identifies characteristics that experience has shown to be relevant in identifying suspects.
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agree with the plurality that as a practical matter he then was
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the plurality opinion. This is an airport "stop for
questioning" case similar in its general setting to that before
us in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). 1
The plurality opinion today has discussed helpfully the principles applicable to investigative stops for questioning. Since
I was the author of one of the opinions in Mendenhall, id., at
560, I write briefly to repeat that the public has a compelling
interest in identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in
illicit drugs for personal profit. As the plurality opinion emphasizes, ante, at 15, the facts and circumstances of investigative stops necessarily vary. In view of the extent to
which air transportation is used in the drug traffic, the fact
that the stop at issue is made by trained officers in an airport
warrants special consideration. 2
This case, however, is strikingly different from Mendenhall in its circumstances following the lawful initial questionAs the plurality notes, ante, at 12, n. 9, five Justices in Mendenhall
were of the view that the respondent in that case had not been illegally
detained, and therefore that she had consented to be searched.
2
Since 1974 the Drug Enforcement Administration has assigned highly
skilled agents to the major airports as part of a nationwide program to intercept drug couriers. These agents are guided in part by a "drug courier
profile" that identifies characteristics that experience has shown to be relevant in identifying suspects. See Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 562.
1
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ing and request that Royer accompany the officers to a more
private place. He then found himself in a small, windowless
room-described as a "large closet"-alone with two officers
who, without his consent, already had obtained possession of
his checked luggage. In addition, they had retained his driver's license and airline ticket. Neither the evidence in this
case nor common sense suggests that Royer was free to walk
away. I agree with the plurality that as a practical matter
he then was under arrest, and his surrender of the luggage
key to the officers cannot be viewed as conse;tual.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the plurality opinion. This is an airport "stop for
questioning" case similar in its general setting to that before
us in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980). 1
The plurality opinion today has discussed helpfully the principles applicable to investigative stops for questioning. Since
I was the author of one of the opinions in Mendenhall, id., at
560, I write briefly to repeat that the public has a compelling
interest in identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in
illicit drugs for personal profit. As the plurality opinion
emphasizes, ante, at 15, the facts and circumstances of investigative stops necessarily vary. In view of the extent to
which air transportation is used in the drug traffic, the fact
that the stop at issue is made by trained officers in an airport
warrants special consideration. 2
This case, however, differs strikingly from Mendenhall in
the circumstances following the lawful initial questioning and
'As the plurality notes, ante, at 12, n. 9, five Justices in Mendenhall
were of the view that the respondent in that case had not been illegally
detained, and therefore that she had consented to be searched.
2
Since 1974 the Drug Enforcement Administration has assigned highly
skilled agents to the major airports as part of a nationwide program to intercept drug couriers. These agents are guided in part by a "drug courier
profile" that identifies characteristics that experience has shown to be relevant in identifying suspects. See Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 562.
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the request that the suspect accompany the :-(}fficers to a more
private place. Royer then found himself in a small, windowless room-described as a "large closet"-alone with two officers who, without his consent, already had obtained possession of his checked luggage. In addition, they had retained
his driver's license and airline ticket. Neither the evidence
in this case nor common sense suggests that Royer was free
to walk away. I agree with the plurality that as a practical
matter he then was under arrest, and his surrender of the
luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as consensual.
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